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Abstract
This dissertation is motivated by a desire to better understand the causes and consequences of
geographic inequality in the US today. Using the models and methods from urban, real estate, and public
economics, I study how housing, land use, and place-based policies interact to mitigate or exacerbate
existing economic disparities. Ultimately, I hope to highlight that acknowledging and appreciating
historical linkages between race, place, and local economic conditions is critical for conducting urban
economic analysis. In my first chapter, I propose and examine a new causal channel behind the rise of
housing supply restrictions: loss of control over local public finance. Exploiting California's mid-1970s
landmark school finance equalization as a natural experiment, I show school districts with larger
exclusionary motives--those that benefited most from local control of education funding--enacted more
stringent land use controls, built less housing, and experienced greater house price appreciation after
losing local fiscal autonomy. These findings have implications for the unintended effects of fiscal
federalism on the housing market, namely that fiscal policy affects new development in the short run and
the urban form in the long run. In the second chapter, I document the incidence and estimate the
economic impacts of institutionalized historical mortgage lending discrimination, or Redlining. Using
recently digitized maps, I document that neighborhoods with Black residents were disproportionately
assigned the most restrictive credit rating. Comparing credit-restricted "redlined" census tracts to
adjacent tracts, I estimate redlining was associated with large differential declines in housing supply and
population density. After discriminatory lending was outlawed during the mid-1970s, there has been
moderate convergence in homeownership rates and racial composition. However, housing supply and
population density remain persistently lower in formerly credit-restricted census tracts relative to their
credit-favored neighbors. These findings suggest true community reinvestment should involve not only
expanding credit access, but also new capital-intensive projects. My third chapter, co-authored with
Professor Joseph Gyourko, reports results from a new survey of local residential land use regulatory
regimes for nearly 2,500 primarily suburban communities across the United States. Comparing the data
to a previous survey (Gyourko, Saiz, Summers, 2008), we are able to observe how the local regulatory
environment has changed in over 800 communities. This represents the first consistent nationwide data
documenting changes in residential land use regulation at the local jurisdictional level. Finally, we discuss
how these changes can and should broaden the research questions for housing and urban economists
investigating the local residential land use environment.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN URBAN AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Jacob Krimmel
Fernando Ferreira
This dissertation is motivated by a desire to better understand the causes and consequences
of geographic inequality in the US today. Using the models and methods from urban,
real estate, and public economics, I study how housing, land use, and place-based policies
interact to mitigate or exacerbate existing economic disparities. Ultimately, I hope to
highlight that acknowledging and appreciating historical linkages between race, place, and
local economic conditions is critical for conducting urban economic analysis.
In my first chapter, I propose and examine a new causal channel behind the rise of housing
supply restrictions: loss of control over local public finance. Exploiting California’s mid1970s landmark school finance equalization as a natural experiment, I show school districts
with larger exclusionary motives–those that benefited most from local control of education funding–enacted more stringent land use controls, built less housing, and experienced
greater house price appreciation after losing local fiscal autonomy. These findings have
implications for the unintended effects of fiscal federalism on the housing market, namely
that fiscal policy affects new development in the short run and the urban form in the long
run.
In the second chapter, I document the incidence and estimate the economic impacts of
institutionalized historical mortgage lending discrimination, or Redlining. Using recently
digitized maps, I document that neighborhoods with Black residents were disproportionately
assigned the most restrictive credit rating. Comparing credit-restricted "redlined" census
tracts to adjacent tracts, I estimate redlining was associated with large differential declines
in housing supply and population density. After discriminatory lending was outlawed during

v

the mid-1970s, there has been moderate convergence in homeownership rates and racial
composition. However, housing supply and population density remain persistently lower
in formerly credit-restricted census tracts relative to their credit-favored neighbors. These
findings suggest true community reinvestment should involve not only expanding credit
access, but also new capital-intensive projects.
My third chapter, co-authored with Professor Joseph Gyourko, reports results from a new
survey of local residential land use regulatory regimes for nearly 2,500 primarily suburban
communities across the United States. Comparing the data to a previous survey (Gyourko,
Saiz, Summers, 2008), we are able to observe how the local regulatory environment has
changed in over 800 communities. This represents the first consistent nationwide data
documenting changes in residential land use regulation at the local jurisdictional level.
Finally, we discuss how these changes can and should broaden the research questions for
housing and urban economists investigating the local residential land use environment.
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CHAPTER 1 : Reclaiming Local Control:
School Finance Reforms and Housing Supply Restrictions
1.1. Introduction
Local regulations preventing new home construction are at the root of some of the most
urgent issues facing advanced economies today. These housing supply restrictions cause
housing shortages and affordability issues for metropolitan areas, exacerbate existing geographic inequality and racial segregation within cities, and reduce aggregate productivity
and growth at the macroeconomic level.1 Explicit supply regulation is not endemic to the
urban political economy either; unlike municipal zoning ordinances which first appeared in
the US in the early 20th century, housing supply controls came to prominence only in the
1970s.2 Though supply restrictions are a relatively new phenomenon, they have become
widespread in the last 40 years.
Unlike their consequences, the causes of restrictive housing supply policies and their rise over
time are not well established. From a theoretical standpoint, endogeneity between supply
controls, house prices, and household sorting confound the aims of supply restrictions.
Empirically, a dearth of natural experiments to address the endogeneity plus the lack of
longitudinal regulation data has prevented researchers from identifying local governments’
motivations for limiting new housing.
In this paper, I propose and test a new causal channel behind the widespread adoption of
housing supply restrictions: the loss of local control over property taxation. This erosion of
local autonomy isolates localities’ desire to maintain quality public goods as a particular motive for enacting supply restrictions. I first show in a model that without the ability to price
1

On housing shortages and affordability issues, see for example Glaeser and Gyourko (2003, 2018), Turner
et al. (2014) on the local welfare consequences. On geographic inequality and segregation, see for example
Trounstine (2018, 2020), Shertzer et al. (2016, 2018, 2021). On macroeconomic effects, see for example
Hsieh and Moretti (2019); Duranton and Puga (2019)
2
In California, the most supply-constrained state today (Gyourko et al. (2008); Gyourko et al. (2021)), just
5 percent of its local municipal governments had adopted a supply restriction by 1970. This rate increased
nearly five-fold to 24 percent by the end of the 1970s and more than doubled again to 58 percent by 1990
(see Figure A.2.1).

1

a congestible local public good like education, localities turn to coarser quantity controls
(housing supply restrictions) to prevent overcrowding and attract high-wealth households.
I then test the empirical relevance of this channel by exploiting California’s mid-1970s landmark school finance equalization as a natural experiment. Leveraging new panel data on
regulation and housing outcomes, I overcome the typical measurement and identification
challenges and show that high-spending localities benefiting most from decentralized school
finance are more likely to enact stringent housing supply controls in response to losing local
control.
Drawing on seminal local public finance literature (Tiebout (1956); Hamilton (1975); Ellickson (1971)), my model illustrates why communities might adopt stringent land use policies
in response to losing funding authority over a valuable public amenity like education. In a
system with local control, local governments rely on both fiscal and land use policy to provide quality public goods. These policy levers jointly impact local revenues and the size or
density of the jurisdiction. Since education is a congestible local public good, for a fixed per
capita funding level, quality declines as the population increases (Wildasin (1987)).3 Fiscal
policy (property tax rates) directly impacts local revenues, while indirectly affecting enrollments (through its function as the price of education). Conversely, land use policy (housing
supply restrictions) directly impacts density and enrollments, while indirectly affecting local
revenues (through their effect on house prices).
Without fiscal autonomy, however, localities lose not only the ability to improve public
good quality through additional tax revenue, but also the market-like benefit of screening
households by flexibly setting entry fees. Unable to increase revenues, the quantity and
characteristics of students and neighbors becomes more salient to incumbent residents.
Revenue constrained districts therefore reclaim local control over school quality by adopting
housing supply restrictions. These regulations function as brute force quantity controls while
3

In other words, additional resources on a per capita basis are required if one is to expand the population
(number of students) provided education in a given jurisdiction while keeping the quality of education
constant (Wildasin, 1987 p. 1135)

2

indirectly affecting access fees, as supply restrictions increase house prices.4 The resulting
price increases may have racially exclusionary effects, as minority households historically
tend to have considerably less wealth than white households.5
To explore this mechanism empirically, I exploit California’s 1973 school finance equalization
reform as a natural experiment. Before the reform, localities simultaneously set education
funding, property tax rates, and land use policy. Under the reform, all school districts
lost fiscal autonomy over education spending and property tax rates. To equalize funding
across school districts, California’s state government set annual per-pupil revenue limits
for each district, preventing jurisdictions from choosing their desired level of education
spending. The reform adjusted these limits in a progressive fashion over time, such that
funding for wealthy districts was constrained as poorer districts caught up (Sonstelie et al,
2000). In order to cross-subsidize poorer districts, wealthier districts essentially had their
funding levels frozen in place in real terms. The reform was intended to enhance equity, but
the lack of flexibility over education financing created an incentive for previously high-tax,
property-rich districts to prevent new families from moving in.
In practice, the school finance equalization introduced exogenous temporal variation in local control over education revenues and cross-sectional variation in terms of which districts
were most helped or hurt by the policy change. This allows me to test whether localities
enacted housing supply controls in response to losing autonomy over local public good financing. Using both administrative and survey data, I create a novel school district level
panel dataset linking local fiscal data, municipal housing supply regulations, and housing
and demographic characteristics. I merge newly-digitized district fiscal policy records with
hand-collected revenue equalization schedules to determine which school districts were con4

This is theoretically consistent and analogous to the “ticket” price of Banzhaf and Mangum (2019)
two-part tariff model for how local amenities are capitalized into house prices. They find that most
variation in house prices across neighborhoods can be explained by the access fee household pay to enter a
neighborhood and consume local public services; moreover, “ticket prices” or access fees increase sharply as
land use regulations become more stringent.
5
Urban Institute calculations from Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers 1962 (December 31),
Survey of Changes in Family Finances 1963, and Survey of Consumer Finances 1983-2016.
https://apps.urban.org/features/wealth-inequality-charts/

3

strained by the school finance reform. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I then
compare constrained versus unconstrained districts before and after the equalization reform on housing market and sorting outcomes, including housing supply restrictions, new
construction, house prices, and racial composition.
I find that school districts with larger exclusionary motives – those constrained by the
reform’s revenue limits–enacted more housing supply restrictions and built fewer new homes
in the short run. Fiscally constrained locales were differentially 66 percent (5.8 ppt) more
likely to adopt a supply restriction in the five years following the implementation of the
1973 school finance reform.6 These districts also constructed about 1% fewer housing units
per year (as a share of pre-period stock) over this same time frame. These two results
suggest the loss of local control over education funding prompted wealthier localities to use
quantity controls in order to maintain higher quality schools.
In a heterogeneity analysis, I find the effect sizes on supply constraints are even larger for
higher-income and highly-educated localities. These types of school districts were perhaps
motivated both by the fear of overcrowding and by the desire to maintain wealthier, more
highly educated neighborhoods. Importantly, the results on housing show no evidence of
pre-trends and are robust to the exclusion of major coastal metro areas known for their
natural amenities and high land values. The results and trends are specifically due to
localities’ pre-reform reliance on fiscal policy, rather than the natural correlation between
property values and school spending. In a placebo test, I show there is no relationship
between a jurisdiction’s pre-reform assessed property value per-pupil and its likelihood of
adopting a land use control after the reform.
As a result of the adoption of the supply restrictions, the wealthier, fiscally constrained
school districts also became more socioeconomically and racially exclusive. In the short run
(5 years), house prices in constrained districts increased 7 percent relative to unconstrained
6

All main results are in the short run (5 years, 1973-1978). These short-run effects precede the passage of
Proposition 13, a major property tax limitation, which only further constrained local autonomy over
taxation and school funding. See section 3.2 for a further discussion of Proposition 13.
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districts. Consistent with the house price increases (given correlations between race and
wealth/income), Black and Hispanic population share differentially fell 17 percent (3.5 ppts)
in constrained districts following the reform.
The loss of local control over public good financing significantly changed the supply side
of the housing market in the short run. I also find suggestive evidence for long run consequences. In the 20 years following the school finance equalization, wealthier, fiscallyconstrained districts continued to adopt additional housing supply restrictions. Differential
changes in house prices and racial composition persisted and even further widened, an
indication of the lingering effects of restrictive land use controls.
This is the first paper to my knowledge to quasi-experimentally identify a source of a
statewide increase in land use regulations over time. The temporal and cross-sectional
variation generated by the school finance reform exactly match the initial rise of land use
regulations in California both in terms of timing and geography. This new causal channel
can help explain the origins of restrictive land use policy in the most supply constrained
state today. By exploiting California’s school finance equalization, this paper also underscores that the system of local public finance is important for understanding not only the
theoretical relationship between local public good provision and land use controls, but also
the widespread empirical increase in housing supply regulations over time. In particular,
the centralization of school finance and the loss of local control over education revenue
magnified congestion and peer effect concerns. My findings highlight that fiscal federalism
and centralization in one market (education) has persistent unintended consequences on
another (housing) even for the same geographic area. Because of the durability of housing,
short-run changes to the supply side of the housing market – whether from new construction
or policies that prevent it – have long-run impacts on the city growth, house prices, and
residential sorting.
The central finding of this paper – that localities benefiting most from local control over
public education financing quickly adopted housing supply restrictions after losing fiscal
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autonomy – informs three distinct literatures at the intersection of urban, housing, and
public economics. First, a long literature in urban and housing economics is concerned
with identifying the empirical determinants of land use controls (Molotch (1976); Bogart
(1993); Evenson et al. (2003); Glaeser and Ward (2009); Shertzer et al. (2016)). Much of
the literature in urban and housing economics concludes incumbent residents (homeowners) adopt land use controls to maintain stable home values and preserve neighborhood
characteristics.7 My proposed causal channel is a refinement of these hypotheses, offering
a better-identified mechanism. Localities and homeowners in part maintain value through
the stability of quality local public goods. When a rivalrous public amenity like schools
faces an increased threat of congestion, localities react by restricting future housing supply.
Second, understanding the interactions between local public goods, fiscal policy, and land
use controls has been an important topic at the intersection of local public finance and
urban economics for almost fifty years (Mills (1975), Buchanan and Goetz (1972), Hamilton
(1975), White (1975)). Yet empirical research on these endogenous relationships is “virtually
non-existent” (Blöchliger et al. (2017)). This paper provides some of the first empirical
evidence on the effects public good revenues on land use controls (see also Lutz (2015) on
the connection between property taxes and new home construction).
Third, my empirical setting has implications for better understanding the full picture of fiscal federalism type policy interventions (Oates et al. (1972); Brunner and Sonstelie (2006);
Weingast (2009)). Work in this area is often concerned with efficiency gains or losses from
centralizing vs. decentralizing public good provision (Ellickson (1971), for example). Decentralized authority over public good provision produces wide variation in taxes and public
good quality, offering allocative efficiency gains (e.g. Ellickson (1971)) at the expense of
horizontal equity (Berne and Stiefel (1999). The resulting inequities, have prompted higher
levels of government to intervene using fiscal federalism (Oates et al. (1972); Oates (1999)).
Still, we cannot understand the full impacts of these interventions reforms without con7

see for example: Fischel (1987); ?); Glaeser et al. (2005); Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013); Ortalo-Magné
and Prat (2014); Bogart (1993); Hall and Yoder (2018)
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sidering that localities might react to losing autonomy over one policy lever by reclaiming
control using another. My findings highlight the potential for adverse unintended consequences of fiscal federalism interventions, particularly in the housing market. Finally, the
paper’s insights also relate to work on school finance reforms and their effect on house prices
(Hoxby & Kuziemko (2004); Lutz (2009); Bayer et al. (2020); Chakrabarti and Roy (2015).
The paper proceeds as follows: section 1.2 establishes a model connecting school finance
and housing supply restrictions; section 1.3 introduces the institutional setting and details
the school finance reform; section 1.4 describes the empirical design, including the data and
identification strategy; section 1.5 provides the results; and section 1.6 concludes.

1.2. Model of Local Land Use and School Finance
The purpose of this stylized model is to relate systems of school finance to local land use
policy. These systems may either be decentralized with local control its local education
budget and property property taxes, or centralized with state control over school funding. Compared to the decentralized case, land use becomes more restrictive (lower density)
under a centralized funding regime, where education revenue is equalized across locations.
This increase in housing supply restrictions is driven by wealthier localities, whose per-pupil
education revenue is constrained under the equalization relative to under local control.

1.2.1. Set Up
The model below combines elements of Ellickson (1971)’s theory on jurisdictional fragmentation and the benefits of fiscal decentralization with Diamond (2017)’s model of local
government public good quality and housing supply.

The set up of the stylized model is as follows:

Let there be a single metropolitan area M with two municipalities indexed by j = {1, 2}.
Municipalities’ objective is to maximize local public school quality denoted by Φj (one can
7

think of this being done by a representative median voter or by a municipal government).
The two municipalities are identical in geography and natural amenities.
School quality (Φj ) is a function of per-pupil spending (sj ). Under local school finance, sj
is determined by local property tax revenues; under centralized school finance, sj is set by
the state and its level is constant across municipalities. At this constant level, it will be
denoted as s.
Local public education is a congestible public good, meaning that as the number of consumers (students) increases, overall quality for all will marginally decrease. This congestion
externality can be offset by increases in per-pupil spending or by reductions in the number
of students. In economic terms, local public education is non-rivalrous only up to a point.
Examples of congestion could be larger class sizes, which lower the quality of education for
all (on average). At some point, the municipality may have to build an additional school
because of overcrowding, so the costs of congestion are both non-pecuniary and pecuniary.
Importantly, because of the congestibility, school quality also depends on the number of students, or equivalently the density of homes in the municipality. Following Ellickson (1971),
congestion enters through the municipality’s budget constraint. The cost of providing public education services of quality Φ(s) to a population N is sN . The municipality’s total
revenue is then τ rD, where τ is the property tax rate, r is the price of housing, and D is
the amount of residential land (identical for all municipalities). Formally then, the total
budget constraint is sN = τ rD. In other words, the total cost of providing education of
quality Φ(s) to N students is equal to the municipality’s total tax revenue τ rD.
In addition to setting fiscal policy (property tax rate τ ), municipalities also choose land use
policy. Let the land use policy parameter (γ) set the residential housing density requirement
for the municipality, where γ =

D
N.

Then the budget constraint can be re-written as s = τ rγ.

Land use parameter γ is equivalent to the number of acres per home, making it akin to a
minimum lot size requirement. Because γ sets the density requirement in the municipality,
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it in turn affects congestion and school quality. The price of housing r is given by the
following housing supply function: r = γN . House prices are therefore increasing in γ and
decreasing in density.8

Under the local finance regime, municipalities maximize (congestible) school quality by
choosing property tax rate (τ ) and housing supply regulation (γ)

max
τ,γ

Φ(s)
(1.1)

s.t. s = τ rγ

The metropolitan area also contains households, who are identical in preferences but heterogeneous in wealth (w = {H, L}). For simplicity, let half of the households be rich (high
wealth, w = H) and half poor (low wealth, w = L). Wealth is exogenously determined and
is essentially an endowment. There is no labor market in the model, so there are no firms
or commuting. In this way, the spatial distance between the two municipalities is irrelevant
and I assume households can move costlessly from one municipality to the other.
Household utility is given by:

Ui = wi − (1 + τj )rj + Φj
In words, utility for household of wealth type i is equal to the after tax price of housing in
municipality j plus the benefit of school quality in j.

In equilibrium, households are indifferent between locations, so
8

Also, all houses are identical and are owned by absentee landlords. As in Diamond (2017), houses are sold
at the marginal cost of production, then rented to households by the absentee landlords; house prices paid
are then the present discounted value of rents.
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Ui = wi − (1 + τj )rj + Φj = U
Households take the behavior of the municipalities as given and choose a place to live
weighing the quality of local schools against the after tax cost of living.9
The model evolves over two school finance regimes: decentralized (period 1) then centralized (period 2). These regimes occur sequentially such that municipalities’ and households’
decisions under the decentralized regime carry over into the initial state of the centralized
regime. However, the regime change is an exogenous shock not foreseen by municipalities
or households, so there are no dynamic elements other than the outcome of period 1 setting
the initial conditions for period 2.

1.2.2. Decentralized Regime: Local School Finance
Under local school finance, municipalities have two levers to provide quality public education
– set the cost of access: (1) fiscal policy (τ ), which determines property tax revenues
collected (τ r); and (2) land use policy (γ), controls density and population growth (N )
Figure 1.1 shows the equilibrium of local public good quality and pricing under decentralized school finance. The diagonal line represents the municipal budget feasibility set where
quality (Φ) is equal to per-pupil tax revenue (τ r) scaled by the density control parameter
(γ). The slope of the feasibility set then depends on γ. In the simplest case as shown,
both municipalities choose the same density control parameter (γ = 1). Each municipality
then faces the same feasibility set and quality is exactly equal to the per-pupil tax revenue
raised (Φ = τ r). The figure shows the result of perfect sorting by wealth along the budget
feasibility set. The blue and red dots represent the municipalities containing low wealth and
high wealth individuals, respectively. At a given γ, higher quality public schooling requires
higher revenues; the locality with high-wealth households raises more local revenue and thus
has higher-quality schools. This equilibrium is stable, as wealthy households’ utility gains
9

For simplicity, assume all households have exactly 1 school age child that must attend the local public
schools.
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from higher quality schools are exactly offset by the higher after-tax price of housing. Under the decentralized regime, municipality wealth, house prices, property taxes, and school
quality are collinear. In the general case with many municipalities and a continuum of
wealth levels, τ is pinned down by household demand. While raising τ will increase quality,
holding γ constant, it also increases the after-tax price of housing.

1.2.3. Centralized Regime: School Finance Equalization
In the second period, the state government exogenously imposes a funding equalization
reform, such that each municipality receives the same revenue per student (s) regardless
of the municipalities’ previous or current tax base. The equalization is represented by
the horizontal green bar in Figure 1.2. All else equal, school quality will converge across
municipalities in the long run at Φt=2
poor=rich (Figure 1.2, left panel). The equalization level
s acts as a binding revenue constraint for the wealthier municipality.
t=2
Faced with the prospect of a decline in quality from Φt=1
rich to Φpoor=rich due to the imposition

of a real revenue constraint, the wealthier municipality will choose to increase γ, thus
flattening its budget feasibility set. This will reduce congestion by reducing N in the long
run. As shown in the right panel of Figure 1.2, increasing γ and flattening the budget set
allows the wealthier municipality to maintain its pre-reform quality level despite operating
with fewer real dollars per-pupil. The size of the γ increase depends on the degree to which
the municipality’s funding is constrained relative to its pre-reform optimum. Graphically,
that means it depends on the both the level of s and initial quality level Φt=1
rich .
This stylized example show the loss of flexibility over education pricing results in municipalities instead controlling the quantity margin. The policy instrument at their disposal
is of course housing supply restrictions. These restrictions function as brute force quantity
controls while indirectly affecting access fees, as supply restrictions increase house prices.
The implications of the model are as follows: (1) changes in γ and N depend on district’s pre-reform spending relative to s (i.e. whether district is constrained by reform); (2)
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constrained districts will increase γ; (3) constrained districts will decrease N (new construction). As a result, the additional empirical predictions to be tested are: (1) house prices
will differentially increase in constrained districts; and (2) Constrained districts will have a
lower minority population share due to the pre-existing correlation racial wealth gap.
The goal of the research design of this paper (Section 1.4) is to determine the empirical
threshold above which localities are revenue constrained by the policy change (i.e. the
empirical analogue of s). With this threshold in hand, the empirical section (Section 1.5)
then tests the implications of the model–namely that land use controls will increase under
centralization and differentially so among constrained localities.

1.3. Background
1.3.1. California School Finance Under Local Control
Prior to the 1970s, California’s schools–like most across the US–were financed primarily
by local property taxes.10 In the final years of this decentralized system, the pairwise
correlation between per-pupil property tax revenues and overall per-pupil spending was
0.85. This relationship was driven primarily by heterogeneity in assessed property values
rather than in property tax rates.11
The wide variation in property values across districts, coupled with a school finance regime
reliant on local funding, generated large disparities in per-pupil education funding across
school districts. Figure 1.3 documents the relationship between school district property
value, property taxes raised, and per-pupil base revenue.12 The left and right panels show
10

In 1967, the earliest year for which funding data are available at the school district level, local revenue
sources accounted for 60% of overall funding (Picus (1991) via NEA Estimates of School Statistics) By
1972, 64% of the median district’s total revenue came from local sources
11
For unified and elementary districts in 1972, the coefficient of variation of per-pupil assessed property
values was 1.19 (mean=$30,158; SD=$35,786) while the coefficient of variation of property tax rates was
0.38 (mean=2.99%; SD=1.13%).
12
Note that this is non-categorical per-pupil revenue. That is, it excludes additional funding districts receive
from the state or federal governments based on student characteristics, such as special needs students. I
exclude categorical aid here because districts have no control over these students’ characteristics and
because categorical aid was never factored into the eventual school finance equalization formula.
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this relationship for unified and elementary school districts, respectively.13
There are two important takeaways from this figure. First, both panels illustrate the strong
positive relationship between assessed property value (x axis) and property tax revenue
raised (solid blue line and blue scattered dots). The unconditional correlations between
these two are 0.85 for unified districts and 0.74 for elementary districts. This is true because of property values, not tax rates. In fact, there is a negative correlation (not shown)
between property tax rates and district property wealth. Second, the addition of some progressive state aid (red dotted line) does very little to break the overall relationship between
property wealth and education revenue: the correlation between property value and base
revenue (property tax revenue plus state aid) shrink to just 0.79 and 0.7, respectively. The
addition of state aid is only significant for the bottom quartile of the distribution. At the
median, state aid accounted for just 25% of base per-pupil revenue (about $200 per student
in nominal 1972 dollars).14

1.3.2. Serrano v. Priest and School Finance Reform
This inequitable funding arrangement led to a major lawsuit (Serrano v. Priest I 15 ) brought
by parents of children in low property wealth districts. In late 1971, California’s Supreme
Court ruled that the quality of public education may not be a function of district property
wealth, equating education quality to per-pupil revenue. The ruling stated that differences
in property wealth "must not lead to significant differences in district revenue" (Sonstelie
et al. (2000)).
The Courts struck down the system of local control, but left it to the legislature to design a
13

In California, each house (student) is either zoned to a unified school district (which operates and finances
both primary and secondary schools) or an elementary and a high school district. Multiple elementary
school districts feed into the same high school district, so high school districts’ financing information
contains property values from multiple elementary districts. Elementary and unified districts, therefore,
are the smallest levels of non-overlapping districts; together they cover the entire state. I drop high school
districts from all analysis in this paper in order to prevent double-counting the same properties that result
from the elementary-high school district overlap. Importantly, doing so does not drop any geographic areas
or households; it only prevents double counting.
14
State aid formula calculated via Sonstelie et al. (2000) and sources cited therein
15
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584; 487 P.2d 1241; 96 Cal. Rptr. 601; hereafter Serrano I.
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new system of school finance with more state involvement. In 1972 and 1973, the California
legislature passed major funding reforms to begin in the 1973-1974 school year with the
aim of equalizing per-pupil funding across school districts by de-coupling local property
tax revenue form local education spending.16 To achieve this, the equalization reform
established for each school district an annual “revenue limit” per-pupil and introduced
a progressive growth schedule such that these “revenue limits” would equalize over time.
Revenues in property-poor, low-spending districts would increase over time while funding for
property-rich, high-spending districts would be constrained by the state-imposed revenue
limits. Revenue limits were determined by the state according to a district’s pre-reform
funding under local control. A full description of this process and its results can be found
in the Empirical Design section.
Furthermore, school districts lost autonomy over setting property tax rates under the reform. If a district’s tax base exceeded its revenue limit (i.e. if its per-pupil assessed property
value increased faster than its scheduled per-pupil revenue growth), property tax rates would
be reduced such that the district could not raise more local revenue than its limit. This
mechanism ensured two things: (1) revenue limits would bind; and (2) districts could not
use property taxes to screen out potential new residents.17
As a result of state intervention, per-pupil revenues began to equalize over time. Figure 1.4
16
17

SB 90 and AB 1267. For details see Sonstelie et al. (2000); Elmore and McLaughlin (1981); Picus (1991).
The reforms did allow districts to vote to override their revenue limit by majority vote. The practice was
rare, however. Using data on overrides, I find this occurred in less than 5% of districts. Additionally, all
analysis is done with revenue limit overrides, so any estimates are an upper bound. For wealthier school
districts, the impacts of the reform were twofold: first, the spending caps and lower scheduled growth rates
substantially decreased per pupil funding (in real terms); second, requiring households pay property taxes
to fund schools according to the state-determined formula made the current property tax system politically
untenable (Fischel (1989)). On the second point, breaking the link between property taxes and education
spending put downward pressure on property tax rates. As a result, there was a massive tax revolt in
California in 1978; a statewide ballot initiative was passed to limit property taxes to 1% of assessed value.
In turn, the state took control over the property tax system, and public education effectively became a
state-financed program. After Proposition 13, the share of education spending coming from state sources
jumped from around 40 percent to around 75 percent. Please note that this version of the paper will not
examine Proposition 13 and any corresponding effects on the housing market. The focus will be strictly
limited to the pre-prop 13 time period to show the causal effects of funding reforms on the housing and
land markets. Prop 13 will be incorporated in future versions of this paper, and I expect it will only
amplify the results and general thrust of my argument.
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below illustrates the change in per pupil revenue (relative to the top revenue quartile) before
and after the reforms by plotting difference-in-differences coefficients from the following
equation:

P erP upilRevenueit = β1 P reRef ormQuartilei × Y eart + SchDistricti + Y eart + it (1.2)

Prior to the reform, revenue for the bottom 3 quartiles were falling relative to the top quartile (left side of graph). Then in the first 5 years after the introduction of revenue limits and
progressive growth rates, per-pupil revenues grew considerably for the bottom 3 quartiles
relative to the top. The relative increases were monotonic, as intended by the reforms’ progressive growth rates.18 Bottom quartile per-pupil revenues increased 23% between 1973
and 1978; second quartile increased 18%; and third quartile increased 11%.

While this figure shows the progressive nature of California’s school finance reform, it does
not reveal which school districts were helped or hurt by the reform or show to what extent
they were. The next section on Empirical Design uses new microdata on the reform to
make these district-level delineations and then relates these findings on constrained versus
unconstrained districts to the question of housing supply restrictions.
1.3.3. The Rise of Land Use Regulations in California
In addition to school finance, residential land use policy in California also underwent rapid
change in the 1970s. Locally adopted housing supply restrictions became mainstream, as
the share of California municipalities with a land use regulation went from just 5 percent
in the late 1960s to 24 percent by 1980. (See A.2.1 for the statewide trend over time.) The
figure below shows the geographic proliferation of such regulations, mapping the share of
municipalities in each county with a land use regulation for years 1967 (prior to the school
finance reform), 1973 (the year of the reform), and 1978 (5 years after the reform).19
18
19

This figure was inspired by Bayer et al. (2020)
The legend/color palettes are identical for each panel. Counties are shaded depending on whether a land
use regulation is present in >5%, 5-15%, 15-25%, or >25% of its municipalities. Data are from Jackson
(2016). See section 1.4.1 and references therein for a full description
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Several patterns emerge. First, the increase over time is obvious and especially pronounced
between 1973 and 1978 (the second and third panels). This timing lines up with the 5
years following the implementation of the school finance reform (1.4 above). Second, visual
inspection confirms there was very little change in the prevalence of regulations prior to the
onset of the school finance reform. The aggregate data series (Figure A.2.1) shows little
movement between 1967 and 1973, and only a few counties show increases between those
two years (the left and middle maps of 3.1). This descriptive evidence suggests there are
not geographically concentrated pre-trends prior to the school finance reform. Third, the
patterns do not tell a particularly clear geographic story. Despite the fact that housing
supply constraints today are especially prominent in large coastal cities, these maps show
that, at least initially, the San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego metro areas were
neither early adopters of land use regulations nor disproportionately likely to have them
compared to other regions. By 1978, supply constraints are somewhat prominent in counties
in all regions of California. The phenomenon is not limited to coastal counties or major
metro areas. San Bernardino County, for example, has about the same share of cities with a
regulation as Sonoma County. However, the increases between 1973 and 1978 are especially
pronounced in the Bay Area.
These maps show the regional patterns of local regulatory policy over time. But they do
not shed light on the local drivers of land use regulations or their association with school
finance. The following section examines the connections between school finance and housing
supply restrictions at the local level. The rest of the paper explores how localities whose
funding was constrained by the school finance equalization discussed in Section 1.3.2 were
more likely to adopt restrictive land use controls to limit the supply of new housing, reduce
the potential for congested schools and neighborhoods, and attract wealthier, more highly
educated households.
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1.4. Empirical Design
The goal of the empirical section is to understand how the loss of local fiscal autonomy
differentially affected certain districts, and to determine whether this differential impact
had spillover effects onto local housing supply policy. How did the new regime of school
finance impact district revenues? Which districts were constrained by the state-imposed
revenue limits? What would they have spent absent the reforms? This section uses prereform school finance data combined with new school district level administrative data on
the revenue limits to determine an empirical threshold above which districts were financially
constrained by the reform. In other words, I determine which districts were hurt most by
the funding centralization. These districts benefited most under local control and were
therefore more likely to adopt restrictive housing supply policies after losing the ability to
impact their own revenues.

1.4.1. Data
Estimating how the overhaul of California’s school finance system impacted local housing
supply and land use policy requires data from several disparate sources. In short, I link
school district level data from the Census of Governments and the California Department
of Education to decennial US census data on district housing and demographics. After
creating a crosswalk to match school districts to their municipality (or municipalities), I
then merge on city-level data on land use regulation over time. The master dataset contains
information on: (1) the finances and funding sources of California’s school districts before
and after the funding reforms; (2) the mechanics of the reforms, including the statutory
education revenue limits placed on each school district over time and the associated changes
in property tax rates; (3) historical housing stock and demographic variables at the school
district level; (4) land use policies enacted at the municipality level over time.
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Housing Data
Data on municipal land use regulations over time come from Jackson (2016), who combined
responses from two surveys of California land use officials in 1989 (Glickfield and Levine
(1991); Levine (1999)).20 The data contain 18 dummy variables indicating whether certain
land use regulations were adopted by each municipality at the time of the survey. The
types of regulations include: direct population/housing supply controls, zoning regulations,
political controls, growth management plans, and commercial/industrial limitations.21 The
surveys used by Jackson also include year in which each regulation was adopted, which
allows for the creation of a balanced panel of regulations adopted by each jurisdiction, by
regulation type, from 1965 to 1995. In this paper, I do not distinguish between regulation
types; that is, the outcome variables in regressions and figures will either be an extensive
margin measure of whether the municipality adopted any land use regulation or the intensive
margin measure of the number of regulations adopted at a given year.
I use decennial US census data for housing and demographic data at the school district
level. Specifically, I use the 1970 Fourth and Fifth Count Data for School Districts, the
1980 Census of School Districts, and the 1990 School District Data Book.22 Merging these
three survey waves together yields a decennial panel of district demographic data including information on population, income, race, house value, and housing stock, and year of
construction. I use the year of home construction variable to impute each school district’s
housing stock in intercensal years. The census typically asks whether the respondent house20

I am very grateful to Kristoffer (Kip) Jackson for generously sharing his data.
For a full list of the land use restrictions measured and for a more thorough treatment of the dataset, see
Jackson (2016).
22
United States. Bureau of the Census. Census of Population and Housing [United States], 1970:
Fifth-Count Tallies: Sample Data for School Districts . [distributor], 2003-01-02.
https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03524.v1
United States Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. User’s Manual for 1970
Census Fourth Count (Population): School District Data Tape . [distributor], 2004-05-28.
https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03525.v1
United States. Bureau of the Census. Census of School Districts, 1980: [United States] . Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2003-05-09.
https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR02537.v1
United States Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. School District Data
Book (SDDB), 1990: [United States]. [distributor], 2006-10-27. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR02953.v2
21
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hold’s housing unit was built in the last two years, the last six years, the last ten years,
etc. Using these questions for the 1980 census, for example, I can impute a school district’s
housing stock for 1978 and 1974; I then use the 1970 census for the 1970 housing unit count
and continue to impute backwards in time into the 1960s. In total, I have snapshots of each
district’s housing stock for years: 1960, 1964, 1967, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1990.

Education Data
Data on school district finances comes from both survey and administrative data sources.
The Census of Governments’ (COG) School District Finance Data contains historical revenue, expenditure, and enrollment data for all school districts nationwide from FY1967
through 1991 (note that FY 1967 is the 1966-1967 school year, and so on).23 I use the COG
data for measures of district’s total revenue, revenue raised by local property taxes, by
other local sources, and revenue from intergovernmental transfers. Between 1967 and 1980,
the COG conducted a full census of districts only in years ending in 2 and 7. For all noncensus years, about a third of districts were sampled. The rotating sample in non-census
years means I do not have a balanced panel on revenue data. Fortunately, my identification
strategy relies only on knowing a district’s pre-reform revenue levels and sources (which I
do know for the full sample of districts in 1972). Additionally, administrative data from the
State of California allows me to create a fully balanced panel for revenue and enrollment
data.
For years 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1976, I digitized and hand-collected California Controller’s
Office data on districts’ assessed property values, property tax rates, and average daily
attendance.24 I also hand-collect school districts’ statutory revenue limits, property tax
rates, assessed property values, and attendances for years 1974 through 1977 by digitizing
archival data from the California Department of Education.25
23

https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/data/historical-data.html
California State Controller, Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning School Districts of
California, Sacramento, California, various years.
25
California State Department of Education, A Compilation of School District 1975-76 Revenue Limits
24
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After merging the COG-Census linked data with the administrative finance data, I am
fully able to illustrate each step of the school finance reform (see Sonstelie et al. (2000);
Picus (1991); Elmore and McLaughlin (1981) for more details). Starting with the top left
panel Figure 1.6, the reforms set a more generous state noncategorical aid (that is, the a
per-pupil transfer given to all students regardless of student characteristics) formula, where
districts with lower than average per-student property wealth would receive additional lump
sum revenue. Next, the reforms created “revenue limits” based on a district’s pre-reform
“base revenue,” which is the sum of its per-student property tax revenue and its state
noncategorical aid. Figure 1.6’s top right panel shows a binned scatter of the revenue limits
for 1975 as a function of districts’ pre-reform base revenue.26 A district’s 1972 base revenue
(via COG data) nearly perfectly predicts its 1975 revenue limit (via CA Controller data).
To sum up, the top two panels show that given a district’s pre-reform 1972 base revenue
(property tax revenue + non-categorical state aid), one can map not only the district’s 1975
revenue limit, but its future revenue growth path as given by the state scheduled increases
(see below).
The bottom two panels show the progressive increases in state-mandated revenue limits
from 1975 to 1976 (left in blue) and from 1976 to 1977 (right in red). Each dot represents a
district and the lines are lowess estimated fits. While there is some variation around the regression estimated lines, the pictures tell a simple story: initially low base revenue districts
would see their revenue limits rise year over year at a much higher rate than initially wealthier districts. For example, future revenue would rise 8 percent per year for districts with
a $1,000 per pupil revenue limit in 1975 compared to 3 percent per year for districts with
an initial limit of $2,000 per pupil. If this were to continue, the initial $1,000 funding gap
Computed Pursuant to Senate Bill 90 and Assembly Bill 1267 by County Superintendents of Schools,
Sacramento, California, 1976 (and other years).
26
The 1974-1975 school year is the first time revenue limits were implemented. The 1973-1974 school year
was the first post-reform year as far as the passing of legislation, but the state was still gathering data
during time and was thus unable to formally implement revenue limits. See note in California State
Department of Education, A Compilation of School District 1975-76 Revenue Limits Computed Pursuant
to Senate Bill 90 and Assembly Bill 1267 by County Superintendents of Schools, Sacramento, California,
1976. Note to include this in full in next draft.
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between these two districts would be halved in 10 years and completely disappear within 15.

1.4.2. Identification Strategy
Typically in the US, and as was the case prior to California’s school finance reform, local
governments make joint decisions over education quality (raising local property tax revenues
by choosing property tax rates) and urban growth (permitting new construction by setting
land use and zoning policy). Because each of these choices may be made with the other in
mind, simultaneity bias and reverse causality are major threats to identifying causal effects
of local public good financing on land use and housing supply. Exploiting California’s SFR
sidesteps these classical endogeneity concerns since localities lose fiscal control under the
new school finance regime. Conditional on pre-reform property wealth and tax rates, postreform education revenue is determined completely by a centralized formula. But while
the adoption of the reform offers temporal variation over which to examine the effect of
local fiscal control on land use and housing, this alone is insufficient for identifying the
mechanisms at play.
The policy change dictates that all localities lost autonomy over school spending and property tax rates at the same time, but the loss of control was accompanied by real funding
increases for some districts and funding decreases for others. My identification strategy
leverages this cross-sectional variation as well. The key then to estimating the differential
effects according to district education funding is to find a natural and transparent measure
for districts most-impacted by the loss of local control over their finances. It is not just the
loss of local control over revenues that matters for housing supply outcomes, but also the
districts’ inability to re-optimize when revenues decrease.
Identification therefore depends on determining which districts experienced a decrease in
revenue precisely due to the policy change. Empirically, I find that school districts at or
above the 75th percentile in terms of pre-reform per-pupil revenues were constrained by the
equalization reform, whereas districts below that threshold were unconstrained or beneficia-
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ries of centralization of school finance. Districts in the top quartile then are the treatment
group in my difference-in-differences specifications, with those below that threshold the
control observations.
I determine the 75th percentile as the empirical threshold in two ways. First, and most
simply, I calculate for each district its real per-pupil revenue before versus after the reform.
Specifically, I take a district’s 1972 base revenue (propert tax revenue + state non-categorical
aid, per pupil) and compare that to its revenue limit four years into the reform (in 1977).
The pre-reform base revenue is under the system of local control over financing, so it is
presumably at a district’s optimal funding level for that time. The post-reform revenue limit
is the statutory funding level dictated by the equalization reform (which is a function of the
same 1972 pre-reform funding levels). Figure 1.7 shows the real per-pupil revenue increases
between 1972 and 1977, by 1972 base revenue. The figure plots both a linear and a lowess
regression line fit to show the by-design negative relationship under funding equalization.
School districts at the 25th (50th) percentile saw on average a 20% (10%) increase in perpupil funding. Districts at or above the 75th percentile, however, experienced no real base
revenue increases in the four years after the reform. Below the 75th percentile threshold,
the reform increases district revenue; above it, revenue decreases. This is the first indication
of which districts’ funding was most constrained by the policy change.
Second, I conduct a stylized counterfactual exercise. Conceptually, districts "most-impacted"
are those whose per-pupil funding under the state-financing regime is most different from
what it would have been under pre-reform local financing. While this true counterfactual
is unknown, Figure 1.8 computes a stylized counterfactual for all districts using their prereform property tax rates, while letting their assessed property values evolve as they did
in reality. In effect, the difference between the red counterfactual lines and the blue revenue limit is the difference in per-pupil revenue due to losing autonomy over property tax
rates. Again, districts above the 75th percentile (gray dashed line) would have better-funded
schools under the local-financing counterfactual.
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The reforms had differential effects on wealthy versus poorer districts by design. Revenues
in poorer districts increased in large part due to progressive state aid. State subsidies meant
that residents of poorer districts got better funded schools without bearing the cost of high
property taxes. Meanwhile, wealthier districts’ revenues were constrained by the limits.

1.4.3. Estimation
Using the 75th percentile empirical threshold, I then assign each district to either the treatment (Funding ’Constrained’) or control (’Unconstrained’) group.27 To find the differential
impact of the policy change on constrained versus unconstrained school districts, I first
estimate the following non-generalized difference-in-differences equation:

yidmct = β1 Constrainedi × P ostt + β2 Constrainedi + β3 P ostt

(1.3)

+ Controls0i β + LatLongm + δc + ηd + idmct

where yidmct is an indicator for whether a land use regulation has ever been adopted in
district i of type d by municipality m in county c at time t; Constrained is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a district is in the top quartile of 1972 base revenue for its district
type (i.e. there are different quartile cut offs for elementary and unified districts). P ost
is a dummy variable for years after the reform (post-1973); Controls are: school district
assessed property value per pupil in 1972, housing units in 1960, enrollment in 1972, percent
Black in 1970, percent Hispanic in 1970, and median income in 1970; LatLongm are controls
for the municipality’s latitude and longitude; δc is a county fixed effect; and ηd is a district
type (unified or elementary) fixed effect; and idmct is the error term.
I estimate this equation over years 1966 through 1978 to understand the short run effects of
the funding reform on changes in housing supply restrictions.28 The coefficient of interest is
27

Note that I compute percentile cutoffs separate for the distributions of unified and elementary school
districts, but the 75th percentile threshold is the same.
28
Passed in 1978, ballot Proposition 13 took effect in the 1979 school year. As a result of Prop. 13’s property
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β1 , which is the difference-in-difference term for the differential likelihood of treated districts
to adopt a housing supply restriction after the reform.29
My preferred specification is a generalized difference-in-differences version of 1.3 above:

yidmct = β1 Constrainedi × P ostt +

(1.4)

αi + γt + δc + ηd + idmct

where α is now a district fixed effect and thus collinear with district controls and the treatment variable. The coefficient of interest is again β1 , which represents the differential effect
of moving from a local to state finance regime (P ost) for initially high base revenue school
districts (Constrained).

1.4.4. Identification: Assumptions and Threats
The identifying assumption of a difference-in-differences estimator is one of parallel trends:
absent the change in school funding policy, districts above and below the 75th percentile
revenue cut point would have continued on their pre-reform land use and housing supply
trends. In other words, had it not been for the reforms, pre-existing differences in housing
supply restrictions would have remained at the same level over time. One piece of suggestive
evidence for parallel trends is the absence of pre-trends, which can be verified in figure 9 and
tax limitation, there were state and local budget shortfalls, and the school finance system was reformed
once again (with equalization still a key policy goal). The property tax system was fully centralized by the
state, who enacted even more extreme funding equalization. This version of the paper will focus on
housing impacts prior to Proposition 13 to limit complications. Though I suspect incorporating Prop. 13
into the model and empirics will only amplify the results.
29
Estimating a land use regulation equation requires I overcome an important complication: regulations are
enacted by municipal governments, not school districts. These are different geographies, and while every
city will contain at least one school district, not every school district will be within or overlap with an
incorporated municipality with authority over land use. Using shapefiles from the 1990 census, as well as
matching districts to municipalities based on their listed city in the 1980 school district data book, I create
a two-way district to municipality crosswalk. I find there are 416 elementary and unified districts in
incorporated places, 377 of which (91%) match to exactly one city. Similarly, I find 411 cities incorporated
by 1973, the time of the reform; 362 (88%) match to exactly one school district. This yields 472
district-city pairs, which I then classify according to the district’s pre-reform revenue quartile.
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10. Prior to the policy change, there are no differential changes between the treatment and
control group in terms of likelihood of adopting a housing supply restriction or rates of new
construction. Treatment and control districts only diverged in their likelihood of enacting
supply restrictions after losing fiscal autonomy over local education financing. Additionally,
the policy change was truly unforeseen by school districts and local governments. Though
the Serrano v. Priest opinion was handed down 2 years before the funding reform was
enacted, the nature of the reforms mechanisms were not known or settled until enacted by
the state legislature. This was the first statewide school finance reform of its time as well, so
it is unlikely districts knew ex ante what to expect or how their budgets would be affected.
The precise timing of the measured effects is highly suggestive, but cannot on its own rule
out potential confounders. For example, there are several concurrent trends that could be
argued as alternative mechanisms explaining why high-wealth localities might have differentially begun adopting restrictive land use regulations in the mid-1970s. First, one hypothesis
is that the environmental movement was in part behind the adoption of growth controls (Fischel (2015)). It could be the case that localities with natural amenities attracted high-wealth
households, whose high property taxes funded schools. Then as environmental preservation gained momentum as a social movement, these high-wealth households petitioned local
governments to enact stringent land use controls to preserve nature. Under this hypothesis,
the timing with California’s school finance reform is only coincidental. However, all of my
specifications include geographic controls, including county fixed effects, longitude-latitude
coordinates, and district fixed effects (in the preferred specification). Thus, the treatment
effect is within-county and/or district, so point estimates are averaged across counties –
coastal and non-coastal, north and south. This makes the environmental confounder less
likely, as identifying variation comes not from geography, but from differences in pre-reform
per-pupil revenue, conditional on property wealth.
A second alternative mechanism is that demographic trends during this time, such as black
middle class suburbanization or Hispanic immigration into California, are actually behind
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the rise in land use restrictions. This is a narrative of racial/ethnic motivated exclusionary
zoning whereby wealthier white communities, feeling threatened by the prospect of more
integrated schools or neighborhoods, enacted land use restrictions. While certainly plausible, this is unlikely to confound my results due to the sharp timing of my policy change and
the use of county and year fixed effects. Demographic trends were evolving slowly over this
time period, so year fixed effects, plus the pre-post nature of the difference-in-differences
estimation show that timing of my results are coincident with the school finance reform
rather than decades-long trends like suburbanization or immigration.
A final set of identification concerns has to do with the effect of Proposition 13’s tax limitation on the supply side of the housing market and a localities’ likelihood of limiting
development. A tax limitation could certainly have effects on housing supply (Lutz (2015));
for this reason, my main results stop at 1978, the year Prop. 13 was passed by California
voters. Importantly though, my results show that housing supply restrictions, were increasing prior to the property tax limitation, particularly in localities with well-funded schools
and high property tax revenues.

1.5. Results
1.5.1. Housing Supply Restrictions
Table 1.1 presents the main difference-in-differences results for the effect of the loss of
local control on housing supply restrictions in reform-constrained school districts. Column
(1) shows the results of equation (1.3) without county fixed effects, while Column (2) adds
county fixed effects as in estimating equation. The difference-in-differences coefficient shows
that after the 1973 funding reforms were enacted, constrained school districts were 5.8
percentage points more likely to have any land use regulation relative to control districts.
Moving down the column, the post period (1974-1978) is associated with 7.4 percentage
point increase in likelihood of regulation. Interestingly, constrained districts were actually
4.2 percentage points less likely than unconstrained districts to have adopted a housing
supply restriction in general. This latter point, however, might be due to district-level
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unobservables, which are accounted for by adding district fixed effects in columns 2 and 3.
Column 3 includes district fixed effects and the point estimates are unchanged. The post
period is associated with an increase in regulations for all districts, on average, regardless
of pre-reform revenue. This is suggestive evidence that loss of fiscal autonomy in general
causes localities to restrict land use.
Column (4) presents the preferred generalized difference-in-differences specification (equation (1.4), adding year fixed effects to control for time trends that may have confounded
column 3. The point estimate remains unchanged. Note that just 11 percent of districts
had a land use control in 1973, the year of enactment. The 5.8 percentage point coefficient
suggests a 52% increase in likelihood of housing supply restriction in the post period among
revenue constrained school districts. The pre-period sample mean (1966 through 1973) is
8.8 percentage points, which implies a 66 % increase relative to entire pre-period.
Figure 1.9 below plots the annual event studies of the generalized difference in difference
from 1966 (the omitted base year) through 1978 (before the passage of Proposition 13).
In addition to showing no differential pre-trend, the Figure shows a statistically significant
(95% confidence intervals in bars) differential increase in the likelihood of adoption of a
land use regulation in high-revenue school districts after California’s SFR policy beginning
in 1975 through 1978. The point estimates are generally increasing over time as well, though
not statistically significant from one another. The point estimate in 1978 is 0.073; so relative to the pre-period sample average of 0.088, revenue constrained localities were about
83% more likely to have adopted a supply restriction 5 years after the reform relative to
the pre-reform average.

Robustness
A natural concern is that these main results are unique to or driven by particular geographic
areas. One could argue, for example, that expensive coastal metropolitan areas like San
Francisco and Los Angeles contain both elite school districts and–because of natural ameni-
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ties and pre-existing high land values–are more likely to enact housing supply restrictions.
By this logic, the timing of the school finance reform and its constraining effects on school
district revenues is merely coincident. Even though the main results include county fixed
effects, and thus exploit within-county identifying variation, it could be the case that a
handful of counties are driving the effects.
Table 1.2 below assuages this concern by excluding the San Francisco and Los Angeles
metropolitan areas from the sample.30 Within these two large coastal metros, the point
estimates on the difference-in-differences coefficient are nearly identical to those with the full
sample (0.60 vs. 0.58, respectively). Despite fewer observations, they remain statistically
significant at the 5% level. In Appendix Table A.1.1, I also drop the San Diego metro area.
The point estimates are just slightly smaller (0.47), but statistically indistinguishable from
the main results. The main results are not driven by major coastal metropolitan areas.
Taken together, these robustness exercises mean the proposed causal channel is not unique
to the high house price, high natural amenity cities that are especially supply constrained
today.
Another identification concern is that school districts or localities with higher property values will naturally be more likely to adopt land use controls in order to block new supply
from tempering price growth and changing the physical landscape as well. Under this argument, the reason localities adopt land use restrictions has nothing to do with local public
goods, property taxes, or fiscal constraints imposed by the school finance reform; the fact
that a district is constrained by the school finance reform is merely coincident, as property
values are highly correlated with pre-reform school spending. To rule out this competing
(or complementary) channel, I conduct a placebo test where treated localities are those in
the top quartile for assessed per-pupil property value, instead of those in the top quartile
of school spending. While these two measures are correlated, the difference is driven by
localities’ preferences for better funded schools vis a vis their pre-reform property tax rates.
30

Specifically, I drop the following counties: San Francisco, Marin, San Mateo, Alameda, Contra Costa, Los
Angeles, Orange.
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If the local public goods channel dominates the property value channel, we would expect
to see no change in local land use policy around the policy change. Indeed this is exactly
shown in Figure A.2.2.

Heterogeneity and Peer Effects
The previous sections have established that high education revenue localities (“Constrained”
districts) are differentially more likely to adopt housing supply restrictions upon losing
control over school funding. Theory established in Section 2 shows this is because districts
unable to adequately price a congestible local public good, like education, respond by using
direct quantity controls to prevent future overcrowding. In addition to the number of
students contributing to local congestion, constrained localities might also be especially
concerned about the characteristics of such students and their families.
Peer effects in education and neighborhood social networks are extremely powerful (Epple and Romano (2011); Sacerdote (2011); Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009)) and valuable to
households (Calabrese et al. (2006); Brasington and Haurin (2009)). High-achieving (lowachieving) students confer positive (negative) externalities to their peers; parents too might
gain (lose) from wealthier (poorer) social networks. Under local school finance (pre-reform),
districts set the price of access via property taxes to impact both the quantity of potential
entrants and the “quality” (i.e. income level) of district. Under the reform, losing the
ability to price education might therefore make peer effects even more salient, in addition
to exacerbating congestion concerns. One would then expect Constrained localities with
high income and/or highly educated families to be even more likely to enact restrictive land
use policies. Implicitly, this assumes elite school districts with wealthier, highly-educated
families would be most concerned with poorer and/or less-educated families moving in and
lowering average student “quality” after the school finance reform.
Tables A.1.2 through A.1.5 test this heterogeneous effects hypothesis by setting up the
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following triple difference regression:
yidmct = β1 Constrainedi × P ostt + β2 Constrainedi + β3 P ostt
+ β4 AboveM ediani + β5 AboveM ediani × P ostt
+ β6 AboveM ediani × Constrainedi

(1.5)

+ β7 AboveMediani × Constrainedi × Postt
+ Controls0i β + LatLongm + δc + ηd + idmct
where β7 is the triple difference coefficient of interest that interacts the usual difference-indifference interaction (Constrainedi × P ostt ) with an indicator variable equal to one if the
school district is above the statewide median income or college attainment before the reform
(1970).31 If β7 is positive and significant, funding-constrained districts with higher parental
education (for example) are even more likely to adopt housing supply restrictions after the
policy change. Indeed this pattern is exactly what we find. shows the triple-difference coefficient for above median income is 0.081 and statistically significant. By comparison, the
baseline result in Table 1.1, Column 4 was 0.058; so constrained districts above the median
income districts were even more likely to adopt restrictive land use policies. Table A.1.3
tells a similar story for constrained districts above the median college attainment. The
statistically significant point estimate on the triple difference coefficient is 0.098, suggesting
an differentially stronger effect in highly-educated districts. These heterogenous effects are
consistent with the idea that more elite constrained districts are sensitive to peer effects in
education above and beyond the first order congestion concerns.

1.5.2. New Construction
A second set of housing supply results examines new construction at the school district
level as the dependent variable. If the supply restrictions bind, new construction should
31

School district level data on median income and college attainment are from the 1970 Census. I compute
separate median cutoff points depending on the district type. For instance, I pool all unified school
districts, compute the median of district median income, and assign a value of 1 if the district is above that
cut point. College attainment is measured as the share of households in the district whose household head
has ever attended college
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differentially decrease in constrained districts, as stringent regulatory policies are designed
to prevent new supply in some way. Put another way, land use regulations might be thought
of as the mechanism behind a differential decline in new construction or urban growth.
Proving this sequence of causality is beyond the scope of this paper at this time, however.
I estimate this effect only with housing unit data supplied in decennial census years or in
years for which I can credibly impute from census questions (years: 1967, 1970, 1974, 1978).
Figure 1.10 shows the results from the following generalized difference-in-differences event
study:
yidct = β1 Constrainedi × Y eart +

(1.6)

αi + γt + δc + ηd + idct

where dependent variable is the school district’s percent change in housing since 1967 (thus
1967 is the omitted group in the plot). Importantly these percentages are calculated off
of each district’s housing stock in 1967 and are cumulative over time. The specification
includes district, district type, year, and county fixed effects. The plot again shows now
evidence of differential pre-trends, and a gradual differential decline in new housing during
the post period (1973-1978). The 1974 point estimate is -0.036 and the 1978 point estimate is
-0.096.32 Interpreting the 1978 point estimate, school districts that were revenue constrained
by the policy change added differentially 9.6% fewer homes relative to their housing stock in
1967. Note, however, that this was during a building boom. The median district’s housing
stock grew by 42% between 1967 and 1978, so constrained districts were still adding homes,
just not at the rate of their revenue unconstrained peer districts.
In 1970, the median (mean) district in this sample had about 3,700 (11,750) homes; from
1970 through 1978, constrained districts constructed about 1.2% fewer homes per year, or
about 45 (140) fewer homes per year evaluated at the median (mean).
32

Though neither are statistically significant, a pooled difference in difference (non-event study) produces a
-.066 point estimate, which is significant at the 10% level.
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1.5.3. House Prices and Racial Composition
Following the adoption of housing supply restrictions and the differential effects on new
home construction, one would expect correspondent economic impacts on house prices and
residential sorting. Land use controls make the local housing supply curve more inelastic,
and absent a negative demand shock, house prices in revenue-constrained (treatment) school
districts should differentially increase relative to revenue-unconstrained (control) districts.
Table 1.3 examines the short-run (column 1) and long-run (column 2) impacts on average
house value. These specifications are the same as equation (1.6), though they include only
decennial census years. Because of this, we are unable to examine pre-trends or the time
series around the 1973 policy change. While the results stand on shakier causal ground,
they are informative and suggestive nonetheless.
The table shows short run and persistent differential changes in house value. Despite real
cuts to school funding and the loss of control over future per-pupil revenues, house prices
went up in constrained school districts. Between 1970 and 1980 (column 1), average house
price increased differentially by 6.8% in Constrained districts. House price gains widened
further to 11.2% when the analysis is extended to 1990 (column 2). Newly-restricted land
use, declining rates of construction, and increasing house prices should also have effects
on residential sorting. Here I examine the effect of the school finance reforms on minority
population share across constrained versus unconstrained districts over time. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 1.4 show short run differential declines in Black and Hispanic population
share, respectively. The differential declines in column 1 are economically but not statistically significant. Note the mean district Black population share was just 2% in 1970, so a
differential decline of 0.5 percentage points is small, but it has an effect size of 25% relative to the pre-reform mean. Hispanic population share fell differentially by 2.9 percentage
points (on a pre-reform district-level mean of 15%). Taken together, this 3.4 percentage
point differential decline means Black and Hispanic population share fell 17% in constrained
school districts after the funding reforms.
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1.6. Conclusion
Restrictive land use polices are adopted at the local level, but their cumulative effects have
first order impacts on spatial economics at a broader scale. From their effects on housing
affordability (Glaeser and Gyourko (2018)) to economic opportunity (Trounstine (2020))
and mobility (Ganong and Shoag (2017)) to GDP growth (Hsieh and Moretti (2019)), the
negative externalities of land use restrictions have been well documented. This research has
focused on these ill effects, taking the origins of the policies as given. Yet identifying and
understanding the local motivations for land use controls will be key to increasing access to
quality neighborhoods and solving housing affordability crises throughout the country.
This paper argues that the desire to safeguard local public goods is a key motivator behind
the adoption of supply restrictions. To solve the natural endogeneity between public goods
and the housing market, I exploit an exogenous shock to the system of local public finance.
I theoretically propose and then empirically test the loss of local fiscal control over school
finance as a new causal channel for housing supply restrictions. Finally, I provide new
evidence consistent with supply constraints’ effects on new home construction, house prices,
and neighborhood demographics.
The theoretical model illustrates that communities constrained by the fiscal centralization
are forced to substitute from price controls (property taxation) to quantity controls (land
use restrictions). Without the ability to influence public good quality via the fiscal channel,
communities rely more heavily on land use instruments. This behavior can be further
generalized: when one set of public policy instruments is taken away, economic agents
will adjust by finding a new set. In this case, the new set of instruments are housing
supply restrictions, which are have distortionary and durable impacts on the urban form,
neighborhood accessibility, and housing affordability.
Using California’s 1973 school finance equalization reform as a natural experiment, I show
that when communities lose the ability to set their desired level of school funding, they
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respond by adopting housing supply restrictions and build less housing as a result. School
districts with larger exclusionary motives–those whose school spending was constrained by
the reform–were 66% more likely to enact a housing supply restriction in the five years
after reform. These same localities also built about 1% fewer new homes per year over this
same time frame. Consistent with the predicted effects of supply regulations, house prices
in constrained districts increased differentially 7 percent relative to unconstrained districts
in the short run. Price increases had predictably exclusionary effects: Black and Hispanic
population share differentially fell 17 percent. The house price and district demographic
effects persisted into the long run (20 years), indicating the lingering effects of land use
controls.
This is the first paper to empirically test any causal channel behind the widespread adoption of housing supply regulations across space and over time. Additionally, the proposed
mechanism–the loss of local control over school finance–helps explain the origins of supply controls in California. I also provide new empirical support to seminal local public
finance theory on the interactions between public good provision, property taxation, and
land use/zoning (Mills (1975); Hamilton (1975); White (1975)). Documenting this connection and identifying determinants of restrictive land use policies is especially timely. Many
metropolitan areas are facing serious housing affordability crises, and supply constraints are
seen as a primary driver.
In addition to addressing the connection between land use and public goods, this work also
highlights the importance of examining the unintended consequences of equity policies and
fiscal federalism interventions. The intention of centralizing education finance was to create
a more equitable system. Instead, limiting per-pupil revenue created an incentive to limit
new housing. Policy interventions in other contexts may engender local adjustments along
other policy margins or backlash in other forms; in this instance, localities reclaimed control
via land use controls – policies with severe long-run consequences for households and the
urban form.
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1.7. Tables
Table 1.1: Effect of School Finance Reform on Housing Supply Restrictions

Post X Constrained
Post-Reform
Constrained District
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1973
District Controls
FE

(1)
Any Reg.

(2)
Any Reg.

(3)
Any Reg.

(4)
Any Reg.

0.058∗∗
(0.025)
0.074∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.039∗∗∗
(0.012)

0.058∗∗
(0.027)
0.074∗∗∗
(0.011)
-0.042∗∗∗
(0.014)

0.058∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.074∗∗∗
(0.010)

0.058∗∗∗
(0.014)

5447
0.098
0.11
Yes
District Type

5447
0.250
0.11
Yes
County

5447
0.693
0.11
Yes
District

5447
0.699
0.11
Yes
District, Year

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include district controls, city coordinates controls, district type FE
Standard Errors Clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table 1.2: Robustness Test: Excluding San Francisco and Los Angeles Metro Areas

Post X Constrained
Post-Reform
Constrained District
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1973
District Controls
FE

(1)
Any Reg.

(2)
Any Reg.

(3)
Any Reg.

(4)
Any Reg.

0.060
(0.040)
0.086∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.020
(0.016)

0.060
(0.045)
0.086∗∗∗
(0.015)
-0.113∗∗∗
(0.024)

0.060∗∗
(0.027)
0.086∗∗∗
(0.014)

0.060∗∗
(0.025)

3419
0.130
0.13
Yes
District Type

3419
0.306
0.13
Yes
County

3419
0.741
0.13
Yes
District

3419
0.747
0.13
Yes
District, Year

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include district controls, city coordinates controls, district type FE
Standard Errors Clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01

Table 1.3: Differential House Price Increases in Revenue-Constrained School Districts

Post X Constrained
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1970
Years
FE

(1)
(ln) Real Mean House Value

(2)
(ln) Real Mean House Value

0.068∗∗∗
(0.021)

0.112∗∗∗
(0.032)

1114
0.978
147,000
1970-1980
District, Year

1660
0.948
147,000
1970-1990
District, Year

Standard errors in parentheses
District and Year FE, standard errors clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗
p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 1.4: Minority Population Share Declines in Constrained Districts
1970-1980

Post X Constrained
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1970

1970-1990

(1)
Pct. Black

(2)
Pct. Hispanic

(3)
Pct. Black

(4)
Pct. Hispanic

-0.005
(0.003)

-0.029∗∗∗
(0.010)

-0.004
(0.003)

-0.038∗∗∗
(0.011)

1118
0.932
0.02

1118
0.943
0.15

1666
0.913
0.02

1666
0.922
0.15

Standard errors in parentheses
District and Year FE, standard errors clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗
p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01

1.8. Figures
Figure 1.1: School quality and per-pupil tax revenue under local control

Figure 1.2: School Finance Equalization (s) Increases Housing Supply Restrictions (γ)
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Figure 1.3: Base Revenue Per Pupil by Per-Pupil Assessed Property Value, 1972
Elementary Districts (n=635)
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Gray lines are 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th percentiles of assessed property value
Base Revenue includes property tax revenue plus state non-categorical aid

+ State Aid

Gray lines are 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th percentiles of assessed property value
Base Revenue includes property tax revenue plus state non-categorical aid

Base Revenue Per Pupil by Per-Pupil Assessed Property Value Under Pre-Reform Local School Finance
(1972) shown separately for Unified and Elementary School Districts. Base Revenue is non-categorical
per-pupil revenue shown as the sum of property tax revenue and state equalization and foundation aid.
All lines are lowess smoothed estimates and each dot is a school district. Only the scatter plot for property
tax rev by assessed value is shown.

Figure 1.4: Change in Per Pupil Revenue by 1972 Base Revenue Quartile

Log Per Pupil Revenue
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Plots the coefficients from a difference in difference regression, before and after the school financing reforms
were implemented. The base year is 1973 and the omitted group is the top quartile of districts. The
regression includes district and county fixed effects

38

Figure 1.5: Geography of California Land Use Regulations Over Time
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Share of California cities in each county with at least one land use regulation, 1967, 1973, 1978. Author’s
calculations; data via Jackson (2016). Balanced panel of 411 cities incorporated prior to 1973.

Figure 1.6: The Four Steps of California’s School Finance Reform

The four steps of California’s SFR: (top left) More generous state aid; (top right) Impose revenue limits
according to pre-reform revenue; (bottom left) Implement a progressive revenue increase schedule; (bottom
right) Continue progressive increases until funding equalizes
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Figure 1.7: Determining Treatment and Control Groups

-10

Percent Increase, 1972-1977
0
10
20
30
40

Real Increases in Base Revenue, 1972-1977

0

25
50
75
Base Revenue Percentile, 1972
Lowess Fit

100

Linear Fit

This figure pools unified and elementary school districts by 1972 base revenue percentile. It shows that
districts above the 75th percentile experienced real revenue decreases between 1972 (pre-reform) and 1977
(4 years into the reform). Districts above this 75th percentile threshold are ’constrained’ by the policy
and are considered the treatment group for the empirical analysis.
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Figure 1.8: Funding Equalization After Reform: A Stylized Counterfactual
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Figure 1.9: Differential Change in Land Use Regulation Over Time
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Figure 1.10: Change in New Housing Units
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CHAPTER 2 : Persistence of Prejudice:
Estimating the Long Term Effects of Redlining
2.1. Introduction
This paper analyzes an important policy in the economic history of urban America, and
one often linked to urban decay, segregation, and racial and spatial inequality: the implementation and repeal of neighborhood-specific mortgage lending guidelines. This practice
is more colloquially known as redlining. As part of a New Deal initiative to minimize systemic risk of home foreclosure, a government-sponsored agency called the Home Owner’s
Loan Corporation (HOLC) surveyed America’s 239 largest cities and rated each neighborhood’s perceived credit risk on a grading scale of A through D (analogously coded green,
blue, yellow, and red). The HOLC then created Residential Security Maps to guide private
lenders’ local standards and to influence Federal Housing Administration (FHA) criteria
for selecting where to insure loans (Gordon, 2005). This regime remained legal until 1977,
when redlining was outlawed by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).1
As urbanist and activist Jane Jacobs wrote in The Death and Life of Great American Cities,
"Credit blacklisting maps are accurate prophecies because they are self-fulfilling prophecies."
Under this hypothesis, mortgage redlining formalized by HOLC appraisals created a vicious
cycle of credit crunch and neighborhood decline in redlined neighborhoods compared to a
virtuous cycle of favorable loan terms and reinvestment in higher-rated areas. Broadly
speaking, this research setting presents a unique opportunity to uncover how changes in
credit supplied to a neighborhood affect its long-term economic trajectory. More specifically
though, tracing out the effects of HOLC redlining sheds new light on the essential trends
1

Enacted in 1977, the CRA formally banned banks from basing lending decisions on a borrower’s
neighborhood. The CRA follows a suite of Civil Rights laws, including the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975. Unlike the
previous legislation, the CRA requires any institution receiving FDIC insurance be evaluated by Federal
banking agencies to ensure banks offer adequate credit to all neighborhoods in which they are chartered
(https://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerscommunities/cra_about.htm).While redlining remained legal
until 1977, it is not clear how long the HOLC maps remained relevant for lending policy. See Section 2.3 for
a summary of the active historical debate regarding how the maps were used, for how long, and by whom.
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of 20th century urban America, including urban decline (Rosenthal, 2008), segregation
(Cutler, Glaeser, Vigdor, 1999), and inequality (Oliver and Shapiro, 2013).
Using geo-rectified versions of the original HOLC redlining maps and a new crosswalk linking
census tracts from 1930-1940 to 1970-2010, I formally document the role of race in the
selection of redlined areas, estimate long-run effects of redlining between 1940 and 1970, and
test whether anti-redlining legislation reversed the economic fortune of previously divested
areas. I first show the HOLC maps overwhelmingly marked America’s black neighborhoods
for credit redlining. Across my sample of 51 cities, 86 percent of African Americans lived
in a redlined neighborhood in 1940, despite the fact that blacks constituted only 8 percent
of the (sample) population.2 By contrast, only one in three whites (35 percent) lived in
redlined areas despite making up over 90 percent of the 1940 sample population.
To estimate the long-run effects of redlining, I use a difference-in-differences approach at
the HOLC redlining boundaries comparing the most credit restricted (red, D-graded) census tracts to otherwise equal adjacent census tracts graded slightly more favorably (yellow,
C-graded). My identification strategy attempts to overcome several challenges and sorting concerns which are widespread in the urban economics literature. Compared to the
average neighborhood classified for conservative lending (Grade C, marked on the maps
with yellow ink), the mean high-risk area (Grade D, marked with red ink) in 1940 had a
higher population density, a higher proportion of black residents, and lower homeownership rates and house values. Because of selection on observables, I limit my analysis to
neighborhoods directly bordering a Red-Yellow boundary line and use border fixed effects
to compare adjacent neighborhoods receiving different credit worthiness grades. Narrowly
focusing on boundary tracts not only creates much more observably similar treatment and
control groups, but also controls for geographically related unobservables.
At the red-yellow boundary line, I still find redlined areas had significantly more black
2

My 51 city sample includes about 34.4 million people, which covers about 46 percent of the US urban
population in 1940.
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residents at the onset of the policy in 1940. Indeed there is highly suggestive evidence that
red lines were drawn precisely along pre-existing racially segregated areas. Despite this fact,
treatment (redlined) and control (yellow-lined) neighborhoods at the red-yellow boundary
lines did not differ significantly on other economic and demographic variables in 1940, such
as housing supply, population density, labor force participation rate, or neighborhood share
of foreign born residents. Still to address lingering selection concerns, my difference-indifferences specifications also control for initial differences in tract-level observables used
in HOLC neighborhood appraisal. While there are likely unobservables correlated with
historically African American neighborhoods for which I cannot account, the baseline results
also hold when restricting the sample to neighborhoods that were homogeneously white in
1940.
The difference-in-differences identifying assumption is one of parallel trends: absent the
HOLC’s credit restrictive policies, the change in outcomes for redlined (treatment) areas
would not have been different than the change in outcomes for the yellow-lined (control)
areas. While parallel trends cannot be tested directly, I rely on data pre-dating the HOLC
maps to examine trends between the treatment and control census tracts. Using 1930 census
data available for subsample of cities, I do not find evidence of differential trends between
1930 and 1940 for several neighborhood quality measures including housing stock, population density, and homeownership rate. I do find a slight pre-trend in racial composition
across the red-yellow borders, indicating that redlined border neighborhoods became about
2 percentage points more black between 1930 and 1940. However, this pattern reverses,
rather than continues, during the treatment period.
Between 1940 and 1970, I find redlined neighborhoods saw large differential declines (around
20 percent) in housing supply and population density compared to adjacent neighborhoods
that were rated slightly more favorably.

Homeownership rates and racial composition

did not change differentially from their 1940 baseline. Finally, I extend the differencein-differences exercise through 2010 to determine if patterns that emerged along redline
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boundaries have persisted or reversed thanks fair housing legislation passed in the mid1970s. After mortgage lending discrimination was formally outlawed, I find evidence of
convergence in both homeownership rates and racial segregation between adjacent redlined
and yellow-lined neighborhoods. However, I find redlining had persistently negative effects on housing supply and population density. Such discontinuities at a fine geographic
level remain through 2010, despite the fact that the discriminatory lending policy has been
outlawed for nearly 40 years.
Although historically black neighborhoods were far more likely to be redlined, I show in
robustness exercises that the estimated effects of HOLC redlining are not driven by neighborhood racial composition in 1940. Indeed, the results hold at similar magnitudes when
comparing adjacent boundary neighborhoods that were initially homogeneously white. This
suggests that persistent differences in housing and neighborhood outcomes are driven in
large part by market responses to HOLC ratings and not by unobserved forms of discrimination.
Despite strong anecdotal evidence of credit redlining for over 50 years (Sugrue, 2014), the
HOLC’s maps were only rediscovered by urban historian Kenneth Jackson in 1980 (Jackson, 1980; Hillier, 2003a). Recent technological advances have inspired a herculean effort
to digitize and geo-reference the maps (Nelson et al., 2016), providing researchers across
disciplines with geographically precise HOLC data. As such, only a fledgling literature has
begun to study the legacy effects of redlining on a national scale.3 Aaronson, Hartley, and
Mazumder (2017) use the newly digitized maps to track the effects of HOLC grades on
racial segregation, homeownership, and house values. On these measures, they find little
persistent differences between red and yellow boundary neighborhoods, but they do uncover
large persistent differences along the yellow-blue HOLC boundaries – a phenomenon they
3

There are two working papers I became aware of while working on previous versions of this draft:
Aaronson, Hartley and Mazumder (2017) and Appel and Nickerson (2016). To the best of my knowledge,
all three papers–Aaronson, Hartley, and Mazumder; Appel and Nickerson; and this paper–were developed
independently and concurrently. I began this work in February 2016 as an independent research project in
Fernando Ferreira’s PhD course in Urban and Real Estate Economics.

46

call "yellow-lining." Interestingly, they also find significant differences in credit scores across
HOLC boundaries today. Appel and Nickerson (2016) and Anders (2018) use regression
discontinuity designs to show redlining decreased home values and increased crime, respectively. Unlike these latter two papers which use only one year of outcome data, my methods
trace out neighborhood dynamics between 1940 and 2010. Additionally, I document large
differences in covariates and the HOLC boundaries in 1940, which calls into question the
identifying assumptions of a regression discontinuity design.
In contrast to Aaronson, Hartley, and Mazumder, my results focus almost exclusively on
the most credit-restricted (redlined) neighborhoods. While I validate their findings on the
dynamics of racial segregation and homeownership, my results emphasize the large and
persistent effects of the redlining maps on housing stock and population. Such effects are
only found when comparing adjacent red and yellow-graded neighborhoods. These outcomes
suggest that tying credit risk to neighborhood boundaries has a fundamental effect on
the geography of capital-intensive projects and economic activity. Specifically, my results
indicate that HOLC credit ratings had a first-order impact on whether and where homes
were built. I interpret changes in housing supply as an indication of which areas developers
deemed areas worthy of investment. Because of the durability of housing, supply decisions
made during the redlining period have a persistent effect on the stock of housing and density
of economic activity today. As noted by Duranton and Puga (2014), "the fact that housing
is durable has important effects on the evolution of cities."4 I show this is also true for the
economic trajectory of neighborhoods. Like Bleakley and Lin (2012), Davis and Weinstein
(2002), and others studying the long-run effects of place-based shocks, I use population
density as a proxy for economic activity. I find historically black and formerly redlined
neighborhoods remain sparsely populated today, suggesting neighborhood desirability and
economic activity is path dependent. These population patterns were shaped by sustained
shifts in investment based on HOLC neighborhood credit ratings and were unchanged by
4

Others such as Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Rosenthal (2008) also speak to the connection between
city growth and decline and the life-cycle of a city’s housing stock.
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anti-redlining fair housing initiatives.
Due to residential sorting (Bayer and McMillan, 2005; Bayer, Ferreira, McMillan, 2007;
Sampson and Sharkey 2008) and differential access to credit (Charles and Hurst, 2002), the
financial and racial background of borrowers are inextricably linked (Thompson and Suarez,
2015). This paper examines the historic and geographic roots of that link and contributes
to literatures on place-based policy and persistence in urban economic settings. The field of
economics has shown a growing interest in the geography of economic activity (Krugman,
1991), including quantifying the effects of place-based policies (Kline and Moretti, 2013;
Matias, Gregory, and Kline, 2013) and examining the persistence of local economic shocks.
This paper’s methods of studying long-run economic impacts on either side of a border
resembles Ahlfeldt et al.’s (2015) research on the economic development on either side
of the Berlin Wall, Siodla’s (2015) work examining the long-run redevelopment after the
San Francisco earthquake and fire, and Hornbeck and Keniston’s (2017) paper exploring
the spillover effects from burned to neighboring unburned plots following the Boston fire.
Studying the persistent effects of redlining is also related to the body of work on path
dependence (Bleakley and Lin, 2012; Redding and Sturm, 2016) and the effect of shocks on
cities in the long run (Davis and Weinstein, 2002).
This paper also contributes to work on the local economic impact of credit access (Black
and Strahan, 2002) and federal housing policy (Harriss, 1951; Jackson, 1985; Gordon, 2005;
Schill and Wachter, 1995). I find redlining created large disparities in adjacent neighborhoods’ housing stock presumably through new construction and renovation on the favored
side versus neglect and deterioration on the credit-restricted side. This neighborhood-level
result is in line with the literature linking durability of housing to city-wide urban decline
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Rosenthal, 2008). Studying mortgage redlining also advances
our understanding of urban economic history by exposing one of the roots of residential
segregation and suburbanization (Boustan, 2010; Shertzer and Walsh, 2016).
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces the institutional details surrounding
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the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation maps and credit policies; section 3 describes the data;
section 4 provides descriptives and stylized facts on the racial element of redlining; section
5 examines how the HOLC lines were drawn and the associated challenges to identification;
section 6 provides the estimation strategy; section 7 presents the difference-in-differences
results, including heterogeneous effects and robustness checks; section 8 concludes.

2.2. Institutional Details
2.2.1. Setting and Motivation
As part of a New Deal initiative to minimize systemic risk of home foreclosure, a governmentsponsored agency called the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) surveyed America’s
largest 239 cities and rated each neighborhood’s perceived credit risk on a grading scale of
A through D (analogously coded green, blue, yellow, and red). The HOLC advised that
the third graded areas (marked with yellow ink) were in decline and that "good mortgage
lenders [should be] more conservative." Alternatively, the agency suggested "some mortgage
lenders may refuse to make loans" in the fourth graded areas. These fourth graded areas
were outlined and colored red on the HOLC’s maps – hence the term “redlining.” In making
the maps, the HOLC consulted with bankers and builders in each city (thousands of local
experts in total) in order to influence local lending standards (Wilder (2000); Greer (2013)).
The maps and neighborhood appraisal methods were also shared with the Federal Housing
Administration (Hillier (2003a,b); Light (2010)) to help set neighborhood-level criteria for
FHA mortgage insurance (Gordon (2005)). Ultimately, the practice of "redlining" was finally
outlawed following the passage of several key pieces of Civil Rights legislation culminating
with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977. The CRA made it illegal for
banks to base lending decisions on borrower’s neighborhood and in fact encouraged banks
to meet the needs of the formerly credit constrained areas.5 Importantly distinct from
the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts, which protected individuals from
discrimination in the mortgage markets, the CRA’s explicit purpose was to increase the
5

https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-cra-reinvestmentact.pdf
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flow of capital to disinvested neighborhoods.
Despite the red ink demarcations specific to the HOLC maps, the term “redlining” in
common parlance has come to represent any race or location-based discriminatory lending in general.6 As a result, race-based and location-based lending policies have become
the catchall cause of urban decay, disinvestment in cities, residential segregation, and a
widening racial-wealth gap (Badger (2015); Coates (2015); Greer (2013)). While there may
ultimately be truth to this view, such conclusions do not yet rest on firm empirical ground.7

2.2.2. Institutional Details on the HOLC
After roaring through the 1920s, the American housing market crumbled following the stock
market crash in December 1929. The "Great Contraction" from 1929 to 1933 led to a 30
to 40 percent fall in housing prices (Fishback et al. (2011)). Hundreds of thousands of
homeowners defaulted and thousands of mortgage lending institutions failed, which created
a "self-reinforcing cycle of delinquency, foreclosure, forced property sales, and decreases in
home values” (Courtemanche and Snowden (2011)). As part of the New Deal, the Roosevelt Administration established the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 1933 to
purchase distressed mortgages from private lenders and also issue new mortgages directly to
troubled borrowers. Along with the FHA, the HOLC helped revolutionize the home mortgage market by standardizing the long-term, low interest rate, amortized mortgage. Importantly, these would be the only types of mortgages "eligible for insurance programs that
were promulgated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)" (Greer (2013), p.
278). The standardization of the long-term mortgage instrument forced lenders–now with
fewer degrees of freedom–to rely on a coarse shorthand, like neighborhood characteristics,
6

As a result, examples of lending discrimination potentially unrelated to the original HOLC Residential
Security Maps, however structural or representative of routine discriminatory practices (historical or
ongoing) within the real estate industry, have fallen under this umbrella term. For the purposes of this
paper which studies specifically the legacy of the HOLC Residential Security Maps, redlining will refer to
neighborhoods designated as Grade D by the HOLC rather than the act of discriminatory lending in general.
7
There is in fact ample evidence in 1930s-40s FHA underwriting manuals that the federal government
sought to create separate mortgage markets for black and white Americans and maintain racially
homogeneous neighborhoods, see for example Racial Content of FHA Underwriting Practices. 1934 - 1962
http://archives.ubalt.edu/aclu/pdf/Plex48.pdf
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to evaluate individual mortgage risk.
In late 1935, the HOLC’s parent organization (the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, or
FHLBB) established the City Survey Program to appraise real estate risk levels in each of
the country’s 239 cities with over 40,000 residents. Between 1935 and 1940, HOLC staff and
local realtors surveyed these cities and produced detailed Residential Security Maps of each
neighborhood (Hillier (2003a)). The goal was to produce formal and consistent appraisal
methods across cities, such that "one appraiser’s judgment of value would have meaning to
an investor located somewhere else" (Jackson (1987)). Likewise, Greer (2013) cites two purposes for the Residential Security Maps: (1) to direct underwriting criteria of the FHLBB;
and (2) to provide all other newly-regulated financial institutions with a detailed guide for
making future mortgage loan investment decisions. In this way, the Residential Security
grades were guidelines for not only government lenders, but also potentially for private
regulated banks who sought mortgage insurance from federal underwriters. Formally, the
explanations of each of the Residential Security grades as well as the HOLC’s instructions
to local financiers is summarized below:
"Four classifications are used as indicated by the legend, namely: First, Second, Third and
Fourth grades. The codes letters and colors are A, B, C, and D, and Green, Blue, Yellow and
Red respectively. In establishing the grade of an area, such factors as these are considered
[including the] economic stability of the area [and] social status of the population.
The First grade of A areas are "hot spots"; they are not fully built up...The Second grade
or B areas, as a rule, are completely developed. They are like a 1935 automobile – still good,
but not what the people are buying today who can afford a new one...The Third grade or C
areas are characterized by age, obsolescence, and change of style; expiring restrictions or lack
of them; infiltration of a lower grade population.
Good mortgage lenders are more conservative in the Third grade or C areas and hold loan
commitments under the lending ration for the A and B areas. The fourth grade or D areas...are
characterized by detrimental influences in a pronounced degree, undesirable population of an
infiltration of it... The areas are broader than the so-called slum districts. Some mortgage
lenders may refuse to make loans in these neighborhoods and others will lend only on a con-

51

servative basis.
These maps and descriptions have been carefully checked with competent local real estate
brokers and mortgage lenders, and we believe they represent a fair and composite opinion of
the best qualified local people."8

In conducting the city surveys and appraisals, the FHLBB and HOLC determined neighborhood sizes and boundaries according to the consensus of the day. That is, determining
where one neighborhood ended and another began could depend on physical geography,
major roads, reputation at the time, etc. Once the neighborhood boundaries were determined, the HOLC surveyed each one, "documenting the condition of occupation, income,
and ethnicity of the inhabitants and the age, type of construction, price range, sales demand, and general state of repair of the housing stock" (Jackson (1987)), and then finally
assigned each one a Residential Security Grade. Baltimore’s Residential Security Map is
reproduced below (Figure 2.1)).
In an attempt to mitigate perceived risk nationwide, the HOLC’s Residential Security Maps
were designed to codify lending standards across markets and to demarcate neighborhoods
worthy of investment by private and public developers, lenders, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Moreover, the maps were drawn with the explicit intention to
maintain racial and social homogeneity within neighborhoods, as keeping races and/or social classes separate was seen as a way to preserve neighborhood stability and property
values at the time. Such sentiments are apparent both in FHLBB and FHA manuals of
the time.9 As historian Louis Lee Woods (2012) writes: "While the HOLC did not create
racial and socioeconomic lending bias, it certainly helped nationalize the practice" (p. 1038).

8
9

Residential Security Map of Baltimore, MD 1937 https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/32621.
see Richard C. Stearns, Memorandum, Racial Content of FHA Underwriting Practices 1934-1962
http://archives.ubalt.edu/aclu/pdf/Plex48.pdf.
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2.2.3. How Were the Maps Used?
While there is broad consensus Jackson (1987); Greer (2013); Wilder (2000) that local private sector bankers and real estate experts consulted in making the maps, the historical
literature is somewhat divided on whether private entities used the maps to make lending
decisions. Hillier (2003a) and Greer (2013) argue the maps were not shared with privatesector lenders, though Greer acknowledges that HOLC director Corwin Fergus publicly
stated that 5,000 private real estate agents and bankers were involved in developing the
maps. According to others, the maps became the primary sources used secretly by local
real estate financiers to determine mortgage terms, loan eligibility, and mortgage insurance
availability throughout the post-war period (Sugrue (2014); Jackson (1987)). Woods (2012)
argues HOLC appraisals were used by subsidiary banking agencies throughout the entire
federal banking system, including the FHA, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Associations, and 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks located across the country.10 Crucially,
the historical literature agrees that the FHA and HOLC had close ties (Light (2010)) and
that the FHA had access to the Residential Security Maps (Hillier (2003b,a)).
Despite a lack of explicit documentation, there is strong suggestive evidence the maps’
residential security grades and instructions were used as guidelines, albeit not legal requirements. It is also not known for how long the maps remained relevant to the FHLB, the
FHA, or private sector lenders. Due to a lack of historical bank and mortgage lending data,
this paper will not resolve any of these debates. Instead, an important contribution of this
paper is to highlight the strong correlation between the HOLC redlining boundaries and
new housing construction. The pattern of new housing only on the credit-favored side of the
boundary provides suggestive evidence that HOLC neighborhood redlining influenced pri10

By the late 1930s, the FHLBB’s monthly reports "reached an extremely representative cross section of the
whole field of urban home-mortgage finance and reflected the interests not only of the home-financing
institutions but also of appraisers, real-estate dealers, material suppliers...and of the many other people
and institutions which require useful and accurate information upon current trends in the urban home
market." (Fifth Annual Report, FHLBB, 1936-1937, 20 (via Woods, 2012)). By 1940, FHLBB had become
"the largest coordinated mortgage credit reserve in US history, and all of its members had adopted the
HOLC appraisal practices" (Woods (2012)). By 1948, the Federal Home Loan Banking System held 90
percent of the nation’s total savings and loan assets (Woods II (2013))
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vate sector behavior whether or not the maps were consulted directly, which likely occurred
through the channel of where homes were eligible for mortgage insurance. Such a narrative
is consistent with Greer’s 2012 argument whereby the maps set de facto boundaries for new
home construction. Because of the new long-term mortgage and because mortgage insurance required certain minimum building standards, the New Deal and post-War mortgage
market "would direct lending toward new construction" (Greer (2013), p. 292). The maps,
therefore, created "new channels in which mortgage capital would flow across metropolitan
space."
2.2.4. Related Literature
There is a small literature identifying the immediate effects of HOLC neighborhood classification, including Hillier (2003b,a); Crossney and Bartelt (2005a,b); Brennan (2015). In
a series of papers, Hillier examines the Philadelphia HOLC map and lending practices and
determines that though racial composition was a significant predictor of map grades, the
HOLC did continue to make loans in the redlined neighborhoods. In their study of New
Deal lending in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Crossney and Bartelt show the appraisal and
lending behavior was not necessarily consistent across cities, suggesting "local context is
important for studying the HOLC as a public policy instrument." Both sets of papers analyze one or only a small handful of cities, however. Because the HOLC Residential Security
maps have only recently been digitized and made publicly available (Nelson et al. (2020)),
literature on the long-term effects of widespread HOLC redlining is scarce. Research most
closely related to this project are concurrent work by Aaronson et al.; Appel and Nickerson
(2016); Anders (2018).
Like this project, Aaronson, Hartley, and Mazumder (AHM) (2017) examine neighborhoods on opposite sides of HOLC boundaries and trace out the effects of redlining from
1940 through 2010. In a triple-difference-in-differences framework, they compare differences
across existing boundaries to differences across "counterfactual" boundaries over time. Much
of their analysis focuses on the differences between second and third graded areas, rather
than third and fourth grade areas as I propose. Between HOLC grade B-C (second-grade to
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third-grade) boundaries, they find evidence of a long-run decline in homeownership, house
values, and credit scores in lower graded areas that persists today.11 However, they only
find persistent effects across C-D (Red-Yellow, or third grade-fourth grade) boundaries on
the credit score measure and not on housing variables. Like my paper, they find racial segregation and differences in homeownership rates between redlined and yellow-lined tracts
declined after 1970.
Appel and Nickerson (2016) apply a regression discontinuity design exploiting HOLC boundaries and find that redlined areas have nearly 5 percent lower home prices in 1990 relative
to adjacent control tracts. Unlike my analysis, Appel and Nickerson pool across all HOLC
grades, which implicitly imposes a common treatment effect across HOLC ratings. They
also examine long-run outcomes only in 1990, rather than tracing out the long-run dynamics before, during, and after the policy was in effect. Anders (2018) conducts both a
spatial within-city RD and an across-city RD to examine the long-run effects of redlining
on crime. In the within-city analysis, he finds redlining is associated with incresed crime in
present-day Los Angeles. The cross-city analysis exploits a discontinuity in which cities were
mapped by the HOLC, and he finds redlining increased the overall volume of city-level crime.

2.3. Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1. Data
I rely on "geo-rectified" digitized versions of the HOLC Residential Security Maps provided by the Mapping Inequality Project (a project of the University of Richmond’s Digital
Scholarship Lab12 ) and decennial US census data. The Mapping Inequality Project provides
downloadable ArcGIS shapefiles for over 150 cities. Each consists of a set of polygons of the
HOLC-defined and graded neighborhoods. Unlike today, the entire country was not mapped
11

Though I do not focus on the "yellow-lining" phenomenon proposed by Aaronson, Hartley, and Mazumder,
my findings in Appendix A.3.3 validate theirs on racial segregation and homeownership across B-C
boundaries.
12
Robert K. Nelson, LaDale Winling, Richard Marciano, Nathan Connolly, et al., "Mapping Inequality,"
American Panorama, ed. Robert K. Nelson and Edward L. Ayers, accessed April 6, 2016,
https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/ (Nelson et al. (2020))
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for census tracts in 1940 (or earlier), so the number of cities for which HOLC polygons are
available exceeds the number of cities for which census tract level data exist. As a result,
the full sample includes 6,794 tracts from 51 cities, which account for about 46 percent of
the 1940 urban population. The sample includes 9 of the top 10 and 20 of the top 25 most
populated cities in 1940. A list of cities in the sample can be found in the appendix.
The majority of cities were surveyed between 1937 and 1940.13 For instance, the HOLC
map for Chicago, the largest city in my sample (New York’s five boroughs each had separate
maps), was not completed until April 1940. As such, I treat the 1940 census data as
coincident with the onset of the policy, or the "pre-period" for the purposes of the long-term
analysis. I do this both because of data limitations and to better align neighborhoods.
First, using 1940 rather than 1930 as my baseline allows me include 51 rather than just 19
cities because fewer cities were mapped for census tracts in 1930. Second, the 1940 census
data, compared to 1930, is likely a better representation of neighborhoods as they were
surveyed by the HOLC in the late 1930s through early 1940. In densely populated areas
in major cities, HOLC neighborhood polygons usually contain several tracts. Importantly,
the boundaries of the HOLC polygons often but not always line up with boundaries of the
1940 census tracts.
To determine each tract’s HOLC grade, I first compute from the geo-rectified maps the
percentage of each tract’s area covered by each HOLC grade. I then assign each tract its
credit-worthiness grade according to the plurality HOLC grade of that tract.14 In order to
conduct the border analysis of neighboring tracts, I determine for each tract the nearest
HOLC polygon boundary associated with a change in HOLC grade. More specifically, I
use the HOLC neighborhood polygon shapefiles to create a GIS dataset identifying all RedYellow border line segments for each city in my sample.15 For each border line segment,
13

In email exchanges with me, professor and co-creator of the Mapping Inequality Project Robert Nelson
indicated that the majority of the cities were surveyed in 1937 or later.
14
In the full sample, the median tract’s plurality coverage rate is 67 percent, while among red and yellow
graded areas, the median coverage rate is 69 percent. In other words, the HOLC grade I assign covers
about two thirds of the tract’s area, on average.
15
I use border line segments, rather than entire polygon border lines, in the main analysis in order to group
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I determine all census tracts within 3 miles of the border. Here I use the tract’s extant
boundaries, not its centroid coordinates, such that if a tract borders a Red-Yellow boundary
line segment, its distance to the boundary is zero. I then use the unique line segment
identifier to determine which tracts border which Red-Yellow boundary. Finally, I group
census tracts based on the longest border that they share with an HOLC boundary line
segment.
The vast majority of tracts (5,026 of the 6,794 in my full sample) are graded either D (Red)
or C (Yellow). These tracts accounted for about 36% of the urban population in 1940 but
only 9 percent of the urban population in 2010.16 Additionally, the neighborhoods coded
red or yellow account for about 72 percent of the full sample’s population in 1940. The
main analysis compares census tracts bordering a Red-Yellow HOLC boundary line. There
are 2,055 red-yellow border tracts in total (918 of which are majority red and 1,137 are
majority yellow) located across 1,012 borders in 51 cities. Per city, my analysis captures on
average 39 tracts located across 19 borders. In 1940, about 47 percent of all people living in
red or yellow areas lived in a boundary tract (the population living in red-yellow boundary
neighborhoods make up about 34 percent of my full sample population in 1940).
The full panel includes data from the 1940, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 decennial
censuses, via NHGIS (Manson et al. (2017)) and Brown University’s Longitudinal Tract
Data Base (Logan et al., 2014). To test for pre-trends, I use 1930 census tract level data
to create a 1930 to 2010 sub-panel. Even fewer places were mapped for census tracts in
1930, so the sub-panel contains data for only 19 cities.17 The census data allow me to
construct time series of tract level population, housing supply, homeownership rate, race of
inhabitants, occupancy status (occupied or vacant), median house value, and median rental
tracts for a finer geographic fixed effect. A polygon border fixed effect would group together all tracts on
either side of that boundary, while an HOLC border line segment fixed effect treats each line segment of a
polygon boundary as a separate identifier. See figures in Section 5 for more detail
16
While the inner-cities may have hollowed out, more people live in urban areas today and the definition of
urban has expanded since 1940. That is, measuring the US urban population over time is not comparing
constant geographies.
17
See appendix for list of cities in 1930 sample.
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price (median values through 2000 only). The 1940 census also includes several variables
useful for backing out of the determinants of the HOLC grading system, such as male labor
force participation rate, percent of foreign-born residents, median years of schooling, percent
of homes in disrepair, and percent of households with radio, refrigerators, and/or heating.
To overcome the fact that census tract boundaries change over time, I use a series of crosswalks to arrive at a constant geography. I use 1940 tract boundaries as my baseline because
these likely reflect neighborhoods contemporaneous with the HOLC surveys of the late
1930s. I create this common geography across these census waves in two steps. First, I use
Brown University’s Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB) for a block-by-block crosswalk
to convert the 1970 through 2000 data into the 2010 census tract boundaries.18 With the
common geography of 2010 in hand, I then overlay the 2010 boundaries on the 1940 census
tract shapefiles and, using tract area intersections, create my own 2010-to-1940 crosswalk.
I use a methodology similar to the LTDB to re-weight the 1970-2010 tracts to their 1940
equivalents.19 I also create a 1930 to 1940 crosswalk using the same method. Because 1930
and 1970-2010 census tracts are re-weighted according to their land area overlap with 1940
tract boundaries, the crosswalk exercise introduces some statistical noise to the time series
data. As a result, my point estimates using time series data may be biased downward due
to classical measurement error.

2.3.2. Who was Redlined?
Table 2.1 below shows several descriptives of 1940 census tracts by their assigned HOLC
Residential Security Map Grade. Over 70 percent of tracts were assigned a grade of C or
D (Yellow or Red); these tracts housed nearly 80 percent of the sample population in 1940.
Furthermore, lower graded tracts were more likely to have higher population density and
fraction of black residents and lower homeownership rates and housing values (not shown).
The fact that red tracts (in the pooled sample) were 17.5 percent black, while yellow tracts
18
19

https://s4.ad.brown.edu/projects/diversity/Researcher/Bridging.htm
https://s4.ad.brown.edu/projects/diversity/Researcher/LTBDDload/DataList.aspx (Logan et al. (2014))
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were only 1.81 percent black hints at both the highly segregated nature of urban living
in the 1930s-40s and the nonrandom assignment of HOLC grades. In some cities, there is
anecdotal evidence that the presence of one black family automatically triggered an HOLC
grade of D.20 . Indeed Greer (2013) used the HOLC Security Maps and Area Descriptions
to confirm this was the case in Chicago.
Table 2.2 further highlights the racial element of redlining. The table shows the 12 largest
cities’ black and white population share and the share of each race’s population residing in
a redlined neighborhood. See Appendix for the same table including all 51 sample cities.
Chicago, for instance, was just 8 percent black in 1940; but 98 percent of Chicago’s black
residents lived in an area redlined on the HOLC map.21 Despite making up just 8 percent
of the sample population of 34.4 million people across 51 cities, 86 percent of blacks in 1940
lived in a neighborhood marked for credit redlining by the HOLC. By contrast, only one
in three whites in 1940 lived in the most credit-restricted areas despite making up three
quarters of the sample population.
Figure 2.2, Panel A plots data from Table 2.2 for the full sample of cities. It shows kernel
density plots for within-city share of black residents redlined (solid line) and share of white
residents redlined (dotted line). Densities are weighted by city population in 1940. The
figure shows two very different distributions. The distribution for the share of black residents redlined is highly skewed, with most of the mass around 90 percent. The population
weighted median is 89 percent; the mean is 81 percent with a 20 percent standard deviation.
In other words, for the average city, about 9 in 10 African Americans lived in an area that
was redlined in 1940. This ratio is remarkably consistent across cities. The share of whites
redlined is distributed rather normally across cities with the mean and median of 35 percent
and a standard deviation of 13.6 percent.
20

See the "one-drop rule": http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/19/498536077/interactiveredlining-map-zooms-in-on-americas-history-of-discrimination
21
Because I do not have micro data, I estimate this by dividing the number of black residents residing in
census tracts that were plurality redlined by the total number of black residents in the city. Another way
of stating this is: 98 percent of Chicago’s black residents lived in census tracts that were mostly colored red
on the HOLC map.
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Panel B of Figure 2.2 repeats this exercise for black and white residents living in "Yellowlined" (Grade C) neighborhoods in 1940. Around 10 percent of black residents lived in
yellow-lined neighborhoods in most cities compared to about half of the city’s white residents. Recall from Table 2.1 that nearly 80 percent of the sample lived either in a redlined
or yellow-lined neighborhood, with about an equal proportion living in redlined (38.8 percent) as yellow-lined (39.6 percent) areas. While white residents were roughly split between
Grade C and Grade D neighborhoods, black residents nearly always lived on the lower-rated,
credit-restricted side of the boundary. This speaks to both the high degree of segregation
at the time and the race-based selection of the credit ratings.

2.4. Empirical Design
2.4.1. Identification Challenges
In an ideal natural experiment, redlining beginning with the maps’ introduction in the late
1930s and ending with the enactment of anti-redlining legislation in 1977 would represent
a randomly assigned, exogenous (and unanticipated) shock to credit availability. Of course
the HOLC credit grades were not randomly assigned, initial economic conditions differed
significantly across the risk grades, and lending discrimination was likely rampant–although
not geographically precise. So rather than a regression discontinuity or a general differencein-difference, I rely on a difference-in-differences at the HOLC redline boundary to evaluate
the changes over time between census tracts of different credit ratings.
I categorize the 1940 census data as "pre-redlining" for the purposes of the long-term analysis. The majority of cities were surveyed between 1937 and 1940. Treating 1940 as coincident
with the onset of redlining assumes that, for those cities that were surveyed in the late 1930s,
the policy did not have significant effects on neighborhoods in the several years between the
production of the maps and the 1940 census. This is not worrisome as the purpose of this
project is to identify long-run, not short-run effects. If there were negative effects in these
first few years, my analysis will underestimate the impact of redlining. Using 1940 rather
than 1930 as my baseline allows me to expand expand my sample to more cities, which
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improves power and reliability.22 Additionally, 1940 tracts a better align neighborhoods
with HOLC boundaries, which minimizes within-city measurement error.
The major threats to identification are concerns of highly-selected, non-random HOLC
classification, potential violations of the parallel trends assumption, and the confounding
policies or events after 1940 unrelated to HOLC redlining that might bias the results.
Analyzing initial conditions close to the HOLC grade boundaries reveals tracts were selected
against based on certain observables. Figure 2.3 below plots a local polynomial regression of
the share of black residents in 1940 by distance to the nearest red/yellow HOLC boundary.
Negative values correspond to neighborhoods on the red (Grade D) side of the boundary
while positive values are associated with those on the yellow (Grade C) side. The figure
includes all tracts within 0.5 miles of the boundary (3,670 in total). The shaded gray areas
represent 95 percent confidence intervals. From the figure’s sharp discontinuity, we see
that tracts with any non-negligible share of black residents were almost always graded least
favorably by the HOLC. At the boundary, tracts coded red are about 15 percent black in
1940. On the other side of the border, neighborhoods are about 1-2 percent black. This
graphic is consistent with the d racial selection implied by Figure 2.2’s city-level density
plots.
While Figure 2.3 documents stark racial segregation in 1940, it obfuscates the fact that
other socioeconomic variables were also highly correlated with race. Figure 2.4 below repeats these local polynomial regressions for other economic and demographic neighborhood
characteristics. Despite the fact that neighborhoods directly on either side of the boundary
differed significantly on racial composition, they were more similar on other observables,
such as the number of housing units, population density, the share of foreign born residents, labor force participation rate, and home vacancy rate.23 Moving farther from the
boundary, tracts are much less similar. Sizable discontinuities in homeownership, median
house value, and median years of school completed still exist at the HOLC boundary, with
22
23

The results are robust to limiting the sample to the 1930-2010 panel of 19 cities.
Household income unfortunately is not available from the NHGIS 1940 census data.
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larger differences moving away. The selection concerns are threefold: (1) The control and
treatment groups are not observationally equivalent at the onset of the policy; (2) Redlined
tracts were specifically selected against because they were already declining, and thus any
differential changes after the fact could be attributed to a continuation of pre-trends rather
than the policy; (3) the boundaries were drawn in a particularly forward-looking manner,
whereby surveyors expected lower-rated neighborhoods to decline in the future, irrelevant
of the policy. If this were the case, failing to account for the ’forward-looking boundaries’
would result in upwardly biased estimates.
To combat the selection concerns in the raw data, my analysis focuses only on neighborhoods
on the HOLC red-yellow boundary. I also control for tract level observables in 1940 and
include both border segment and city-by-year fixed effects. Appendix Table 9.4 shows that
controlling for tract-level covariates and border segment and city fixed effects can effectively
account for differences in housing supply or population density in 1940. However, these
controls cannot explain the small but significant differences in 1940 racial composition or
rates of homeownership.
The difference-in-differences identifying assumption is one of parallel trends: absent the
HOLC policy, differences between the pre and post period for the redlined D-graded neighborhoods would be the same as those in the yellow C-graded neighborhoods. This implies
that absent the credit restrictive policies, the change in outcomes (like housing supply, population density, homeownership rate, and racial composition) for redlined areas would not
have been different than the change in outcomes for the non-redlined (control) areas. While
parallel trends cannot be tested directly, evidence of differential pre-trends is an indication
the parallel trends assumption might be violated. Nationwide census tract level data does
not exist for 1930 and earlier, so I am unable to empirically test for pre-trends for the full
sample.
Table 2.3 tests for differential pre-trends between adjacent red and yellow tracts for the
19 cities which have census tract data and a digitized HOLC map. The list of these cities
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can be found in Appendix Table 9.3. The coefficient of interest is the the difference-indifferences estimator (“Redlined X 1930”), which compares the differential trend between
redlined and yellow-lined census tracts in 1930 relative to 1940 (the omitted reference group).
The specifications control for border segment fixed effects and city-by-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the border segment level, rather than the city level (as
they are in the main results specifications) because the 1930-1940 sub-panel contains only
19 cities.
The difference-in-differences coefficient shows no statistically significant changes in housing
supply, population density, or homeownership rates between 1930 and 1940.24 Note the
coefficient on redlined is always statistically significant, suggesting that over the 1930-1940
time period redlined border neighborhoods had 12 percent fewer housing units, 13 percent fewer people per square mile, 4 percentage more black residents, and 2 percent lower
homeownership.
There is, however, a slight pre-trend in racial composition. The share of black residents
(Table 2.3, column 3) increased differentially by about 2 percentage points in redlined
tracts relative to adjacent yellow-lined neighborhoods between 1930 and 1940. Despite the
statistical significance, the racial pre-trend is not particularly concerning for two reasons.
First, the magnitudes are very small in absolute terms and are driven entirely by variation in
the redlined side. As shown in Figure 2.3, on average, there were nearly no black residents on
the yellow side of the border in 1940.25 Because the share of black residents in yellow border
tracts was close to zero in both 1930 and 1940, any level change in the share of black residents
in redlined tracts would produce a differential pre-trend. Pooling across the sample, the
average tract was about 4.3 percent black in 1930 (not shown). Summing up the regression
coefficients, redlined tracts went from about 7.5 percent black (0.043−0.020+0.009+0.043)
24

The 1930 census has tract-level data on the number of occupied housing units, but not the total number of
housing units, as I use throughout the rest of the paper. I compare the log of occupied housing units in
1930 and 1940.
25
The raw data (not shown) confirm that yellow-border tracts in the pre-trend sub-panel were only 1.6
percent black in 1930 and 1.7 percent black in 1940.
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in 1930 to 8.6 percent black (0.043 + 0.043) in 1940 . While statistically significant, it is
not clear that such a change is economically meaningful. Second, if this were to violate
the parallel trends assumption, one would expect the upward trend between 1930 and 1940
to continue and redlined border tracts would become more black after 1940. This is in
fact the opposite of what we see. Between 1940 and 1970 (not shown), the share of black
residents in these same sub-panel redlined tracts falls differentially by about 3 percentage
points (not statistically significant) relative to adjacent yellow tracts. In the full sample,
the share of black residents in redlined tracts falls differentially between 1940 to 1970 by
about 0.8 percentage points (2.5).
The final major identification concern is that the parallel trends assumption does not hold
due to confounding policies, events, or local political boundaries that would exacerbate
differences between tracts of different colors. This could happen for several reasons. First,
the HOLC boundaries could have been drawn in a particularly forward-looking manner.
Even in the absence of differential pretrends, the prospect of ’forward-looking boundaries’
(whereby the HOLC lines divided neighborhoods expected to thrive from those expected
to decline) would upwardly bias the difference-in-differences estimates. One way in which
boundaries may have been drawn in a forward-looking manner is if surveyors expected
neighborhoods with more black residents and/or older housing to decline in the future.
While my results are robust to controlling for initial housing characteristics and when the
sample is limited to all-white neighborhoods, this may not be enough to fully assuage
concerns regarding the anticipatory nature of the policy.
Second, highway or railroad construction (Baum-Snow (2007); Brinkman and Lin (2019),
slum clearance policies, or riots may have occurred along or interacted with the credit
redlining policy and/or the HOLC bounds I exploit. It is also possible that local political
districts may have been drawn along the HOLC boundaries. And so depending on the
efficacy of local political representatives, public good provision may have varied across
redlined and yellow-lined neighborhoods after 1940 in ways I do not observe. I cannot
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control for such potential confounders due to data limitations. There is also the potential
that unobserved policies or trends coincident with the repeal of redlining could overstate
the effect of striking down discriminatory lending. If urban renewal projects and various
place-based redevelopment projects were more likely to occur in once-redlined boundary
neighborhoods, the effect sizes on redlining repeal will be biased upwards.
2.4.2. Estimation Strategy
In order to best deal with selection issues and the fact that there are initial differences
between red neighborhoods and yellow neighborhoods, I run a difference-in-differences comparing only tracts on either side of a common HOLC neighborhood polygon border segment.
Visually, instead of including all tracts that are either majority yellow or majority red (see
the map in 2.5), the border analysis includes in the sample only census tracts that fall
directly on either side of an HOLC Red(D)-Yellow(C) boundary line.
I focus chiefly on D and C graded tracts for several reasons.26 Most importantly, the motivation for studying the long-run impact of mortgage lending discrimination is to determine
whether there were causal effects within areas where disinvestment was highest. Focusing
only on tracts coded red and yellow captures the marginal effect of extreme lending discrimination relative to conservative lending practices.27 They are also more similar than
the others HOLC grades on observables, including lower homeownership, and, according to
the HOLC guidelines, third and fourth grade areas should be serviced differently than first
and second grade areas. Additionally, C and D graded tracts were both on similar downward trajectories, according to HOLC surveyors. Including all tract colors would not only
certainly violate the parallel trends assumption, but it would also impose some unrealistic
assumption about homogeneous treatment effects across residential security grades.
Estimating the effects of lending discrimination for only Red-Yellow border tracts presents
a tradeoff between greater statistical power and cleaner measurement on one hand and bet26
27

Analysis of A-B, B-C, and B-D borders can be found in the appendix.
Also, looking back at summary statistics tables above, the vast majority of tracts were coded either red or
yellow (over 70 percent).
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ter identification on the other. Of the 5,026 census tracts that received an HOLC grade
of C or D in the sample, only 2,055 lie on or intersect a C-D border. Table 2.4 shows
estimated effect size drops and standard errors increase moving from a sample of all red
and yellow tracts to only those on the border. Focusing only on border neighborhoods may
also magnify classical measurement error because census tract boundaries often do not line
up with with neighborhood boundaries drawn by HOLC surveyors. Tracts in the treatment
group could actually have portions that are in control areas (and vice versa).28 Because
I do not observe lending behavior, I cannot determine the extent to which discriminatory
practices spilled over into yellow-lined areas. The border tract analysis may be more sensitive to positive or negative spillover effects compared to using a wider geographic bandwidth.

Estimating Equation
The border analysis is estimated with the following equation:

yibct = β1 (Dibc × Pt ) + β2 Dibct=1940 + β3 Pt + δXibc + αb + γtc + ict

(2.1)

where y is the outcome variable of interest for tract i located along border b in city c at time
t; Dibc is a dummy variable for whether tract i is treated–that is whether it received a D
grade from the HOLC surveyors; Pt is a dummy variable for the post-treatment period; Xibc
are tract-level covariates controlling for differences in initial conditions (as seen in Table 3);
αb is a time invariant HOLC border segment fixed effect; γtc is a time-varying year-by-city
fixed effect; and ibct is an error term. The specification includes only border tracts coded
red and those colored yellow, so the control group in this analysis are yellow, or C-Graded,
tracts. The difference-in-differences coefficient of interest is β1 , while β2 captures the average difference between treated and untreated tracts, β3 captures the time effect.

28

Recall that I define tracts as Redlined if their plurality HOLC color is red. The results are robust to
alternate definitions of the treatment group, such as the grade of the tract’s centroid point or a continuous
treatment variable (percent redlined versus percent yellow-lined).
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Border Line Segment Fixed Effects
Tracts are indexed by their main border b in city c at time t. The "main border" is defined
as the longest red-yellow boundary line that intersects or overlaps the tract’s own boundary. Because both treated and control tracts will share common main borders b, the border
analysis must include both treatment and post dummies. This runs in contrast to a generalized difference-in-difference, as tract and time fixed effects are collinear with treatment
and ’post’, respectively. A tract is either treated or not, while a border is both treated and
untreated by definition.
The border fixed effect αb is in principle flexible across specifications. A border could be
defined broadly as a HOLC polygon boundary or as narrowly as a HOLC polygon line
segment combination. For example, a polygon boundary might be the long border found in
the northwest corner of the Figure 5 Baltimore map on the left above. All boundary tracts
closest to this polygon combination borderline would be grouped together. Instead I prefer
the HOLC polygon line segment fixed effect, as it is more specific and localized. A line
segment fixed effect groups together tracts on either side of a specific portion of the HOLC
polygon combination boundary. For instance, the red-yellow HOLC polygon border in the
northeast portion of the maps above is reproduced below.
Under a specification controlling only for polygon fixed effects, all these tracts would be
grouped together, as they all share the common HOLC polygon boundary. HOLC polygon border line segment fixed effects instead group tracts on either side of the specific
jagged edges of the larger boundary. In my robustness tests, I also test using neighborhood
matched-pair fixed effects. In a matched pair setting, I find for each border tract whose
centroid is in a red area the closest border tract whose centroid is in a yellow area. If
multiple red tracts are closest to the same yellow tract, I match the red tract/yellow tract
pairing whose distance is the smallest.
Including border segment and city-by-year fixed effects will in principle deal with some of
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the identification concerns about other policies or events confounding the effect of redlining. City-by-year interacted fixed effects control for any citywide time-variant and invariant
unobservables, such as such as political climate, citywide initiatives, citywide time-varying
construction costs, etc. Additionally, the HOLC border segment fixed effects will control
for any time-invariant unobservables occurring at the immediate points of neighborhood
adjacency. These border segment fixed effects control for local geographic observables and
unobservables not varying over time, such as location or topography. Yet, any unobservable
time-variant, non-citywide intervention occurring only on one side of the border would bias
the results. I cluster standard errors at the city level to control for the fact that tracts
within the same city might be correlated in some unknown way.

Outcomes and Measurement
Housing is a building block of personal wealth and a hallmark of neighborhood desirability.
Since historical microdata on loan approvals or household wealth do not exist, I study the
long-run effects of redlining on neighborhoods, rather than individuals. Still, a large body
of research tells us that neighborhood quality affects an individual’s earnings, education
choices, and intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al. (2011, 2014, 2016); Katz et al. (2001)).
One would expect credit restrictions to negatively influence neighborhood quality through
both the supply and demand channels. For instance, with banks reluctant to supply credit
and government unwilling insure mortgages, real estate developers would prefer to build
new homes elsewhere; unable to secure financing for even a deteriorating home, families
would prefer to reside in non-redlined neighborhoods.
The four outcome variables of interest are tract-level housing supply (i.e. total number
of housing units), the homeownership rate, population density, and the percent of black
residents. I focus on these variables for several reasons. The supply of housing is a key
indication of which areas real estate developers viewed as a safe investment and which areas
were seen as more risky. Developers should build on plots located in less-risky (Grade C)
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land and neither construct new homes nor repair existing ones located on plots in redlined
areas. Another reason for such behavior might be that developers would not construct new
homes in areas where the HOLC and FHA would not underwrite loans. Creating this market
reaction was precisely the goal of the HOLC and its surveyors. Exploring the changes in
housing supply will help determine if the HOLC security maps actually affected behavior
within the real estate industry.
Similarly, tracking the changes in homeownership between adjacent neighborhoods over time
is also an indication of the availability of credit. Historical mortgage or credit data are not
available at finer levels of geography, but the share of homes that are owner occupied should
correspond to the supply of credit. Population density is an indicator of the concentration
of economic activity and the density of housing; and tracking the evolution of density at
such a fine geographic level illustrates the general desirability of the location.
Population and race measures are especially important in considering how redlining interacted with the "flight" of white residents from urban to suburban areas throughout the
post-War period. Examining border tracts’ share of black residents measures the level of
racial segregation. Since HOLC credit ratings were chiefly determined by racial composition in 1940, tracking the percent of black residents provides insight on how redlining
preserved or exacerbated existing segregation and whether the CRA simultaneously erased
both HOLC grade lines and longstanding neighborhood racial boundaries.
Because I am interested in both the long-run (30-year) effects of HOLC redlining and
whether trends are persistent after redlining became illegal, I run sets of analyses using two
different pre and post periods. For the 30-year analysis, the pre-treatment period is 1940
and the post-treatment period is 1970. For the full period redlining reversal analysis, the
pre-treatment period is 1940 to 1970, and the post-treatment period is 1980 to 2010. In
my results for the full period analysis, I present figures showing the difference-in-differences
regression predicted values for both treatment and control tracts for years 1940, 1970, 1980,
1990, 2000, and 2010. In this way, we can trace over time the evolution of housing supply,
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population, racial composition, and homeownership rates across borders over time.

2.5. Results
2.5.1. Effects of Redlining: 1940-1970
Table 2.4 below presents results for the long-run effects of HOLC redlining (from 1940 to
1970) on the stock of housing. Column 1 is a naive generalized difference-in-differences
estimate using the full sample of red and yellow tracts and tract level fixed effects. (Note
that all specifications in this table also include city-by-year interacted fixed effects and
cluster standard errors at the city level). We see that on average redlined tracts saw a
nearly 700 housing unit (37 percent, relative to the mean total housing units) decrease
relative to yellow-graded tracts between the introduction of the HOLC maps in 1940 and
1970. Column 2 limits the sample to tracts within 0.5 miles of a HOLC red-yellow boundary
and includes controls for differences in tracts’ initial conditions. This specification also uses
border segment fixed effects. We see that narrowing the sample to tracts within half a mile
only reduces the point estimate by about 80 housing units (by 4-5 percent), from 695 to
615 fewer homes in redlined areas in 1970. Note that the point estimate on post-1940 is
large and significant, meaning there are significantly more homes in these areas in general
in 1970 (i.e. the rate of home construction was extremely high in the post-war period).
Also notice that the coefficient on Redlined is statistically significant, meaning the controls
and fixed effects are unable to explain the baseline differences in housing supply between
red and yellow tracts within 0.5 miles of the boundary.
Moving to column 3, we see that limiting the sample to border tracts alone reduces the
coefficient of interest (Post40 X Redlined) substantially, but the point estimate remains
large and statistically significant. Column 4 (the preferred specification) includes tract
level covariates as well. Interpreting the difference-in-differences coefficient, redlined border
tracts in 1970 had differentially 470 fewer housing units than adjacent tracts on the yellowside of the border, a difference of about 23 percent. Summing up the first three coefficients
(β1 + β2 + β3 in the estimating equation), there was effectively no change in the supply of
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housing in redlined border tracts between 1940 and 1970, compared to a large increase in
the housing supply in neighborhoods on the higher graded side of the border. Such a story
of further borne out by evidence in Figure 2.7.
As a simple robustness exercise in the introductory table, column 5 controls for tract
matched pair fixed effects, where red border tracts are paired with their closest yellow
neighbor.29 Notice the number of observations drops from 4110 to 1830. The point estimate on the difference-in-differences coefficient is negative and statistically significant at
-173 housing units (about a 9 percent decrease). Taken together, these results imply that
while redlining was legal, home building and/or housing durability in yellow graded areas
far exceeded that in redlined areas. This finding is robust to several types of border fixed
effects.
Table 2.5 repeats the preferred specification (column 4 of Table 4) for the log housing
supply, log population density, percent of black residents, and percent of owner occupied
homes (homeownership rate). Column 1 replicates the result (though this time in logs) of
Table 4. We see that redlining is associated with about a 20 percent decrease in the housing
stock relative to control neighborhoods located on the yellow side of the HOLC boundary.
Similarly, redlining caused a 22 percent decline in population density (column 2), which
is amounts to about 2,750 people per square mile, on average. Between 1940 and 1970,
redlining had no differential effect on racial composition or neighborhoods’ homeownership
rate–though notice that the coefficients on the treatment variable are significant in both
columns 3 and 4. This suggests that throughout the 1940-70 time period, redlined border
neighborhoods have significantly more black residents and a lower homeownership rate
than those on the other side of the boundary. Existing disparities in segregation and home
ownership continued throughout the redlining regime.
29

A full set of robustness matched pair FE regressions can be found in the appendix.
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2.5.2. Effects of Repeal: 1977-2010
Figure 2.7 presents graphical representations of the difference-in-differences regressions for
the full sample period of 1940 through 2010. The lines are predicted means from the border fixed effect regressions (using the preferred specification), so the estimates compare
predicted average differences between adjacent neighborhoods on either side of the same
Red-Yellow HOLC boundary line segment.30 The vertical red line in 1977 represents the
passage of the Community Reinvestment Act, which formally outlawed redlining. Examining the top left panel between 1940 and 1970, we see that there was no new housing (on
net) in redlined areas compared to large gains in the housing stock (about 16 percent) for
yellow neighborhoods (the black line, for visual ease) on the other side of the HOLC border.
In the repeal period represented by census years 1980 through 2010, the housing stock on
both sides of the boundary slowly depreciates. Over this time, the spatial discontinuity
in the housing stock between adjacent red and yellow tracts actually widens by about 17
percent (see Appendix table 9.5). Despite no net home construction on either side of the
boundary, the decline is more dramatic in redlined areas, likely due to older, lower-quality
pre-War housing. On average, there was no new building, on net, in these areas during
the 1940-2010 sample period. During the post-war construction boom, developers may
have been steered to build on the higher rated side of the Red-Yellow boundary. This is
evidence that the HOLC grading and appraisal system actually mattered for the real estate
industry. After redlining was outlawed, the discontinuities that arose between 1940 and
1970 persisted.
The top right panel shows the monotonic decline in population density in both red and yellow border tracts. The decline is more dramatic in redlined neighborhoods, but it does not
appear that people are simply migrating to the higher graded side of the HOLC boundary.
Instead, as the upcoming section will show, these declines are driven by the out-migration
of white residents in both red and yellow border neighborhoods; this white out-migration is
30

See Appendix table 9.6 for the coefficients.
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not surprisingly more pronounced in redlined neighborhoods. Like the housing stock figure,
there are no changes in the population density trends after redlining was made illegal. The
effects of redlining on housing supply and population density are clear: proximate neighborhoods with similar features diverged wildly between 1940 and 1970; and the repeal of
redlining had no effect on this spatial discontinuity.
The figures for the share of black residents and homeownership rate tell a somewhat different
story. The system of redlining preserved the spatial discontinuities in race and homeownership from 1940 to 1970. The repeal of redlining practices actually led to some convergence,
as the gap in the black population share decreased by about 5 percentage points between
1970 and 2010. The gap in homeownership declined by about 1.5 percentage points over
this same time period. Importantly, these bottom two panels in Figure 2.7 also illustrate
the secular trend of a higher black population share and lower rates of homeownership rates
in both red and yellow border tracts after redlining was outlawed.
Comparing these competing post-redlining stories of persistence (in the case of housing
supply and density) and convergence (in the case of racial composition and homeownership),
it seems that some trends are more easily reversed by anti-discrimination legislation than
others. Fighting segregation and boosting homeownership were two primary goals of the
Fair Housing Act, the HMDA, and the CRA. Neighborhood reinvestment and new home
construction are much taller tasks–and ones that rely much more heavily on market demand
and private sector action.
2.5.3. Heterogeneous Effects
Because the HOLC grades were drawn along pre-existing racial lines and because there
was already institutionalized segregation and racism throughout the real estate industry,
education system, and labor market, there is a major concern that the previous results are
either due totally to structural racism or at least biased upwards due to racism unrelated
to HOLC redlining. I confront this concern in two ways. First, I present a triple difference
interacting the difference-in-differences estimator with the tract’s black population share in

73

1940. This triple difference specification will help to decompose the total effect of redlining
into the effect of the HOLC credit grading and the effect of other forms of structural
discrimination. Second, I show in the following section that the main results hold even for
borders with homogeneously white neighborhoods on either side in 1940.
Given the role of race in the selection of HOLC boundaries, one would certainly expect
that neighborhoods with a higher proportion of black residents would be subject to even
harsher lending discrimination and less investment. Yet it is unclear ex ante whether the
neighborhoods would have fared just as poorly had the formal redlining policy never been
enacted. The triple difference specification attempts to disentangle the effects of HOLC
redlining from the more general pervasive racism of the period. The triple difference lets
the treatment effect coefficient (Post-1940 X Relined) vary by a tract’s initial share of black
residents. The rationale for this is that perhaps effects are stronger for, or only driven by,
neighborhoods with a high proportion of black residents in 1940. If the triple difference
specification totally changes the coefficient on the difference-in-differences parameter, this
is evidence that broader forces of segregation and racism were confounding the results
previously attributed to HOLC redlining. The results in Appendix table 9.7 show this is
not the case. Alternatively, if the coefficient on the triple difference is significant, this is
evidence of a heterogeneous effect on neighborhoods with a higher initial share of black
residents.
To determine how the difference-in-differences estimate varies by a neighborhood’s 1940
racial composition, I first discretize the tract’s initial share of black residents into four
buckets (less than 1 percent black, 1 to 10 percent, 10 to 25 percent, and greater than 25
percent). I then interact these indicator variables with the difference-in-differences estimator
(and I also interact with the ‘Post’ and ‘Redlined’ indicators), creating a difference-indifference-in-differences, or triple-difference estimate.
The triple-difference regression results can be found in Appendix A.3.3. Table A.3.8 shows
the addition of the triple-difference term does not alter the difference-in-differences coeffi-
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cient (Post40 X Redlined), which suggests a neighborhood’s share of black residents is not
driving the main results.31 The triple-difference coefficients in columns 1 and 2 indicate that
the effect of redlining on total housing units and population density did not vary significantly by a tract’s initial share of black residents. Though the triple-difference coefficients
are large, they are not precisely estimated and do not vary systemically. Interestingly, column 3 shows that redlined tracts that were greater than 25 percent black in 1940 saw large
differential declines (5 percentage points) in homeownership rates relative to redlined tracts
that were less than 1 percent black in 1940.
Appendix table A.3.9 presents the triple difference results for the post-repeal period. Again,
including a triple difference does not alter the point estimates on the difference-in-differences
coefficients.32 The interactions here show redlined tracts that had higher shares of black
residents in 1940 were differentially worse off in the repeal period. Compared to redlined
tracts that were less than 1 percent black in 1940, the housing stock of redlined tracts
that were over 25 percent black in 1940 fell by an additional 22 percent in the post-repeal
period (this is in addition to the differential decline of 10 percent relative to neighboring
yellow-graded areas). Redlined tracts with higher initial shares of black residents also
saw differential (but not statistically significant) declines in homeownership. The gains in
homeownership after 1977 were highly concentrated in redlined neighborhoods that were
more white in 1940.
Because nearly all historically-black neighborhoods were labeled an extreme credit risk,
the connection between redlining and race cannot be overstated. But although racial composition played a major role in determining whether a tract was redlined, I find racial
discrimination and neighborhood segregation alone cannot explain the persistent housing
and population trends along the HOLC redlining boundaries. Robustness exercises using
an all-white subsample in the following section re-affirm this. The triple-difference exercise,
31

Compare the coefficients here of -0.143, -0.169, and 0.004 to -0.198, -0.22, and 0.006 in the baseline
specifications (First row of Table 4).
32
Compare -0.105, -0.127, and 0.09 to -0.171, -0.19, and 0.13 in row 1 of Appendix table A.3.6
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however, also provides directional but imprecise evidence that neighborhoods with highest
initial share of black residents were most adversely and persistently affected.
2.5.4. Robustness
The previous section showed the main results on housing supply, population density, and
homeownership are not explained by pre-existing patterns of segregation or confounded by
other forms of racial discrimination along the HOLC boundary lines. Despite the policy’s
disproportionate impact on black communities, I estimate redlining affected historicallywhite neighborhoods at a similar magnitude (albeit historically-white neighborhoods were
marked for redlining at a far lower rate). In other words, the results hold even for red-yellow
borders with homogeneously white neighborhoods on either side in 1940.
Table 2.6 below compares the effect sizes using the baseline sample (columns 1, 3, and 5) to
their analogues using a limited sample of bordering neighborhoods that were homogeneously
white in 1940. While the sample size shrinks by about 80 percent, the difference-in-difference
magnitudes are quite robust. Redlining was associated with a differential decline in the
housing supply of 14 percent, compared to 20 percent in the baseline sample. Effect sizes
between the full and all-white sample are almost identical for the population density and
homeownership rate outcomes.
Figure 2.8 compares the baseline results (left panels, for reference) to a sample including
only neighborhoods that had zero black residents in 1940 (right panels). In principle,
these neighborhoods must have received their HOLC rating for reasons other than the
racial makeup of the residents. Between 1940 and 1970, the all-white C and D graded
tracts both saw an increase in their housing supply, though the increase was larger in C
graded areas. In the post-redlining period, the housing stock continues to increase and
then drops dramatically for both red and yellow tracts; the difference between the ratings
remains but converges somewhat by 2010. The regression results of Table 6 column 1
and 2 mask these divergent fortunes between the average redlined area and an all-white
redlined neighborhood. To be sure, redlining had an adverse effect on the construction of
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new housing units. For the average border tract, this effect is driven by large increases
in housing in yellow-lined areas compared with no new building, on net, in redlined areas
between 1940 and 1970. However, among border tracts with no black residents in 1940 (top
right panel of Figure 8), redlining’s negative differential impact on construction is simply
driven by disproportionately more building on the positively-selected (yellow graded) side
of the HOLC boundary.
The bottom two panels show the results for population density. Over the course of the
redlining period, population density in the homogeneously white adjacent red and yellow
tracts diverged significantly. In the all-white sample, redlining was associated with a 22
percent decline in population density between 1940 and 1970; this magnitude is identical
in the full sample. Like in the main results, this discontinuity persists post-repeal–and at a
much larger magnitude.
Appendices A.3.5 through A.3.8 include a battery of other robustness and sensitivity checks.
To test whether the results hold at a finer scale, I compare my baseline results to specifications using census tract matched-pair fixed effects (Appendix A.3.10). The results are
robust, though point estimates on housing supply are lower. There are slight power concerns, as the matched-pair specifications discard half the observations. Another potential
concern is that the results could be sensitive to my redlining assignment rule (Recall, I
assign a tract to treatment or control based on its plurality HOLC grade). Appendix A.3.12
compares tracts that are at least 75% redlined versus tracts that are at least 75% yellowlined. Again, the results do not change when treatment is less fuzzy, suggesting spillover
effects in the main sample are not a major concern. I also confirm that trends in border
tracts are rather representative of all redlined and yellow-lined tracts (Appendix A.3.2). Finally, I repeat the baseline boundary analyses for other HOLC border combinations to test
whether the HOLC lending guidelines bind for other residential security grades (Appendix
A.3.3 through A.3.5). I do not find consistent patterns across other grade combinations, and
no other combinations resemble my main results comparing adjacent red and yellow tracts.
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This suggests there was something unique to how the red-yellow assignment influenced real
estate development and neighborhood desirability.

2.6. Conclusion
As part of a New Deal initiative to minimize the federal government’s exposure to systemic mortgage foreclosure risk, the HOLC–a government sponsored enterprise–and local
real estate professionals created incredibly detailed credit rating maps for each neighborhood every major American city. Using newly geo-rectified versions of the HOLC maps in
over 50 cities, I formally document–both across and within cities–that surveyors targeted
neighborhoods with even a small number of black residents; the HOLC disproportionately
but not exclusively assigned those census tracts the most restrictive credit rating. In my
full sample of cities, nearly 90 percent of African Americans in 1940 lived in a neighborhood
marked for credit redlining by the HOLC.
I then use a difference-in-differences approach to trace out the evolution of housing and
economic outcomes for geographically proximate census tracts located on either side of
over 1,000 HOLC redlining borders. I estimate that between 1940 (the final year of the
HOLC neighborhood survey program) and 1970 (several years before redlining was outlawed) neighborhoods on the credit-favored side of the boundary saw a large (16 percent)
increase in the housing supply while adjacent redlined tracts experienced no new building
on net. Similarly, redlining was associated with large (22 percent) differential declines in
population. Cross-border gaps in homeownership and racial composition did not change
differentially from their 1940 baseline though.
After discriminatory lending practices were made illegal, I find small but statistically
significant evidence of convergence in racial segregation and homeownership across the
HOLC redline boundaries. This provides weakly suggestive evidence that fair housing/antidiscrimination legislation helped reverse some of the negative effects of redlining, perhaps
through increasing access to credit and strengthening legal protections for borrowers. On
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the other hand, large discontinuities in housing supply and population density persist at
the redlining borders nearly 40 years after the discriminatory lending policy was formally
struck down.
The results suggest redlining resulted in large and sustained shifts in capital investment
across proximate neighborhoods. Although black neighborhoods were far more likely to
receive the worst credit rating, I show the effects of redlining on housing supply and population density are not driven by unobservable forms of discrimination stemming from a
neighborhood’s historical racial composition. I also show that the difference-in-differences
effects of redlining hold even in neighborhoods that were initially homogeneously white at
the onset of the policy. My results indicate that the HOLC credit ratings themselves had
a first-order impact on whether and where homes were built and the density of economic
activity for decades to come. Due to the HOLC maps’ national scale, local influence, and
undeniable connection to race, redlining sheds new light on our understanding of urban decline and patterns of racial segregation. The policy’s impact on the trajectory of thousands
of neighborhoods has implications for intergenerational mobility and economic opportunity
for millions of American families.
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2.7. Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics, 1940
HOLC Grade

Share of:
Tracts Population
8.02
4.3
3.59
2.77
14.4
14.5
37.6
39.6
36.4
38.8

None/Unmapped
Green
Blue
Yellow
Red
Mean

Area(sqmi)
8.83
2.22
.876
.865
.602
2.6

Miles to
City Center
8.42
6.45
5.59
5.31
3.34
4.96

Housing
Units
756
1,174
1,558
1,590
1,566
1,329

Population
Density
323
1,761
5,819
6,171
8,983
4,611

Homeownership
Rate
35.6
53.5
41.9
34.8
21.1
37.4

Percent
Black
4.03
2.14
1.11
1.81
17.5
5.32

Source: Author’s calculations using 51 cities, 6,794 tracts. Estimates are pooled across tract colors

Table 2.2: Redlining and Race in America’s Largest Cities (1940)
City

Population

Chicago, Illinois
Los Angeles, California
Brooklyn, New York
Detroit, Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Manhattan, New York
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Bronx, New York
Queens, New York
Cleveland, Ohio
St.Louis, Missouri
Baltimore, Maryland
TOTAL (51 Cities)

3,400,000
2,790,000
2,700,000
2,070,000
1,930,000
1,890,000
1,410,000
1,390,000
1,300,000
1,230,000
1,090,000
860,000
34,400,000

Black
Population Share Share Redlined
8
98
3
86
4
90
8
94
13
89
16
90
6
66
2
81
2
48
7
94
11
82
19
90
8
86

White
Population Share Share Redlined
92
35
95
26
96
46
92
37
87
50
83
58
94
26
98
46
98
12
93
34
89
24
81
33
92
35

Table 2.3: Testing for Differential Pre-Trends, 1930-1940
(1)
Log Occupied HUs

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. Black

(4)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.005
(0.027)
0.479∗∗∗
(0.070)
-0.120∗
(0.064)

0.043
(0.032)
0.062
(0.070)
-0.130∗
(0.071)

-0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.009∗
(0.005)
0.043∗∗∗
(0.010)

0.004
(0.006)
0.340∗∗∗
(0.029)
-0.024∗∗
(0.010)

1638
0.219
Border Tracts
7.07

2106
0.288
Border Tracts
9.6

2043
0.130
Border Tracts
.05

1638
0.422
Border Tracts
.36

Redlined X 1930
1930
Redlined
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

All specifications include controls, border segment FE, and city-by-year FE
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the border line segment level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table 2.4: Effect of Redlining on Housing Stock, 1940-1970

Post40 X Redlined
Post-1940

(1)
Total Units

(2)
Total Units

(3)
Total Units

(4)
Total Units

(5)
Total Units

-695.458∗∗∗
(117.051)
685.465∗∗∗
(25.446)

-615.778∗∗∗
(118.191)
668.143∗∗∗
(25.694)
178.447∗∗
(67.295)
26.664
(90.181)
185.805∗∗
(72.760)
634.298∗∗∗
(119.846)
914.418∗∗∗
(287.034)
383.795
(344.154)
-487.997∗∗∗
(133.550)
-580.735∗
(320.789)
8.190
(194.358)
995.168∗∗∗
(351.214)
103.634∗∗∗
(19.241)

-470.737∗∗∗
(159.885)
409.009∗∗∗
(43.605)
-66.106
(86.120)

-470.737∗∗∗
(160.063)
409.009∗∗∗
(43.653)
95.720
(98.769)

-173.607∗∗
(80.822)
24.167
(53.882)
-24.658
(56.972)

132.542∗∗∗
(35.789)
845.184∗∗∗
(220.623)
595.646
(837.463)
1328.978
(864.923)
-549.122
(377.404)
-908.949∗
(538.695)
-127.140
(408.363)
1342.732∗∗∗
(420.940)
112.827∗∗
(42.584)

1355.975∗∗∗
(203.710)
456.860∗∗
(198.403)
1938.922∗
(1057.221)
667.104
(1009.619)
-497.049
(464.963)
-451.660
(1005.247)
2.079
(412.542)
946.345∗
(553.253)
34.434
(31.640)

8630
0.211
0.5 Mile Radius
Border Segment
1904.8

4110
0.161
Border Only
Border Segment
2032.07

4110
0.222
Border Only
Border Segment
2032.07

1830
0.301
Nearest Match
Matched Pair
1893.74

Redlined
Distance to Border
Tract Area
Pct.Blk in ’40
LFPR in ’40
Pct.Foreign in ’40
Pct.Disrepair in ’40
Pct.Radio in ’40
Pct.Heating in 40’
Pct.Fridge in ’40
Schooling in ’40
Observations
R2
Sample
FE
Mean DV

10052
0.217
All Red & Yellow
Tract
1897.09

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include City-by-Year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01

Table 2.5: Effects of Redlining, 1940-1970

Post40 X Redlined
Post-1940
Redlined
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

(1)
Log Total Units

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. Black

(4)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.051)
0.159∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.043
(0.058)

-0.220∗∗∗
(0.045)
-0.134∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.046
(0.065)

-0.008
(0.016)
0.205∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.036∗∗∗
(0.011)

0.006
(0.005)
0.081∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.034∗∗∗
(0.012)

4106
0.180
Border Only
7.26

4110
0.217
Border Only
9.38

4108
0.373
Border Only
.19

4101
0.279
Border Only
.38

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include tract-level controls, border segment FE, city-by-year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table 2.6: Redlining in Initially All-White Neighborhoods, 1940-1970
Log Total Units
(1)
(2)
All Borders All-White Borders
Post40 X Redlined
Post-1940
Redlined
Observations
R2
Mean

Log Pop/sqmi
(3)
(4)
All Borders All-White Borders

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.051)
0.159∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.043
(0.058)

-0.138∗
(0.076)
2.958∗∗∗
(0.076)
-0.199∗
(0.112)

-0.220∗∗∗
(0.045)
-0.134∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.046
(0.065)

-0.221∗
(0.119)
2.636∗∗∗
(0.119)
-0.139
(0.099)

0.006
(0.005)
0.081∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.034∗∗∗
(0.012)

-0.005
(0.011)
-0.188∗∗∗
(0.011)
-0.034
(0.027)

4106
0.180
7.26

828
0.284
6.9

4110
0.217
9.38

832
0.323
9.19

4101
0.279
.38

824
0.405
.45

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include controls, border segment FE, city-by-year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

Pct. OwnerOcc
(5)
(6)
All Borders All-White Borders

p < .01

2.8. Figures
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Figure 2.1: Baltimore’s map produced by the HOLC and local private mortgage lenders,
May 1, 1937
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Figure 2.2: HOLC Grading and Race, City-Level Density Plots
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Figure 2.3: Percent Black at the Red-Yellow Border, 1940 (raw data)
Racial Composition by Distance to Red/Yellow Border
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Figure 2.4: Initial Conditions at the Border, 1940 (raw data)
Population Density by Distance to Red/Yellow Border
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Figure 2.5: Border Tract Focus, Baltimore

Figure 2.6: Border Line Segment Focus
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Figure 2.7: Effects of Redlining and Repeal, 1940-2010
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Figure 2.8: Robustness Exercise – All White Border Tracts, 1940-2010
All Red-Yellow Border Tracts (L) vs Border Tracts With No Black Residents in 1940 (R)
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CHAPTER 3 : The Local Residential Land Use Regulatory Environment Across
U.S. Housing Markets: Evidence from a New Wharton Index
3.1. Introduction
High house prices, especially in America’s larger coastal markets, have spawned growing
concerns about housing affordability for middle class, not just low income, households.
The potential role of local residential land use restrictions in helping to generate such high
prices is an issue of growing importance in the public and academic spheres. In the public
arena, this led to a host of policy responses, on both sides of the aisle, including a 2019
Presidential Executive Order establishing a White House Council on Eliminating Regulatory
Barriers to Affordable Housing and the Biden Administration’s plans to eliminate local
regulations.1 Regionally, this has been a topic of public debate in California especially, with
recently proposed legislation that would have restricted localities from stopping residential
construction in certain circumstances. In addition, the rise of a Yes In My Back Yard
(YIMBY) political movement is a relatively new development in various parts of the country
ranging from California and Oregon to Minnesota.2 The academic literature on the topic
also has grown substantially in recent years.3
1

In 2019, the Trump Administration established the White House Council on Eliminating Regulatory
Barriers to Affordable Housing. See https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-13878establishing-white-house-council-eliminating-regulatory-barriers/ for the text of the underlying executive
order. The Biden campaign also outlined plans to eliminate some local regulations. See
https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/housing/Biden_DFP_memo.pdf or
https://joebiden.com/housing// for more on their thinking on this issue.
2
For example, California state bill (SB 827) would have limited the ability of localities to stop denser
developments involving multifamily-type construction. For one of many analyses of this effort, which did
not pass or even make it out of committee, see the Vox article at
https://www.vox.com/cities-and-urbanism/2018/2/23/17011154/sb827-california-housing-crisis. See the
July 5, 2017, article in The Atlantic for more on the new YIMBYism movement. Entitled “From ‘Not in
My Backyard’ to ‘Yes in My Backyard’ ”, it may be accessed at
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/yimby-groups-pro-development/532437/. The
Oregon state legislature recently passed a bill to effectively ban single-family zoning in Oregon
neighborhoods. See: https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2019/06/bill-to-eliminate-single-family-zoningin-oregon-neighborhoods-passes-final-legislative-hurdle.html. In late 2018, the Minneapolis City Council
voted to eliminate single-family zoning, and in its stead, permit up to three housing units on each site. On
this, see https://nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/minneapolis-single-family-zoning.html.
3
For example, see Albouy and Ehrlich (2018), Emrath (2016), Been et al. (2016), Jackson (2016, 2018); Lin
and Wachter (2019); Turner et al. (2014) for some recent efforts. Gyourko and Molloy (2015) provide the
most recent scholarly literature review, with Glaeser and Gyourko (2018) describing how a restrictive
supply side of housing markets appears to be affecting home prices in coastal markets especially.

89

There are many challenges to producing convincing analysis of the impact of the local regulatory environment, but such research always starts with measuring restrictiveness.4 In this
paper, we report results from a new survey of the residential land use regulatory environment
in nearly 2,500 primarily suburban jurisdictions across a wide array of metropolitan areas
throughout the country.5 We construct a measure of regulatory restrictiveness called the
Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI), utilizing the same methodology as for the first Wharton regulatory index to facilitate comparison over time. To
distinguish the new index from the first Wharton survey conducted over a decade ago, we
refer to the new measure as WRLURI2018 and the previous index as WRLURI2006.
Our index methodology provides a convenient way to rank individual communities and
markets in terms of their regulatory restrictiveness. The index is standardized so that it
has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, where a higher value implies more
regulation. However, the index does not reveal the actual regulatory policies and practices
of different places. To provide a translation from index values to characteristics of regulatory
environments on the ground, we group communities by their rank in the overall distribution
of WRLURI2018 values. More specifically, we consider those in the bottom quartile of the
WRLURI2018 distribution to be lightly regulated, those in the top quartile to be highlyregulated, and those in the interquartile range to have an average level of regulation.
Being relatively lightly regulated by our metric does not imply that the jurisdiction is unregulated or characterized by a near absence of residential land use controls. Among this
subset of communities, two entities (usually a local planning commission and a local council)
typically are required to approve any project that needs rezoning. Even for projects not re4

Prior efforts to measure the degree of regulatory restriction include Linneman et al. (1990); Glickfield and
Levine (1991); Pendall et al. (2006); Gyourko et al. (2008). For other recent efforts on measuring
restrictiveness, see the Terner Center’s California Land Use data (http://californialanduse.org/index.html)
and Brueckner and Singh (2020).
5
Survey responses are always at the level of the individual political jurisdiction. A few are large central
cities, but the vast majority are suburban communities surrounding the central city of an urban area, with
a small number being rural jurisdictions outside of any core-based statistical area (CBSA). We use the
terms jurisdiction, community and place interchangeably throughout the paper. The names of each
jurisdiction are included in the downloadable data file discussed later in the paper.
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quiring a variance to the zoning code, it is not uncommon for lightly-regulated communities
to require the approval of two local entities in order for the development to proceed. Density
restrictions are omnipresent, too. Ninety-four percent of the communities in the bottom
quartile of the WRLURI2018 distribution have some type of minimum lot size requirement
in at least one of their neighborhoods, with the typical minimum being less than one-half
acre. It also takes a meaningful amount of time to get a proposal through the approval
process in these relatively lightly-regulated communities. The average time span between
submitting a project for approval and receiving a decision is 3.7 months, which amounts to
111 days assuming thirty days per month.
As was the case with the 2006 survey, the new data show that highly-regulated places tend
to be more so on multiple dimensions. Thus, they are in the top quartile of the rankings not
because they are extremely restrictive in only a few facets of regulation. These places tend
to have at least three different entities that must approve (and, thus, can veto) a project.
Density restrictions are more severe on average, as the modal community among this group
reports a 2+ acre minimum lot size restriction in at least one of its neighborhoods. In
addition, there is a more intense level of involvement in the regulatory process reported
on the part of public and local officials in the places we rate as the most highly regulated.
These jurisdictions are also more likely to have open space requirements and exaction fee
programs imposed on builders. Project review delay times are more than double those found
in the lightly-regulated areas, with the average being 8.4 months. The average regulatory
environment looks like the mean of the lightly- and highly-regulated ones. Hence, there is
no place (on average) where residential development is simple and quick in the sense that
projects are reviewed quickly by a single entity that has final approval rights.
A stricter regulatory regime at the jurisdiction level is associated with higher house values,
higher incomes and a larger share of college graduates. In contrast, other local traits such as
race and housing unit permitting intensity are not strongly correlated with our regulatory
measure. These patterns appear to be robust over time, too, as lagged house values, incomes
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and level of educational achievement also predict current WRLURI2018 values, but neither
lagged race nor permitting intensity do so.6 Thus, more restrictive residential land use
regulation appears bundled together with high human capital, high incomes and expensive
homes, both in the cross section and over time.
To the extent that metropolitan area-wide housing markets themselves differ along these
lines, there should be spatial variation visible at that more aggregate level. This is documented using data from 44 metropolitan areas (technically, core-based statistical areas or
CBSAs) in which there were at least ten communities responding to our survey. With 10 or
more respondents, we felt comfortable creating market-wide regulatory index values, which
reflect the simple means of the individual communities’ WRLURI2018 values. The San
Francisco and New York City CBSAs are the most highly regulated markets in the country,
with each having a WRLURI2018 value that is more than one standard deviation above
the national average.
In addition, there is a clear regional pattern to the CBSA-level results (see Figure 3.1 and
Table 3.4 below). Nine of the top 10 markets in terms of measured regulatory strictness are
situated along either the northeast coast (from Boston down through Washington, D.C.) or
the west coast of the country (Seattle, Portland (OR), San Francisco and Los Angeles). The
most lightly-regulated among the group of larger metropolitan areas tend to be declining
markets in the Rust Belt region (e.g., Cleveland, OH, Grand Rapids, MI, Cincinnati, OH,
Detroit, MI, and St. Louis, MO). These markets tend to have WRLURI2018 values that
are about one-quarter to one-third of a standard deviation below the national mean.7 The
interquartile range of this group contains a wide array of markets across the rest of the country. Markets around the national average (WRLURI2018 index values within one-tenth of a
standard deviation from zero) include Houston, TX, Columbus, OH, San Antonio, TX, and
6

For example, the simple correlation of house value from the 2005-2009 American Community Surveys with
a jurisdiction’s WRLURI2018 value is 0.28. The analogous figures for income and college graduate share
are 0.24 and 0.20, respectively.
7
Given that the index is standardized with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1, this implies that
communities in many smaller markets make up the bulk of places with even lower WRLURI2018 index
values.
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Pittsburgh, PA. A simple fixed effects regression of jurisdiction-level WRLURI2018 values
on CBSA dummies generates a R2 =0.45. A separate bivariate regression on census division dummies has much less explanatory power (R2 =0.09), so housing market-level effects
are stronger. Even so, the bulk of the variation in regulatory index value is across places
within a metropolitan area. On average, the locality itself clearly matters in determining
its regulatory environment.
The 2018 survey allows us to paint a broad picture of the current regulatory environment.
However, the cross section cannot tell us how the regulatory environment changed over time–
either in aggregate or for certain markets or regions. To document changes, we exploit data
from the 2006 Wharton survey (Gyourko et al. (2008)) and measure changes in communities’
responses across the two sets of responses. In an online appendix, we detail changes from
both the repeated cross-sections (all 2,720 respondent communities in 2006 versus all 2,825
in 2018) and the panel of 890 communities that responded to both survey waves.8 We
believe this is the first consistent nationwide data to document changes in residential land
use regulation at the local jurisdiction level. In the text below, we focus on a small number of
changes that we believe are especially relevant for future research. The first is not a change
at all, but the absence of change. More specifically, restrictive local land use environments
seem highly resistant to weakening. At the metropolitan area level, there is no case of a
highly regulated market as of 2006 becoming substantially (or even modestly) less regulated
over time. To the extent there is change, it is to strengthen the control regime. Now that
we can measure change (or its absence) over time, a key question for future research is to
pin down why.
This is not to imply that the nature of the local regulatory environment has been static
since the mid-2000s. One trend involves the spread of density controls. Minimum lot size
restrictions are not new, but they have become very popular and are now almost omnipresent
8

Depending upon the specific survey question, there typically are from 750-900 communities that answered
it in both the 2006 and 2018 surveys. The number that answered all questions in both surveys is just over
500. We also confirm that there are not strong selection effects in terms of which communities responded
to both waves of the survey.
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across nearly every locality in every type of metropolitan area. Moreover, it is no longer
uncommon to see a 1-acre+ minimum in the suburbs of virtually any housing market. This
is not the case for other controls such as exaction fees (which declined in usage between
the two surveys), open space requirements, or housing affordability requirements. Future
research needs to use this variation to model and better understand why the local regulatory
environment looks the way it does. A start on this issue would involve determining why the
benefit-cost ratio of imposing higher minimum lot sizes seemed so much more favorable to
many localities compared to the other regulations they could have imposed.
A third interesting stylized fact involves changes over time in the share of highly-regulated
communities with a metropolitan area.

Among CBSAs that we categorize as highly-

regulated metropolitan housing markets, the share of highly-regulated jurisdictions within
them rose over time. In contrast, among CBSAs that we categorize as lightly-regulated,
it is nearly equally likely that the share of high-regulated communities within them fell
(not rose) over time. As is documented below, this change is making it harder than it was
only a decade ago for a prospective home buyer in the San Francisco Bay Area to find a
lightly-regulated community. However, it remains easy, and became easier, to find such a
community in more lightly-regulated regions such as Pittsburgh, Chicago and Atlanta. The
change in the Bay Area (and other markets like it) has potentially vital implications for
affordability conditions and the nature of the housing market itself when a middle class
household cannot easily substitute away from a restrictive supply side environment almost
anywhere within the local labor market area. A fourth and final change that we think will
help drive future research is the ongoing rise in the arduousness of navigating the regulatory environment from the homebuilder’s perspective. This is best evinced by the increase
over time in the number of regulatory bodies that must approve, and thus have veto rights
over, any development project requiring a variance to the local zoning code. This change
is widespread and is not confined to the most highly regulated markets in the 2018 survey. Why this is so and what it accomplishes for individual communities should be on the
research agenda of those interested in understanding local government behavior.
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Note that none of these changes directly involves how regulation affects housing prices,
which has been the most studied issue in this area. That topic certainly will not go away
and the ability to use differences in the regulatory environment over time will help make
that research more credible. However, there clearly are new and different aspects of the
political economy of local government and their housing markets that can be addressed with
the new survey data complementing the old.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section describes how we construct the aggregate regulatory index for each place. Section 3.3 then reports results. This section describes
the distribution across individual communities throughout the nation and then reports on
market-wide variation. We also translate what the index numbers mean in terms of actual
regulations in place. Section 3.4 describes how the regulatory environment has changed
over time. Section 3.5 briefly concludes.

3.2. Defining the Local Regulatory Environment:
Survey Responses and Index Creation
A key reason it is so difficult to accurately measure the restrictiveness of the local regulatory
environment is because there are many different ways that regulation can affect housing
supply. The most direct mechanism is via a hard cap on permitting or building of new
housing units. However, communities also can influence supply in indirect ways by enacting
policies that raise costs or constrain potential builders, such as delaying evaluation of project
proposals, imposing expensive design or density restrictions, etc. To help characterize such
a complex regulatory environment, our survey asks a series of questions focused on the
process of local regulation, as well as a few specific ways in which builders are constrained
by rule or law. As with the 2006 survey, the questions fall into one of three categories.
The first asks about the general nature or characteristics of the regulatory process. These
include queries about who is involved in the process (e.g., local council, state legislature,
local citizens, etc.) and how important these actors are. The second set of questions asks
about the overarching rules of the process by which the housing market is regulated. These
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queries identify whether there are any explicit caps on permitting or construction, as well
as the nature of density restrictions such as minimum lot size regulations. The survey also
includes inquiries about other rules such as affordable housing requirements, impact fees
and exactions. This section also asks about the typical time lag between when a project is
proposed by a builder and when the local government provides a response to the application.
The third and final set of questions asks about outcomes, such as changes in the cost of
lot development, as well as the number of re-zoning permits applied for by developers. The
2018 survey instrument, as well as that from 2006, are reproduced in the first section of the
online-appendix which is available at http://real-faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/gyourko/landuse-survey//. Summary statistics on each question used in any index reported in this paper
follow immediately thereafter in our online appendix.9
In order to translate the voluminous data generated from answers to our survey questions
into a measure of regulatory strictness, we follow the strategy used in creating the first
Wharton index. This begins by building a dozen subindexes that gauge different components of the underlying regulatory environment. Simple factor analysis then is used to
combine the information from the subindexes into a single aggregate measure of regulatory
strictness. We do not argue that ours is the only sensible way to categorize the regulatory
environment. However, many researchers already are familiar with the structure of the
previous index, and it has been found to be a useful indicator of regulatory strictness in
a variety of contexts.10 We exploit this below in Section 3.4’s discussion of how the local
residential land use regulatory environment has changed (or not) over time.

3.2.1. Subindex Creation
Using individual community responses to various survey questions, we create a dozen separate indexes that capture different components of the local regulatory environment. Each
9
10

All data from the 2018 and 2006 surveys also are available for download from this page.
There were over 700 cites of the 2008 paper according to Google Scholar as of this writing, so there is
widespread usage of the first index. Even more importantly for our purposes, this empirical strategy has
the considerable benefit of facilitating comparison with that previous Wharton index.
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subindex is described just below, with the second section of the online appendix providing
a detailed mapping of each underlying question to the subindex in which it is used. Each
subindex is created so that a higher value connotes ‘more’ or ‘stricter’ regulation.
1. Local Political Pressure Index (LPPI)
This subindex quantifies the degree to which various actors are involved in the local residential development process. The underlying data largely come from responses to Question 3
on our survey, which asks: “In your community, how involved are the following in affecting
residential building activities and/or growth management procedures?” Respondents then
rate the importance of various actors–such as a local council or managers, local community
pressure or other listed entity–on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 indicating the actors have no involvement and 5 indicating they are “Very Involved.” To these scores, we add the number of
land preservation and conservation-related ballot initiatives approved by the municipality
between 2008 and August 2018. The ballot initiatives measure is based on the Trust for
Public Land Landvote database.11
Scores are summed as follows:
(1) LP P I = LocalCouncil + CommunityP ressure + Other + BallotInitiatives,
so that the range of answers is from a low of three (1 + 1 + 1 + 0, if the community
responded that no local council was involved in the process, community pressure was
not relevant, that there was no other group we did not list in Question 3, and there
were no relevant ballot initiatives over the past decade) to 15 plus the number of
ballot initiatives (5 + 5 + 5 + BallotInitiatives).12
2. State Political Involvement Index (SPII)
11
12

To access the database, see: https://tpl.quickbase.com/db/bbqna2qct?a=dbpage&pageID=8
Conceptually, even though a higher degree of public and local official involvement could arise from a desire
to lighten the regulatory burden, it almost certainly reflects a relatively high level of existing
restrictiveness. This is confirmed by data reported in Table 3.3 below. This conclusion holds for the next
two subindexes, too.
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The State Political Involvement Index (SPII) is based on the answer to a single question
asking how involved is the state legislature in influencing residential building activities
and/or growth management procedures. Thus,
(2) SP II = StateLeg
Because this is a component of Question 3 described above with respect to the LPPI,
its answers also range from 1 (no involvement) to 5 (very involved).
3. Court Involvement Index (CII)
This is the final index regarding the actors involved in the local residential land use process. The CII is the sum of the reported local and state courts’ involvement in affecting
residential building activities and/or growth management (the sums of questions 3d and 3e,
respectively). That is,
(3) CII = LocalCourt + StateCourt The potential range of values is from 2-10, with a
value of two indicating that both local and state courts are not at all involved in the
regulatory process, and a score of ten indicating that they are heavily involved.
4. Local Project Approval Index (LPAI)
Question 4 of our survey asks for a different type of information on the process of regulatory
control–namely, who must approve different types of projects before they can be built and
whether approval requires a supermajority vote in favor. This subindex pertains to projects
that do not require any variance to the current zoning code (i.e., they are ‘by right’ because
they do not violate any current rule or law).
The question asks which of nine entities have to approve a project before any housing can
be built. Eight specific entities listed include: the local planning commission; local zoning
board; local council, managers, or commissioners; the county board of commissioners; the
county zoning board; an environmental review board; a public health office; or a design
review board; the ninth is ‘Other’ in case there is another group we did not list that is
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relevant.13 Thus,
(4) LP AI = LocalP lan + LocZone + LocCouncil + CountyComm + CountyZone +
Environ + P ubHealth + Design + Other
Response values for each entity range from 0-2. A zero indicates the entity does not
have to approve the project. A value of one indicates that the entity does have to
approve, but may do so by a simple majority vote. A value of 2 indicates that the
entity must not only formally approve the project, but must do so by a supermajority
vote of its decision makers. Hence, the possible range of values for this index runs
from 0-18. A value of zero indicates that there is no entity required to approve a ‘by
right’ project, while a value of 18 would indicate that each of the eight listed entities,
plus at least one other listed by the respondent, must approve with a supermajority
in favor.
5. Local Zoning Approval Index (LZAI)
The LZAI is created exactly as described above for the LPAI, except it pertains specifically
to projects that do require some type of variance or change to the local zoning code (see
the second half of Question 4 from the survey). Thus,
(5) LZAI = LocalP lan + LocZone + LocCouncil + CountyComm + CountyZone +
Environ + P ubHealth + Design + Other,
with the range of possible outcomes the same as for the LPAI subindex.
6. Local Assembly Index (LAI)
The LAI uses the final piece of data generated from Question 4. That question also asks
whether a town meeting is required to approve any type of proposed residential project.
Rather than include this information as a component of the LPAI and LZAI indexes just
13

There were other relevant entities mentioned by respondents. For example, the California Coastal
Commission often was listed by communities in the major coastal metropolitan areas of that state.
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described, we use it to create a separate index to capture whether the local regulatory
environment requires some type of direct democracy involvement of the local population.
Thus,
(6)LAI = T ownM eet
with the index values ranging from 0-2.14
7. Supply Restrictions Index (SRI)
The Supply Restrictions Index reflects the extent to which there are explicit annual caps
on the supply of new housing. Question 8 of the survey asks whether (in a simple ‘yes or
no’ sense) the respondent community places annual limits on the total allowable number
of permitted units, total number units constructed, units per dwelling or the aggregate
number of buildings constructed. More specifically, the question asks whether there are
limits for the following: building permits for single family homes or multifamily units;
the number of single family homes or multifamily units authorized for construction; the
number of multifamily units buildings authorized for construction; and the number of units
in multifamily dwellings. The SRI is the simple sum of the number of limits on building
permits, construction, or number of dwellings and units and is constructed as follows:
(7) SRI = SF P ermits+M F P ermits+SF Const+M F Const+M F Build+M F U nitsDwell
Hence, its value ranges from a low of zero to a high of six.
8. Density Restriction Index (DRI)
One way to constrain housing supply is to impose density restrictions. Question 7 of the
survey asks whether the community has any minimum lot size requirement at all, and if
so, the size of the largest minimum required in any neighborhood within the jurisdiction.
Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate whether their largest minimum required
14

We do not sum across the types of projects in the creation of this index. If any type of project approval
requires some type of town meeting, the subindex takes on a value of 1 or 2 (if supermajority approval is
required), and a value of 0 if no town meeting is required.

100

that homes be built on less than one-half acre of land, from 0.5-1.0 acres, from 1-2 acres or
from 2+ acres.
The DRI subindex takes on values ranging from 0-4 and is constructed as follows:
(8) DRI = 0 if there is no minimum lot size regulation anywhere in the jurisdiction
= 1 if there is a minimum, but it is no larger than 0.5 acres
= 2 if there is a minimum, and the largest one is from 0.5-1.0 acres
= 3 if there is a minimum, and the largest one is from 1.0-2.0 acres
= 4, if there is a minimum, and the largest one is for more than 2 acres.
9. Open Space Index (OSI)
Question 9 of the survey asks about different types of regulations that communities might
impose on developers in return for the right to build. One is whether residential real estate
developers are required to provide some type of space for the community to use (or pay a
fee in lieu of providing such space). This could reflect an explicit open space requirement or
some mandate that space be provided for a specific community use. For simplicity, we call
this the Open Space Index, with OSI measured as 0-1 dummy where a value of one indicates
that some type of dedicated space is required to be provided (or a financially equivalent fee
paid). Thus,
(9) OSI = 1 if some type of mandatory space provision is required; =0 otherwise.
10. Exactions Index (EI)
Question 9 also asked whether the community required developers to pay any type of impact
fee or the allocable share of the costs of infrastructure. The EI also is a 0-1 variable and is
measured as follows:
(10) EI = 1 if an impact fee exists and =0 otherwise.
11. Affordable Housing Index (AHI)
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The final component to Question 9 asks whether developers were required to “Include
affordable housing, however defined, in their projects” in order to be able to build in the
jurisdiction. We interpret an answer in the affirmative to indicate that there exists some
affordable housing requirement in the municipality. This also is a 0-1 variable such that
(11) AHI = 1 an affordable housing program exists and =0 if not.
12. Approval Delay Index (ADI)
The final subindex used in creating our aggregate index is a measure of permit approval
delay. The survey asks about project review time in several places (including questions 16,
17, 18, 20, and 22). The Approval Delay Index (ADI) combines the average review time for
residential projects, rezoning requests involving multiple unit types and subdivision requests
into a single metric. The ADI is calculated in several steps. First, we compute the simple
averages of review time (reported in months) for:
(1) by-right single-family unit projects and by-right multifamily unit projects
sf projrev+mf projrev
2

from Questions 16a and 16b;

(2) not by-right single-family unit projects and not by-right multifamily unit projects
nsf projrev+nmf projrev
2

from Questions 17a and 17b ;

(3) application for and issuance of a building permit for development of less than 50 singlefamily units, 50 or more single-family units, and multi-family units
sf l50+sf m50+mf
3

from Questions 20a, 20b, and 20c;

(4) application for subdivision approval and issuance of a building permit for development
of less than 50 single-family units, 50 or more single-family units, and multi-family
units
subsf l50+subsf m50+submf
3

from Questions 22a, 22b, and 22c.
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We then take the average of these four numbers to arrive at the number of months involved
in the Approval Delay Index (ADI). More specifically,
(12) ADI =

projrev
sf projrev+mf projrev
+ nsf projrev+nmf
+ sf l50+sf3m50+mf
2
2

m50+submf
+ subsf l50+subsf
3

4

This average across such a wide range of potential projects is used because we believe it
helps reduce potential measurement error in this variable.

3.2.2. Creating the Aggregate Index (WRLURI2018)
Simple factor analysis is employed to create the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory
Index. Specifically, we select the first factor from each subindex to create an aggregate
WRLURI2018 value for each jurisdiction.15 As with the previous Wharton index, we employ
this methodology to construct a single measure by which localities can be ranked based on
the restrictiveness of their regulatory environments. We also standardize the WRLURI2018
measure such that the sample mean is 0 and its standard deviation is 1, with lower (higher)
values of the index reflecting a less (more) restrictive regulatory regime in the community.
Table 3.1 shows the weights, or factor loadings, of each subindex in the aggregate index,
as well as the correlation with the aggregate index.16 Note that the Court Involvement
Index, State Political Involvement Index, and Local Political Pressure Index have the highest factor loadings and almost the same strong correlation with the aggregate index, while
the Density Restriction Index and Supply Restriction Index have the lowest factor loadings
and weakest correlations with WRLURI2018. This indicates that there is relatively high
variation across communities in the different political and court involvement indexes, but
not as much in the supply and density restriction measures. That further implies the former
set of subindexes are more influential in determining rankings of communities in terms of
overall restrictiveness, but it does not mean they are the most influential in determining
15
16

Stata’s PCA routine is used to extract the principal component from each subindex.
The factor loadings are the weights applied when multiplying by each of the subindexes (which are
themselves standardized in the principal component analysis) to generate the WRLURI2018 index as a
linear combination of the twelve subindexes.
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the absolute level of restrictiveness in a community.

3.3. Results
3.3.1. Inside Versus Outside Metropolitan Areas
Our full sample contains complete subindex and aggregate index data on 2,472 communities
across the nation.17 Information on the distribution of WRLURI2018 values for this sample
are reported in the first column of Table 3.2. As noted above, the mean index value for
the full sample is zero with a standard deviation of one by construction (see the first and
second rows).18 More detail on the full distribution is provided in the remaining rows of
the column. The interquartile range runs from -0.68 to 0.62, so the middle fifty percent of
communities have aggregate index values within seven-tenths of a standard deviation from
the sample mean.
The second column reports index values for the 2,233 communities that lie within any corebased statistical area (CBSA) in the nation. Given that they represent 90 percent of the
sample, their distribution looks much like that for the full sample. This is not the case
for the 239 communities outside of CBSAs. Their mean WRLURI2018 value is 0.3 standard deviations below that for the metro area sample, and the median community outside a
metropolitan area has an index value of -0.51, which puts it one-half of a standard deviation
below the full sample mean. While the average community outside of any CBSA is much
less regulated by our measure, this does not hold for its entire distribution. The top tail
of the non-CBSA sample–from the 90th percentile and above–is nearly as highly regulated
as the most regulated jurisdictions within metropolitan areas. While the stark differences
17

This includes cases in which we allocated answers. This was done for Questions 3, 4, 8 and 9 as follows.
For example, Question 3 asks about the intensity of involvement in the regulatory process by six possible
actors. If all subparts of the question were left blank, we left the responses as missing. However, if the
locality indicated some type of involvement for one or more (but not all) of the actors, we used those
responses and imputed a response of “No Involvement” (i.e., =1) for the other actors listed. Thus, we
never impute any positive involvement and only impute no involvement when a question is at least
partially answered. Allocation flags for these cases are included in the publicly posted data so that
researchers may see which observations were affected.
18
All results in the main body of the paper are based on equal weighting of all relevant survey respondents.
At the end of this section of the paper, we discuss in more detail how our key conclusions are robust to
different assumptions about weighting.
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in regulatory environments among local jurisdictions outside CBSAs are interesting, the
remainder of this paper focuses on results for communities located within a CBSA.

3.3.2. What Does It Mean to be Lightly, Moderately and Highly Regulated in the U.S.?
Table 3.3 reports subindex and census information on communities within CBSAs. The
first column reports this information for the 559 places in the bottom quartile of the WRLURI2018 distribution. These places have index values more than -0.64 standard deviations
below the nationwide mean. For each subindex, we report mean values across individual
places in the bottom quartile. The middle column of Table 3.3 reports analogous information for the 1,116 places with WRLURI2018 values within the interquartile range of that
index. The third column reports information on the 558 places in the top quartile of the
WRLURI2018 distribution.
Index values provide a convenient way to rank communities by their degree of regulatory restrictiveness, but they do not convey what it means in terms of actual policies and practices
on the ground to have a low, average or high degree of regulation. Consequently, Appendix
Table A.4.1 describes the underlying regulatory environments for communities with index
values representative of those reported in the different columns of Table 3.3. For example,
the first row in the middle column of Table 3.3 indicates that the average LPPI value for
communities with WRLURI2018 values within the interquartile range of the distribution
equals 8.61. The top cell of the middle column of Appendix Table A.4.1 then describes what
those numbers mean in terms of the underlying political environment in which regulatory
decisions are being made. An LPPI of 8.61 is consistent with the underlying community
having what it reported as high involvement from its local political officers (on a local council or commission), moderate involvement in terms of community pressure, little to no other
type of local political involvement and no special ballot initiatives regarding the regulatory
or growth process.
A number of other interesting results and patterns can be gleaned from Table 3.3 and
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Appendix Table A.4.1. First, being lightly-regulated (which we define as being in the bottom
quartile of the WRLURI2018 CBSA-based distribution) does not mean these communities
are unregulated or unrestricted. It is true that the underlying local and state political
and legal environments are not ones in which there is intense involvement by politicians,
judges or citizens. Thus, there is little evidence of pressure from the community to ratchet
up regulation. Perhaps not surprisingly, these places typically do not have public meeting
requirement either. The LAI value of 0.33 indicates that only one-third of them do.
However, this less intense degree of local political or community involvement does not mean
the development approval process is simple or easy. Even for projects that do not require
any rezoning, the mean LPAI of 1.67 indicates that many of these ‘lightly-regulated’ places
have multiple entities that must approve the application. The modal response (at 32%)
reports two such entities; 58% of this group of respondents note that a local planning
commission must give its blessing, and 42% indicate that some other local council must do
so. For projects that do require some type of zoning change, the LZAI value of 2.28 indicates
that at least two entities are required for approval; 73% of these respondents note the local
planning commission’s approval is mandatory; 69% note the same for a local council, and
51% claim that a local zoning board approval is required; no other entity listed in survey
question (question 4) has more than a 6% share.
Having less than the average degree of regulation also is associated with a widespread presence of density controls. Density restrictions in the form of minimum lot size requirements
exist in 94% of this group of communities. The most common size is for less than one-half
acre per lot, although the mean subindex value of 1.92 implies that many of this (relatively)
less-regulated group have larger minimum lot sizes in at least one neighborhood.
Density restrictions may be omnipresent, but formal limits or caps on permitting or developing any type of residential property are not. The SRI value of 0.04 is the mean across
six different 0-1 answers for the presence of such rules, which indicates that virtually none
of this group reported any formal supply restriction. Being relatively lightly regulated also
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means that jurisdictions are not likely to have an open space requirement (OSI), mandatory
exactions fees (EI), or an affordable housing program (AHI). Affordable housing programs
are especially rare among this group, as its mean of 0.02 indicates that only 2% of, or 1-in50, communities imposes any type of requirement pertaining to such housing. Open space
requirements and exactions are more common, but only one-third report having the former
and only one-fifth report the latter.
Finally, the typical time delay between submitting an application for a project and hearing
a decision from the government is 3.7 months among this group of communities. That
works out to 111 days presuming 30 days per month. A second noteworthy pattern in the
data is that to be more regulated implies stricter controls across the board, not just along
one or two dimensions. This is illustrated by the fact that all subindex values rise as one
moves from left to right across Table 3.3. Appendix Table A.4.1 then explains that places
in the top quartile of the WRLURI2018 distribution report a high level of involvement by
local public officials; 90% indicated more than moderate levels of such involvement with
over two-thirds claiming a ‘very high’ degree of involvement; 55% of this group also reports
greater than moderate levels of community pressure; and 1-in-5 reported at least one other
important player in the local regulatory process. On average, these communities report more
involvement by their state legislatures and their court systems, too. Thus, the underlying
political and legal environment in which the regulatory process is managed is more intense
than in lightly regulated places (with ‘average’ places in between).
As noted just above, the same holds true for every other dimension by which we measure
the degree of regulation. This is the only group for which the typical community has an
open meeting requirement (LAI=0.60). Formal restrictions on supply still are quite rare
even for this highly regulated group, but there are more entities that must approve (and
thus, can veto) any given project. At least three entities must approve a project that does
not require any zoning change (LPAI=3.22), while nearly four are typically required to
approve anything that requires some type of variance (LZAI=3.69). On average, density
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controls are much more extreme for this group of communities, too. The modal community
has a 2+ acre minimum lot size restriction somewhere within its jurisdiction; 66% of this
group reports a minimum of over one-half acre. Three-quarters of the most highly-regulated
places also have a formal open space requirement (OSI=0.76), and they typically impose
exaction fee regimes on developers (EI=0.75). Less than half have an affordable housing
program, but the slightly more than one-third that do (AHI=0.36) is more than triple the
share in the interquartile range, and is 18 times greater than in the most lightly-regulated
communities. Typical project review times of 8.4 months (252 days) are more than twice
as long as those in the bottom quartile of most lightly-regulated jurisdictions.
What differentiates an average from a lightly-regulated community in the United States is
a somewhat higher intensity of involvement at the local and state political level, modestly
more entities required to approve any type of project, modestly more stringent density
controls in the form of larger minimum lot sizes, the widespread presence of open space
requirements and exaction fees, along with about 40 more days needed to get a decision on
a project application. Thus, there is a fairly extensive regulatory framework in the places
we rate as average in terms of overall strictness.
Finally, the data reported at the bottom of Table 3.3 show that the degree of regulation
is increasing in local income, house value, and educational achievement of the population
as noted in the Introduction. However, the more tightly-regulated places in our sample do
not have a higher share of white residents; in fact, they are five percentage points lower
in white resident share. Finally, they are larger in terms of population and land area, as
well as in terms of population density, but no causal relation between regulation and any
of these variables is implied.

3.3.3. Regulatory Intensity Across Housing Markets
Table 3.4 reports WRLURI2018 values for the 44 CBSAs with at least ten individual community responses to our survey. These are simple averages across each community within
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the relevant CBSA. These areas contain 150,827,922 people according to 2017 estimates
from the American Community Survey (ACS). This is about 49% of the total population
within CBSAs. This list also contains the 16 most populous metropolitan areas in the
country, so the larger urban areas are well represented, but many less populated ones are
not.19
The regional concentration along the coasts of the most highly-regulated housing markets is
obvious from the first eight names. The San Francisco CBSA has the most regulated housing
market in the country by our measure.20 It and the New York City CBSA are the only ones
that have index values more than one standard deviation above the sample mean. Others
in the top quartile of the WRLURI2018 distribution include the Providence, Washington,
DC, Seattle, Los Angeles, Riverside-San Bernardino, Miami (FL), and Phoenix markets.
The Portland (OR) and Madison (WI) markets are also of note, as they have WRLURI2018
values within four-one hundredths of a standard deviation of the cutoff for the top quartile.
Figure 3.1 maps the strong regional pattern. The map presents three groups: the top 11
(in red), the middle 22 (in blue) and the bottom 11 (in green).21
One other noteworthy pattern in the market-level data is the high share of individual communities in coastal markets especially that are themselves very highly regulated by our
measure (i.e., in the top quartile of the distribution of WRLURI2018 values). Table 3.5
reports these shares for the same 44 CBSAs. If a market is in the top quartile of this group,
it is likely that at least 50% the responding communities within its metropolitan borders
are themselves highly regulated. And, in the San Francisco and New York City CBSAs,
19

The 17th and 18th ranked CBSAs are San Diego-Carlsbad (population 3,283,665; six of its communities
responded to our survey) and Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater (population 2,978,209; eight of its
communities responded to our survey), respectively.
20
The San Francisco CBSA does not include the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CBSA. There were only six
communities from that latter market which responded to our survey. Their average WRLURI2018 value
was 0.92, so this CBSA would rank 4th if included separately.
21
Appendix Table A.4.2 reproduces the rankings from our 2008 paper (WRLURI2006) for comparison
purposes. A quick perusal shows broad persistence in relative rankings in the sense that if a market was in
the top third or one-half of the sample in the first survey, it is very likely to be relatively highly ranked in
the latest survey. However, there are some material moves individually, with the jump of various west
coast markets towards the very top of the rankings.
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the shares are three-quarters and two-thirds, respectively. Thus, the most intensely regulated CBSAs are not so because of a few ultra-restrictive outlier communities; rather there
seems to be a high average level of regulation with a tight variance. Among the markets
in the interquartile range of this table, the share of highly-regulated communities averages
from one-quarter to one-third. In the bottom quartile of these markets by WRLURI2018
values, the typical share is even lower–in the 10%-20% range. Thus, there always are some
highly-regulated jurisdictions within any metropolitan housing market that is itself lightlyregulated on average. However, one of the differences between lightly- and highly-regulated
CBSAs appears to be the ease with which a typical household could find a community that
does not strictly regulate the supply side of the market within its own borders.

3.3.4. Sample Representativeness and the Impact of Weighting on Index Values?
All results discussed thus far presume equal weighting of observations. This subsection investigates the representativeness of our survey sample and reports how different weighting
schemes affect our index values and rankings. The International City Managers Association (ICMA) sent the 2018 survey instrument to 10,949 of its member municipalities and
received 2,825 responses for a response rate of 25.8%.22 The response rates by municipality population are listed in Appendix Table A.4.3. The median (mean) population of the
respondent communities is 8,100 (22,550), which is in line with the median ICMA-member
city.
Because of sampling variability and the potential for differential non-response, we investigated three potential sets of weights that help tell us: (1) how representative the overall
sample is compared to the universe of localities in the U.S.; (2) how representative is the
22

ICMA also sent the survey to 2,901 county equivalent governments and received 521 responses (18.0%).
These 521 may be traditional county governments (that contain many independently-governed
municipalities), consolidated municipality-county governments, or independent municipalities not within a
larger county. The latter two categories are classed as county governments, but govern independently, do
not contain other localities, and are themselves not part of a larger county. Therefore, we include the 23
consolidated municipality-county or independent municipalities in our sample. We do not include
traditional county governments in our dataset because we wish to study the smallest level of local
government with authority over local land use and the residential real estate planning/regulatory process.
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sample of respondents in CBSAs to the set of all localities located in metropolitan areas;
and (3) how representative is the sample of respondents in individual metropolitan areas to
the universe of localities within each relevant area.
To investigate the first issue, we began with a master list of all U.S. localities.23 Using the
55,269 localities in our master file, we estimated a logit specification that regressed a 0-1
dichotomous indicator for whether the locality responded to the survey request on the host
of demographic variables listed in Weighting Analysis Table 2 in the third section of the
online appendix. That table also reports regression coefficients which indicate that morepopulated localities, those with a higher share of people under 18, and places with a higher
share of college graduates are more likely to be in our final sample. Conversely, places with
higher rates of home ownership, a larger share of older residents, and a greater share of nonHispanic whites are statistically significantly less likely to be in the sample. Interestingly, a
locality’s median household income and median house value are not predictive of response.
Consistent with standard practice, the probability of selection is computed for each responding locality using the coefficients from the logit estimation. The sample weight then
is computed as the inverse probability of selection. In total, we create the three sets of
weights discussed above: full sample weights, CBSA sample weights, and individual CBSA
sample weights. The full sample weights are relevant for making inferences about the universe of the nation’s cities and towns. CBSA sample weights are relevant for inferences
about localities that are in metropolitan areas (i.e., CBSAs). The individual CBSA sample
weights come from logit regressions run separately for each CBSA in the US for which there
were at least ten responding communities.24
The first noteworthy conclusion is that weighting does not affect the distribution of overall
(or CBSA-based) index values much at all. This is documented in Weighting Analysis
23

These included Census Designated Places, County Subdivisions (but not Census County Divisions, as they
are purely statistical units that have no legal or governmental function), consolidated municipality-county
governments and independent municipalities
24
Those results are too voluminous to show individually even in the online appendix.
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Table 3 from the online appendix, which is the analogue to Table 3.2 in the main text.
A quick perusal shows that the index values for different points along the distribution of
index values never vary by as much as one-tenth of a standard deviation, and often by much
less. Another way to look at how much weighting matters in this context is to compute the
average change in index ranking for the typical community responding to the survey. We
created unweighted and weighted percentile ranks for each community. Differencing showed
that no place moved more than three percentiles (e.g., from the 11th to 14th percentile
in terms of overall regulatory strictness), with the median observation moving only by a
single percentile. Perhaps this is not so surprising given the large number of underlying
observations. One randomly drawn sample in excess of 2,000 observations is likely to look
similar to another.25
Weighting also does not affect our conclusions about index values for groups of lightly,
average, and highly rated communities either. Weighting Analysis Table 4 from the online
appendix, which is the analogue to Table 3.3 in the main body of the paper, shows how
little subindex values change when we use weights. For example, without weights, the
average LPPI subindex value for communities in the interquartile range of WRLURI2018
was 8.61; this is very close to the 8.43 when weights are used (middle column of the top
row of Weighting Analysis Table 4 in the online appendix. This further implies that our
description of what it means to be lightly or highly regulated in the main body of the paper
is not materially altered by whether weights are used.
Weighting should matter more at the market level, where the number of observations in any
given CBSA is smaller. However, Weighting Analysis Table 5 from the online appendix,
which is the analogue to Table 3.4 in the main text, shows that there is relatively little
change in index values or ranks except in a few cases. The top five CBSAs are nearly same
25

Another way to look at how much weighting matters is to compute the average change in index ranking for
the typical community responding to the survey. We created unweighted and weighted percentile ranks for
each community. Differencing showed that no place moved more than three percentiles (e.g., from the 11th
to 14th percentile in terms of overall regulatory strictness), with the median observation moving only by a
single percentile.
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(with Los Angeles dropping out and Riverside, CA moving from 6th to 5th when we weight),
and the index values are quite similar, too. The only notable changes across the weighted
and unweighted rankings are for metropolitan areas for which observations are sparse. The
Phoenix metro, for example, has only 11 observations in our data. It drops from ninth in the
equally weighted rankings reported in the text to 17th in the weighted rankings below, and
its value declines from 0.64 to 0.26. Youngstown, Ohio–which has exactly 10 observations–
moves in the opposite direction, from 15th in the unweighted version to 6th in the weighted.
Its index value rises to 0.74 from 0.32. As expected, the greater the number of observations,
the less sensitive the CBSA’s ranking is to survey weights. The simple correlation between
number of observations within a CBSA and its (absolute value) ranking change is -0.27.
By construction, the mean difference in rankings is zero; the mean absolute value ranking
change is three.
In sum, index users well may want to weight when using the data in a different research
context. However, weighting turns out not to materially influence any of our key conclusions
about the nature of the local residential land use regulatory environment.

3.4. Key Changes in the Regulatory Environment Over Time
Because altering policy involves a formal legal process, we would not expect the regulatory
environment to exhibit substantial high frequency change on a monthly or annual basis. Fortunately, the decade-plus span between the first and second Wharton surveys allows much
more time to see whether there have been meaningful alterations in the local regulatory
environment.26
We can measure change in the local regulatory environment by comparing answers to a variety of questions that are identical (or close to identical) across the two surveys. Moreover,
we have the ability to see whether changes are due to selection effects from a different set of
26

Most of the survey responses are from 12-14 years apart, as the first Wharton survey was sent out in late
2004, with the last round of responses received as late as 2006. The second survey was conducted entirely
within calendar year 2018.
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communities responding to each survey. In addition to the full sample of respondents who
answered a given year’s survey, we typically have from 750-900 communities that answered
any given question in both surveys, with about 500 having answered all questions fully
across both surveys.
To conserve space, we focus on four major changes in the nature of the local residential land
use environment over the first and second decades of the 21st Century in the remainder of
this section. Much more detail on changes in responses over time to numerous individual
questions based on a comparison of the full cross sections from 2006 and 2018, as well as
within the (smaller) panel of jurisdictions that responded to both surveys, is provided in
our online appendix.
The first truly noteworthy feature apparent from comparing results across the two surveys
is not a change at all, but the absence of change. More specifically, housing markets characterized as having highly restrictive local land use environments in 2006 seem highly resistant
to weakening. At the metropolitan area level, there is no case of a highly regulated market as of 2006 becoming substantially less regulated over time.27 Even though our indexes
help us rank and thus convey relative (not absolute) restrictiveness of the land use control
regime, perhaps the easiest way to see this is by comparing the ranking of CBSAs as of 2018
in Table 3.4 to the 2006 rankings in Appendix Table A.4.2. There are no cases in which a
market ranked in the top quartile in terms of supply side restrictiveness in 2006 changed to
being relatively lightly regulated by our 2018 metric. This does not happen at the subindex
or individual survey question level either. To the extent there is change, it is to strengthen
the control regime.28
27

This should not be interpreted as indicating that no individual jurisdiction in a metropolitan area that is
highly regulated on average ever becomes less regulated. That does happen across all types of metropolitan
areas, as is documented in the final section of our online appendix. What is implied is that it never is the
case that a sufficiently large number of jurisdictions in a highly-regulated market become so much less
regulated over time that the metropolitan itself becomes meaningfully less regulated. Indeed, the trend is
for more communities in those CBSAs to become more highly regulated than become lightly regulated.
28
In our online appendix, we calculated the share of communities in regional groupings that showed a net
increase in regulatory stringency based on their answers to a wide array of questions. CBSAs on the West
Coast (which we defined as having at least one of its constituent counties touching the Pacific Ocean) had
the highest share of individual communities within them which increased regulatory strictness (63%). This
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Why this is so should be a pressing question for research because the long-term nature of
the restrictive regulatory environment has obvious implications for housing affordability in
these markets and the debate over inequality more broadly. One reason for no movement
would be no meaningful change in underlying economic or social conditions over time so
that these parameters of a community’s decision problem also did not change. That seems
unlikely, especially in economic terms, as the Great Recession occurred between the surveys.
This suggests future research should search elsewhere to understand this phenomenon. One
hypothesis that could have explanatory power was posited by Glaeser (2020). To account
for the winners and losers of urbanization around the globe, he suggested that private
sector actors had much greater capacity to influence conditions than local governments did,
many of which were quite weak. In his framework, the private actors were the insiders who
could bend policy to serve their needs, with weak local officials unable to address the needs
of less rich and less powerful citizens. Glaeser (2020) did not directly address our issue,
but his framework seems likely to be relevant as existing landowners are the insiders who
could control land use policy through their elected officials; the outsiders are current renters
and those who live elsewhere (and, thus, cannot vote locally) but would like to live in the
restrictive environment at a lower price. This well may not provide a complete answer,
but given that we can now measure changes in regulatory strictness over time and the
obvious relevance of this stylized fact to the housing affordability and inequality debates,
understanding this stasis among highly regulated markets should be a top priority for urban
and housing researchers.
One characteristic of the most regulated metropolitan areas is the spread of highly restrictive regulation across more individual jurisdictions within these markets. Among the top
quartile of our CBSA sample in terms of regulatory strictness, the share of their communities that themselves are highly regulated (as defined by having index values in the top
was closely followed by CBSAs from our East Coast region (which required at least one constituent county
touching the Atlantic Ocean) at 59%. They also had the smallest shares of individual communities that
decreased regulatory stringency over time, at 15% (West Coast) and 21% (East Coast). The interested
reader should see the online appendix for more detail on how these figures were derived.
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quartile of all jurisdictions throughout the nation for each survey year) increased in 9 of 10
areas.29 This pattern is not evident at the other end of the distribution. In fact, among the
bottom quartile that comprise our the least-regulated metropolitan areas, 8 of 10 markets
experienced decreases (not increases) in the share of their communities that themselves
are highly regulated per the definition above. Among the 20 markets in the interquartile
range of regulatory strictness, half of them experienced increasing shares of highly regulated
communities and half saw decreases in that share.
The potential implications of this phenomenon are very important for research. In the extreme, if households cannot find any locality whose supply side is not tightly regulated, then
affordability conditions throughout a metropolitan area could deteriorate rapidly whenever
demand surges. Pre-COVID conditions in the Bay Area mentioned in the Introduction beg
the question of whether this explains what was happening in that market. Key aspects of
housing markets that urban economists tend to take for granted, such as filtering, need to
be reexamined. If there is little or no way for households to substitute away from restrictive to non-restrictive communities within the labor market area, land prices could become
very high. Recent research finds very large impacts of restrictive supply side conditions
on residential land prices throughout the entirety of major land markets on both coasts
(Gyourko & Krimmel (2020)). In the Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle markets on
the west coasts, they estimate land prices to be at least $100,000 higher for a standardized
one quarter acre lot even if the parcel is more than 30 miles out from the metro urban core.
Price impact is up to four times higher for better located close-in sites within 15 miles of the
metro centroid. Land prices that get high enough could incent owners to upgrade virtually
all housing, thereby interrupting the filtering process which many believe is essential to
providing affordable housing to less well-off households in a market. Whether this is in fact
happening is an important research issue for urban economics.
The usage of regulation itself changed in various ways that are discussed more fully in our
29

We use only 40 of the 44 CBSAs from above in this calculation, as four markets had less than 10
communities respond to the 2006 survey.
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online appendix. The most important is associated with the rise of density controls in
the form of minimum lot size restrictions to nearly omnipresent status. Minimum lot size
restrictions were widespread at the time of the first survey, with 84% of communities having
them in at least one neighborhood. That share grew to 94% according to the 2018 survey.30
Perhaps more striking is the increase in the size of the largest minimum lot size regulation
within a given jurisdiction. Information from figures in our online appendix shows that the
share of communities experiencing an increase in their largest minimum lot size between
surveys was double that which saw a decline (41% versus 20%, with the rest unchanged).31
The modal minimum still is under one-half acre, but the share with a larger minimum
increased from 39% in the 2006 survey to 52% in the 2018 survey.32 While over half of
communities now have a density control requiring at least one-half acre lot sizes somewhere
in their jurisdictions, over one-third (35%) have a 1-acre+ minimum versus 25% in 2006.
The growing popularity of density controls in the form of increasingly stringent minimum
lot size restrictions is in stark contrast to most other regulations asked about in our survey
Data presented in our online appendix show no such increases in community usage or
adoption of open space requirements, affordable housing programs, exactions, or hard caps
on permitting or development. There also has been no material increase in project review
times.33 Regulations such as open space requirements, affordable housing requirements or
explicit impact fees (exactions) directly raise costs to builders for whatever they want to
supply. Density controls primarily restrict what a developer can build (to a more expensive
product). They may be all that is truly essential for a community to control who lives in
it. Research needs to understand why the benefit-cost ratio for more and higher minimum
lot size restrictions appears to have become more favorable compared to other ways that
30

These data are from Question 7a in 2018 and Question 6 in 2006.
These data are from Question 7b in 2018 and Question 6 in 2006.
32
This is for the small set of cities that answered both surveys. The increase is even greater using the
changes based on the two cross sections. See our online appendix for more detail.
33
This is not to imply that these other regulations are not in widespread use, only that they are not
becoming more widespread (or more onerous in the case of review times). Open space requirements are
reported to be in place by between 57%-59% of communities in both surveys. Exactions programs actually
have declined by about one-quarter between survey years. Again, see the data presentation in our online
appendix for more on how these programs either have not changed much or have declined in popularity.
31
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localities can restrict land use or raise the cost of building.
The other major change in the regulatory environment is reflected in the increase in the
number of entities that must approve a project requiring rezoning.34 This is important
because increasing the number of potential veto points raises the level of uncertainty faced
by prospective builders. Researchers using the survey response data should take care in
making this comparison because the 2018 survey asked about more entities that might have
approval rights (9 in 2018 versus 6 in 2006). Hence, we standardized on the six entities
asked about in both surveys.35 The share of communities reporting that there was only one
entity required to approve a project requiring rezoning in 2018 fell by about ten percentage
points by 2018, with a similar fall for those claiming two entities were required. These 20
share points are shifted up the distribution in the 2018 survey responses, with the bulk
of the change (from 16-19 points depending upon the sample–cross sections or panel of
jurisdictions answering both surveys) observed on a sharply increased share of places saying
that by 2018 three entities were required to approve any project requiring rezoning. Among
the group that answered both surveys, in 2006 slightly more communities reported only one
entity required for approval than reported three were needed; just over a decade later, the
share reporting three was nearly four times that reporting only one. This is further reflected
in the fact that 45% of communities that responded to both surveys increased the number
of entities required for project approval versus only 15% that lowered the number.36
This change makes the approval process more arduous, especially for proposed projects of a
type that are not already extant or allowed by rule in the jurisdiction. This begs the interesting research question of how much uncertainty is introduced by an additional required
34

The data discussed in this paragraph are drawn from the answers to the first part of Question 4 from the
2018 survey and from Question 2 in the 2006 survey. The presentation in the online appendix provides
added detail.
35
These entities were the Local Planning Commission, Local Council, County Board, Environmental Review
Board, Public Health Board, and Design Review Board.
36
It is noteworthy that this increase did not occur for ‘by right’ projects (i.e., those not needing a variance to
the zoning code). Those results are based on responses to the second part of Question 4 in 2018 and
Question 6 from the 2006 survey. Hence, the increased hurdles and ultimate uncertainty of approval are
only for projects not consistent with the extant zoning code in the typical community.
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approver entity. Related is the question of how developers might price this change. Whatever the answer, the data across the two surveys tell us that local jurisdictions value the
ability to control density directly via minimum lot size regulations and prefer the approval
process to be more arduous and uncertain as opposed to directly making it more expensive
via imposing impact fees or other building requirements.

3.5. Conclusion
We reported results from a new survey of residential land use regulation across nearly
2,500 individual jurisdictions across the nation and constructed an aggregate measure
that allows us to rank communities by the degree of regulation. We also discussed how
these results may be compared and contrasted with those from the first Wharton survey of 2006. We believe that the combination provides the first consistent national data
with which to measure changes in residential land use regulation at the local jurisdiction
level. Researchers are welcome to download the data for their own usage (at http://realfaculty.wharton.upenn.edu/gyourko/land-use-survey/).
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3.6. Figures
Figure 3.1: Regional Variation in Land Use Regulation

Notes: Figure shows only the 44 Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) with 10 or more WRLURI2018
observations.

3.7. Tables
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Table 3.1: WRLURI2018 and Its Components

Full Sample: n=2,472

Table 3.2: WRLURI2018 Summary Statistics for Communities Inside and Outside CBSAs
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Table 3.3: Variation Across the WRLURI2018 Distribution

CBSA Sample: n=2,233
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Table 3.4: WRLURI2018 Values for CBSAs with Ten or More Observations
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Table 3.5: Share of Places in Top WRLURI2018 Quartile for CBSAs with Ten or More
Observations
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APPENDIX
A.1. Reclaiming Local Control: Appendix Tables
A.1.1. Robustness
Table A.1.1: Effect of School Finance Reform on Housing Supply Restrictions - Excluding
SF, LA, SD

Post X Constrained
Post-Reform
Constrained District
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1973
District Controls
FE

(1)
Any Reg

(2)
Any Reg

(3)
Any Reg

(4)
Any Reg

0.047
(0.041)
0.088∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.012
(0.017)

0.047
(0.046)
0.088∗∗∗
(0.015)
-0.129∗∗∗
(0.025)

0.047∗
(0.028)
0.088∗∗∗
(0.014)

0.047∗
(0.026)

3237
0.133
0.14
Yes
District Type

3237
0.311
0.14
Yes
County

3237
0.749
0.14
Yes
District

3237
0.756
0.14
Yes
District, Year

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include district controls, city coordinates controls, district type FE
Standard Errors Clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01

A.1.2. Heterogeneous Effects
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Table A.1.2: Triple Difference: School District Above Median Income, 1970

High Income X Constrained X Post
Income X Post
Income X Constrained
High Income
Post X Constrained
Post-Reform
Constrained District
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1973
District Controls
FE

(1)
Any Reg.

(2)
Any Reg.

(3)
Any Reg.

(4)
Any Reg.

0.081
(0.065)
0.025
(0.036)
-0.040
(0.034)
-0.000
(0.020)
-0.007
(0.036)
0.068∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.068∗∗∗
(0.022)

0.081
(0.056)
0.025
(0.024)
0.047
(0.029)
-0.041∗∗
(0.017)
-0.007
(0.032)
0.068∗∗∗
(0.009)
-0.065∗∗∗
(0.022)

0.081∗∗
(0.037)
0.025
(0.022)

0.081∗∗
(0.036)
0.025
(0.022)

-0.007
(0.017)
0.068∗∗∗
(0.008)

-0.007
(0.016)

5447
0.100
0.11
Yes
District Type

5447
0.253
0.11
Yes
County

5447
0.695
0.11
Yes
District

5447
0.700
0.11
Yes
District, Year

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include district controls, city coordinates controls, district type FE
Standard Errors Clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table A.1.3: Triple Difference: School District Above Median College Educated, 1970
(1)
Any Reg.

(2)
Any Reg.

(3)
Any Reg.

(4)
Any Reg.

0.098∗∗
(0.039)
0.041∗
(0.024)
0.075∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.032∗∗
(0.014)
-0.036
(0.027)
0.058∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.021
(0.016)

0.098∗∗
(0.047)
0.041∗∗
(0.018)
0.119∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.014
(0.015)
-0.036
(0.036)
0.058∗∗∗
(0.011)
-0.131∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.098∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.012)

0.098∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.012)

-0.036∗∗
(0.016)
0.058∗∗∗
(0.009)

-0.036∗∗
(0.016)

5447
0.109
0.11
Yes
District Type

5447
0.259
0.11
Yes
County

5447
0.696
0.11
Yes
District

5447
0.701
0.11
Yes
District, Year

High College X Constrained X Post
College X Post
College X Constrained
High College
Post X Constrained
Post-Reform
Constrained District
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1973
District Controls
FE
Standard errors in parentheses

All specifications include district controls, city coordinates controls, district type FE
Standard Errors Clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table A.1.4: Triple Difference: School District Above Median Pct. White 1970

High White X Constrained X Post
High White X Post
High White X Constrained
High White Share
Post X Constrained
Post-Reform
Constrained District
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1973
District Controls
FE

(1)
Any Reg.

(2)
Any Reg.

(3)
Any Reg.

(4)
Any Reg.

0.067
(0.050)
0.028
(0.025)
0.008
(0.023)
0.067∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.003
(0.036)
0.062∗∗
(0.025)
0.036∗
(0.018)

0.067
(0.049)
0.028∗
(0.016)
0.088∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.089∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.003
(0.034)
0.062∗∗∗
(0.013)
-0.099∗∗∗
(0.020)

0.067∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.028∗∗
(0.012)

0.067∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.028∗∗
(0.012)

0.003
(0.016)
0.062∗∗∗
(0.011)

0.003
(0.015)

5447
0.107
0.11
Yes
District Type

5447
0.270
0.11
Yes
County

5447
0.695
0.11
Yes
District

5447
0.700
0.11
Yes
District, Year

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include district controls, city coordinates controls, district type FE
Standard Errors Clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table A.1.5: Triple Difference: School District Above Median Enrollment, 1972

High Enrollment X Constrained X Post
High Enrollment X Post
High Enrollment X Constrained
High Enrollment
Post X Constrained
Post-Reform
Constrained District
Observations
R2
Mean DV, 1973
District Controls
FE

(1)
Any Reg.

(2)
Any Reg.

(3)
Any Reg.

(4)
Any Reg.

-0.004
(0.050)
0.019
(0.022)
-0.040∗
(0.021)
0.040∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.061∗
(0.036)
0.064∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.059∗∗∗
(0.015)

-0.004
(0.051)
0.019
(0.018)
-0.076∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.033∗∗
(0.014)
0.061∗
(0.035)
0.064∗∗∗
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.017)

-0.004
(0.029)
0.019
(0.014)

-0.004
(0.028)
0.019
(0.013)

0.061∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.064∗∗∗
(0.010)

0.061∗∗∗
(0.020)

5447
0.100
0.11
Yes
District Type

5447
0.252
0.11
Yes
County

5447
0.694
0.11
Yes
District

5447
0.699
0.11
Yes
District, Year

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include district controls, city coordinates controls, district type FE
Standard Errors Clustered at County-Year level.
Sample includes only unified and elementary districts
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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A.2. Reclaiming Local Control: Appendix Figures
A.2.1. The Rise of Land Use Regulations in California
California is the most housing supply-constrained state in the US today (Gyourko et al.,
2019). However, this is relatively recent phenomenon; land use regulations became prominent in California only in the 1970s.

Figure A.2.1: Share of California cities with at least one land use regulation, 1967-1992
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Author’s calculations using data via Jackson (2016). Red vertical line at 1973, the year California’s school
finance reform was implemented. Includes 411 cities incorporated prior to 1973.

A.2.2. Robustness
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Figure A.2.2: Placebo Test: Assessed Property Value Per-Pupil

Differential Likelihood of Regulation Over Time
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SEs clustered at county-year
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A.3. Redlining: Appendix
A.3.1. HOLC Instructions to Local Financiers
"Four classifications are used as indicated by the legend, namely: First, Second, Third and Fourth grades. The codes letters and colors are A, B, C, and D,
and Green, Blue, Yellow and Red respectively. In establishing the grade of an area,
such factors as these are considered: intensity of the sale and rental demand; percentage of
home ownership; age and type of building; economic stability of the area; social status of the
population; sufficiency of public utilities, accessibility of schools, churches, and business centers; transportation methods; topography of the area; and the restrictions set up to protect
the neighborhoods. The price level of homes is not the guiding factor.

The First grade of A areas are "hot spots"; they are not fully built up. In nearly
all instances they are the new well planned sections of the city, and almost synonymous with
the area where good mortgage lenders with available funds are willing to make their maximum
loans to be amortized over 10-15 year period –perhaps up to 75-80% of the appraisal. They
are homogeneous; in demand as residential locations in "good times" or "bad"; hence on the
upgrade. The Second grade or B areas, as a rule, are completely developed. They
are like a 1935 automobile – still good, but not what the people are buying today
who can afford a new one. They are neighborhoods where good mortgage lenders will have
a tendency to hold loan commitments 10-15% under the limit. The Third grade or C areas
are characterized by age, obsolescence, and change of style; expiring restrictions
or lack of them; infiltration of a lower grade population; the presence of influences
with increase sales resistance such as inadequate transportation, insufficient utilities, perhaps
heavy tax burdens, poor maintenance of homes etc. "Jerry" built areas are included, as well
as neighborhoods lacking homogeneity. Generally, these have reached the transition period.
Good mortgage lenders are more conservative in the Third grade or C areas and
hold loan commitments under the lending ration for the A and B areas. The fourth
grade or D areas represent those neighborhoods in which the things that are now taking
place in the C neighborhoods, have already happened. They are characterized by detrimental influences in a pronounced degree, undesirable population of an infiltration
of it. Low percentage of home ownership, very poor maintenance and often vandalism prevail.
Unstable incomes of the people and difficult collections are usually prevalent. The areas are
broader than the so-called slum districts. Some mortgage lenders may refuse to make
loans in these neighborhoods and others will lend only on a conservative basis.
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These maps and descriptions have been carefully checked with competent local
real estate brokers and mortgage lenders, and we believe they represent a fair and
composite opinion of the best qualified local people. In using them we do not mean
to imply that good mortgages do not exist or cannot be made in the Third and Fourth grade
areas, but we do think they should be made as serviced on a different basis than in the First
and Second grade areas." (Emphasis Added)1

1

Residential Security Map of Baltimore, MD 1937 https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/32621
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Table A.3.1: Redlining by Race in the Full Sample of Cities, 1940
City
Chicago, Illinois
Los Angeles, California
Brooklyn, New York
Detroit, Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Manhattan, New York
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Bronx, New York
Queens, New York
Cleveland, Ohio
St.Louis, Missouri
Baltimore, Maryland
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Boston, Massachusetts
Hudson County, New Jersey
San Francisco, California
Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin
Buffalo, New York
New Orleans, Louisiana
Oakland, California
Indianapolis, Indiana
Atlanta, Georgia
Essex County, New Jersey
Greater Kansas City, Missouri
Seattle, Washington
Louisville, Kentucky
Denver, Colorado
Rochester, New York
Dallas, Texas
Columbus, Ohio
Portland, Oregon
Akron, Ohio
Toledo, Ohio
Birmingham, Alabama
Hartford, Connecticut
Dayton, Ohio
Syracuse, New York
Flint, Michigan
Richmond, Virginia
Staten Island, New York
New Haven, Connecticut
East St. Louis, Illinois
Bergen County, New Jersey
Lower Westchester Co., New York
Camden, New Jersey
Trenton, New Jersey
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Duluth, Minnesota
Macon, Georgia
Augusta, Georgia
Atlantic City, New Jersey
TOTAL

Population
3400000
2790000
2700000
2070000
1930000
1890000
1410000
1390000
1300000
1230000
1090000
860000
820000
770000
650000
630000
590000
580000
490000
490000
450000
440000
430000
400000
370000
340000
320000
320000
320000
310000
310000
290000
280000
270000
250000
220000
210000
210000
190000
170000
160000
150000
140000
140000
120000
120000
110000
100000
80000
70000
60000
34400000

Black
Population Share Share Redlined
8
98
3
86
4
90
8
94
13
89
16
90
6
66
2
81
2
48
7
94
11
82
19
90
1
31
3
93
2
82
1
59
2
98
3
5
29
88
3
79
12
87
29
77
11
83
10
96
1
69
14
77
2
91
1
83
16
36
12
82
1
58
5
67
5
75
41
96
3
0
9
97
1
82
3
98
32
95
2
31
4
60
15
99
3
.
3
52
11
94
7
75
4
68
0
25
42
76
40
98
24
99
8
86

A.3.2. Border Tract Summary Statistics
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White
Population Share Share Redlined
92
35
95
26
96
46
92
37
87
50
83
58
94
26
98
46
98
12
93
34
89
24
81
33
99
12
97
43
97
48
95
35
98
45
97
4
70
49
96
26
88
40
71
30
89
46
90
59
96
20
86
33
97
32
99
29
84
14
88
24
98
24
95
13
95
7
59
56
97
2
91
33
99
26
97
46
68
38
98
35
96
22
85
41
97
.
97
26
89
50
93
32
95
44
100
16
58
64
60
80
75
13
92
35

Table A.3.2: Redlining by Race in 1930 sample
City
Chicago, Illinois
Brooklyn, New York
Manhattan, New York
Detroit, Michigan
Bronx, New York
Los Angeles, California
Cleveland, Ohio
Queens, New York
St.Louis, Missouri
Boston, Massachusetts
Baltimore, Maryland
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin
Buffalo, New York
Indianapolis, Indiana
Columbus, Ohio
Syracuse, New York
Staten Island, New York
Lower Westchester Co., New York
TOTAL

Population
3380000
2560000
1870000
1560000
1280000
1230000
1110000
1080000
820000
780000
760000
670000
580000
570000
360000
290000
210000
160000
130000
19400000

Black
Population Share Share Redlined
7
98
3
90
12
93
8
96
1
77
3
87
6
96
2
46
11
87
3
93
15
78
8
78
Race
Data
2
5
12
89
11
81
1
71
2
36
3
35
6
89
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White
Population Share Share Redlined
92
37
97
51
87
64
92
45
99
50
86
32
93
41
98
13
88
35
97
47
85
36
92
38
Not
Available
98
5
88
44
89
25
99
27
98
38
97
32
90
41

Table A.3.3: Summary Statistics for 1940, Standard Deviations in Parentheses

Housing Units
Population
Density
Home Ownership
Pct. Black
Pct. White
Pct. Other
Area(sqmi)
Miles to City Center
Male LFPR
Pct. Foreign
Pct. Homes In Disrepair
Pct. Homes with Radio
Pct. Homes with Heating
Pct. Homes with Fridge
Median Yrs. Schooling
Share of Tracts With No Blacks
N

Redlined Border Tracts

Yellow Border Tracts

All Red-Yellow Border Tracts

1,624
(1,399)
5,650
(4,876)
21,362
(19,964)
.308
(.174)
.128
(.231)
.866
(.233)
.00582
(.0334)
.82
(4.73)
3.85
(3.05)
.804
(.0582)
.144
(.103)
.117
(.119)
.891
(.114)
.512
(.321)
.459
(.183)
8.17
(1.53)
.173
(.379)

1,718
(1,571)
5,789
(5,213)
17,834
(16,204)
.381
(.182)
.0292
(.0821)
.969
(.0824)
.0021
(.00959)
.814
(1.67)
4.74
(3.55)
.813
(.0566)
.14
(.0872)
.0712
(.0795)
.934
(.0784)
.659
(.312)
.62
(.166)
9.1
(1.71)
.226
(.418)

1,693
(1,541)
5,754
(5,119)
18,889
(17,956)
.358
(.187)
.07
(.168)
.926
(.17)
.00395
(.025)
.877
(3.52)
4.37
(3.34)
.809
(.0567)
.14
(.093)
.0884
(.0996)
.917
(.0959)
.611
(.324)
.565
(.198)
8.83
(1.81)
.198
(.398)

918

1,137

2,224
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Table A.3.4: Summary Statistics for Select Years, Standard Deviations in Parentheses
Red Border Tracts
1940
1970
2000

Yellow Border Tracts
1940
1970
2000

All Border Tracts
1940
1970
2000

Housing Units

1,624
(1,399)

2,059
(2,464)

2,043
(3,228)

1,718
(1,571)

2,654
(3,006)

2,790
(3,768)

1,693
(1,541)

2,471
(2,888)

2,571
(3,712)

Population

5,650
(4,876)

5,897
(7,855)

5,055
(8,466)

5,789
(5,213)

7,445
(8,953)

7,064
(10,433)

5,754
(5,119)

6,936
(8,602)

6,390
(9,905)

Density

21,362
(19,964)

16,684
(15,438)

13,029
(13,915)

17,834
(16,204)

16,213
(13,087)

13,819
(13,051)

18,889
(17,956)

16,239
(14,249)

13,412
(13,692)

Home Ownership

.308
(.174)

.38
(.218)

.383
(.191)

.381
(.182)

.44
(.223)

.431
(.193)

.358
(.187)

.422
(.225)

.419
(.197)

Pct. Black

.128
(.231)

.362
(.364)

.471
(.367)

.0292
(.0821)

.271
(.349)

.406
(.366)

.07
(.168)

.302
(.353)

.426
(.367)

Pct. White

.866
(.233)

.617
(.359)

.308
(.299)

.969
(.0824)

.712
(.347)

.372
(.321)

.926
(.17)

.68
(.35)

.358
(.318)

Pct. Other

.00582
(.0334)

.0209
(.0485)

.221
(.267)

.0021
(.00959)

.0166
(.0281)

.222
(.262)

.00395
(.025)

.0184
(.0377)

.216
(.26)

918

918

918

1,137

1,137

1,137

2,224

2,224

2,224

N
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Table A.3.5: Initial Conditions of Border Tracts, With Controls, 1940
(1)
Log Total Units

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. Black

(4)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.011
(0.058)
0.007
(0.005)
0.543∗∗∗
(0.137)
1.649∗∗
(0.808)
2.781∗∗∗
(0.744)
-0.409
(0.249)
2.763∗∗∗
(0.653)
0.350
(0.275)
-1.261∗∗∗
(0.434)
0.217∗∗∗
(0.039)

-0.034
(0.075)
-0.076∗∗
(0.029)
0.751∗∗∗
(0.170)
1.162
(0.826)
4.643∗∗∗
(0.794)
-0.382
(0.367)
4.403∗∗∗
(0.741)
0.998∗∗∗
(0.356)
-2.647∗∗∗
(0.539)
0.223∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.028∗∗∗
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.001)

0.237
(0.170)
0.321∗∗
(0.120)
0.203∗∗∗
(0.064)
-0.347∗
(0.196)
0.116∗
(0.066)
-0.322∗∗∗
(0.094)
-0.005
(0.005)

-0.033∗∗
(0.012)
0.004∗
(0.002)
-0.048
(0.044)
-0.070
(0.117)
-0.056
(0.139)
0.057
(0.041)
0.163
(0.197)
-0.079
(0.053)
0.259∗∗∗
(0.081)
-0.018∗∗∗
(0.006)

2051
0.266
1940 Border Tracts
Border Segment
7.12

2055
0.409
1940 Border Tracts
Border Segment
9.36

2053
0.295
1940 Border Tracts
Border Segment
.07

2046
0.148
1940 Border Tracts
Border Segment
.35

Redlined
Tract Area
Pct.Blk in ’40
LFPR in ’40
Pct.Foreign in ’40
Pct.Disrepair in ’40
Pct.Radio in ’40
Pct.Heating in 40’
Pct.Fridge in ’40
Schooling in ’40
Observations
R2
Sample
FE
Mean

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include City FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01

Table A.3.6: Difference in Differences Regressions, 1940-2010
Pre: 1940-1970; Post: 1980-2010

Post70 X Redlined
Post-1970
Redlined
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

(1)
Log Total Units

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. Black

(4)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.171∗∗∗
(0.039)
-0.094∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.018
(0.040)

-0.190∗∗∗
(0.036)
-0.691∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.028
(0.046)

-0.038∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.231∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.051∗∗∗
(0.015)

0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.065∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.032∗∗∗
(0.011)

12325
0.176
Border Tracts
7.28

12330
0.248
Border Tracts
9.22

12327
0.412
Border Tracts
.34

12320
0.201
Border Tracts
.4

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include controls, border segment FE, city-by-year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table A.3.7: Difference in Differences Regressions, 1940-2010
Coefficients Relative to 1940 (omitted)
(1)
Log Total Units

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. Black

(4)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.052)
-0.248∗∗∗
(0.057)
-0.265∗∗∗
(0.065)
-0.285∗∗∗
(0.068)
-0.283∗∗∗
(0.070)
0.114∗
(0.058)
0.159∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.060∗∗∗
(0.016)
-0.027
(0.018)
-0.063∗∗∗
(0.018)
-0.150∗∗∗
(0.019)

-0.220∗∗∗
(0.046)
-0.276∗∗∗
(0.051)
-0.291∗∗∗
(0.059)
-0.308∗∗∗
(0.059)
-0.324∗∗∗
(0.062)
0.136∗∗
(0.062)
-0.134∗∗∗
(0.012)
-0.371∗∗∗
(0.014)
-0.495∗∗∗
(0.016)
-0.519∗∗∗
(0.016)
-0.654∗∗∗
(0.017)

-0.007
(0.017)
-0.027
(0.019)
-0.037∗
(0.019)
-0.047∗∗
(0.018)
-0.056∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.055∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.205∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.228∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.251∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.323∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.357∗∗∗
(0.005)

0.006
(0.005)
0.012∗∗
(0.006)
0.014∗∗
(0.005)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.006)
-0.035∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.081∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.040∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.008∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.068∗∗∗
(0.002)

12325
0.180
Border Tracts
7.28

12330
0.252
Border Tracts
9.22

12327
0.412
Border Tracts
.34

12320
0.201
Border Tracts
.4

Redlined X 1970
Redlined X 1980
Redlined X 1990
Redlined X 2000
Redlined X 2010
Redlined
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include controls, City-by-Year FE, Border Segment FE, and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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Table A.3.8: Effects of Redlining – Triple Difference with Percent Black in 1940
Pre: 1940; Post: 1970

Post40 X Redlined
Post-1940
Redlined
Post40 X Redlined X 1-10 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post40 X Redlined X 10-25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post40 X Redlined X >25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Redlined X 1-10 Pct.Blk in ’40
Redlined X 10-25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Redlined X >25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post40 X 1-10 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post40 X 10-25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post40 X >25 Pct.Blk in ’40
1-10 Pct.Blk in ’40
10-25 Pct.Blk in ’40
>25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

(1)
Log Total Units

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.143∗∗
(0.067)
0.232∗∗∗
(0.032)
0.010
(0.078)
-0.111
(0.106)
-0.102
(0.122)
-0.115
(0.203)
0.153
(0.104)
-0.085
(0.127)
-0.031
(0.136)
-0.087
(0.063)
-0.159∗
(0.095)
0.059
(0.190)
-0.063
(0.082)
0.213∗
(0.113)
0.276∗
(0.160)

-0.169∗∗∗
(0.055)
-0.029
(0.035)
-0.039
(0.074)
-0.083
(0.096)
-0.089
(0.119)
-0.027
(0.225)
0.268∗∗
(0.117)
-0.046
(0.126)
0.271
(0.244)
-0.146∗∗
(0.067)
-0.194∗
(0.104)
-0.060
(0.186)
-0.047
(0.084)
0.295∗
(0.147)
0.111
(0.221)

0.004
(0.007)
0.093∗∗∗
(0.005)
-0.025∗
(0.014)
0.018∗
(0.009)
-0.014
(0.020)
-0.051∗∗
(0.025)
-0.024
(0.015)
0.017
(0.027)
-0.003
(0.043)
-0.024∗∗
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.019)
0.055∗∗∗
(0.019)
-0.013
(0.009)
-0.045∗∗
(0.017)
-0.047
(0.031)

4106
0.186
Border Tracts
7.26

4110
0.222
Border Tracts
9.38

4101
0.287
Border Tracts
.38

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include controls, City-by-Year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01

A.3.3. Heterogeneous Effects:
Triple Difference by Initial Share of Black Residents
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Table A.3.9: Effects of Repeal – Triple Difference with Percent Black in 1940
Pre: 1940-1970; Post: 1980-2010

Post70 X Redlined
Post-1970
Redlined
Post70 X Redlined X 1-10 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post70 X Redlined X 10-25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post70 X Redlined X >25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Redlined X 1-10 Pct.Blk in ’40
Redlined X 10-25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Redlined X >25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post70 X 1-10 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post70 X 10-25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Post70 X >25 Pct.Blk in ’40
1-10 Pct.Blk in ’40
10-25 Pct.Blk in ’40
>25 Pct.Blk in ’40
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

(1)
Log Total Units

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.105∗∗
(0.046)
-0.112∗∗∗
(0.022)
-0.004
(0.052)
-0.087
(0.072)
-0.030
(0.088)
-0.217∗
(0.129)
0.088
(0.084)
-0.157
(0.111)
0.029
(0.100)
-0.067
(0.042)
-0.205∗∗∗
(0.070)
0.027
(0.113)
-0.064
(0.072)
0.216∗∗
(0.095)
0.292∗∗
(0.144)

-0.127∗∗∗
(0.039)
-0.598∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.046
(0.049)
-0.068
(0.062)
0.038
(0.082)
-0.174
(0.141)
0.214∗∗
(0.097)
-0.138
(0.093)
0.324∗
(0.193)
-0.110∗∗
(0.044)
-0.270∗∗∗
(0.068)
-0.061
(0.113)
-0.078
(0.073)
0.294∗∗∗
(0.103)
0.063
(0.202)

0.009∗
(0.005)
-0.077∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.024∗
(0.013)
0.000
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.012)
-0.025
(0.023)
-0.011
(0.016)
0.022
(0.027)
-0.017
(0.041)
0.015∗∗
(0.007)
0.028∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.051∗∗
(0.021)
-0.028∗∗
(0.011)
-0.056∗∗∗
(0.016)
-0.038
(0.029)

12325
0.183
Border Tracts
7.28

12330
0.253
Border Tracts
9.22

12320
0.205
Border Tracts
.4

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include controls, City-by-Year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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A.3.4. Robustness: Redlining in Homogeneous White Neighborhoods
Figure A.3.1: Effects of Redlining and Repeal, 1940-2010
All Red-Yellow Border Tracts (L) vs Border Tracts With No Black Residents in 1940 (R)
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A.3.5. Robustness: Border Segment FE vs. Matched Pair FE
Table A.3.10: Effects of Redlining - Pre: 1940; Post: 1970
Log Total Units
(1)
(2)
Border Segment FE Matched Pair FE
-0.198∗∗∗
(0.051)
0.159∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.043
(0.058)

-0.043
(0.032)
-0.061∗∗∗
(0.022)
-0.043
(0.030)

-0.220∗∗∗
(0.045)
-0.134∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.046
(0.065)

-0.063∗
(0.035)
-0.356∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.070∗
(0.036)

4106
0.180
Border Tracts
7.26

1830
0.169
Nearest Match
7.26

4110
0.217
Border Tracts
9.38

1830
0.195
Nearest Match
9.65

Post40 X Redlined
Post-1940
Redlined
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

Log Pop/sqmi
(3)
(4)
Border Segment FE Matched Pair FE

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include controls, city-by-year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01

Table A.3.11: Effects of Repeal - Pre: 1940-1970; Post: 1980-2010
Log Total Units
(1)
(2)
Border Segment FE Matched Pair FE
-0.171∗∗∗
(0.039)
-0.180∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.018
(0.040)

-0.069∗∗
(0.026)
-0.617∗∗∗
(0.017)
-0.037
(0.026)

-0.190∗∗∗
(0.036)
-0.395∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.028
(0.046)

-0.085∗∗∗
(0.029)
-1.108∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.060∗
(0.033)

12325
0.176
Border Tracts
7.28

5490
0.259
Nearest Match
7.2

12330
0.248
Border Tracts
9.22

5490
0.425
Nearest Match
9.4

Post70 X Redlined
Post-1970
Redlined
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

Log Pop/sqmi
(3)
(4)
Border Segment FE Matched Pair FE

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include controls, city-by-year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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A.3.6. Robustness: Subsample of Neighborhoods with Over 75% Coverage
Table A.3.12: Effects of Redlining - Pre: 1940; Post: 1970

Post40 X Redlined
Post-1940
Redlined

(1)
Log Total Units

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. Black

(4)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.178∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.139∗∗∗
(0.032)
0.045
(0.035)

-0.199∗∗∗
(0.037)
-0.085∗∗
(0.040)
0.073∗
(0.037)

0.009
(0.043)
0.307∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.089∗∗∗
(0.030)

-0.004
(0.009)
0.059∗∗∗
(0.016)
-0.039∗∗∗
(0.014)

1496
0.093
7.17

1496
0.216
9.80

1496
0.405
.24

1496
0.261
.35

Observations
R2
Mean
Standard errors in parentheses

All specifications include controls, border segment FE, city-by-year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01

Table A.3.13: Effects of Repeal - Pre: 1940-1970; Post: 1980-2010

Post70 X Redlined
Post-1970
Redlined

(1)
Log Total Units

(2)
Log Pop/sqmi

(3)
Pct. Black

(4)
Pct. OwnerOcc

-0.189∗∗∗
(0.024)
-0.047
(0.042)
0.066
(0.047)

-0.231∗∗∗
(0.032)
-0.302∗∗∗
(0.077)
0.118∗∗∗
(0.042)

-0.044∗
(0.022)
0.265∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.123∗∗∗
(0.042)

0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.017∗
(0.009)
-0.046∗∗∗
(0.016)

4488
0.174
7.08

4488
0.244
9.53

4488
0.252
.4

4488
0.119
.37

Observations
R2
Mean
Standard errors in parentheses

All specifications include controls, border segment FE, city-by-year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01
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A.3.7. Race in Border Tracts vs. All Red and Yellow Tracts
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Figure A.3.2: Red-Yellow Border Tracts (L) vs All Red and Yellow Tracts (R)
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Yellow

A.3.8. Boundary Analysis for Other HOLC Grade Combinations
Figure A.3.3: Yellow (Grade C) vs. Blue (Grade B) Border Tracts
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A.3.9. Segregation and White Flight
The following subsection focuses specifically on racial segregation and movement across
Grade D and Grade C tracts from 1940 through 2010. Importantly, the data are a panel
of census tracts without migration in or outflow data; I of course cannot track individuals’ movement over time. Table A.3.14 presents difference-in-differences results for border
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Figure A.3.4: Blue (Grade B) vs. Green (Grade A) Border Tracts
11000

Population Density

1000

7000

1500

Housing Units
2000
2500

Population Per Square Mile
8000
9000
10000

3000

Housing Units

1940

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

1940

1970

Year

1980

1990

2000

2010

Year

Blue (2nd Graded)

Green (1st Graded)

Blue (2nd Graded)

Controls for Border Segment and City−Year FE

Green (1st Graded)

Controls for Border Segment and City−Year FE

Homeownership Rate

0

.55

.1

Pct. Black
.2

.3

Pct. Owner Occupied
.6
.65

.7

.4

Pct. Black

1940

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

1940

1970

Year
Blue (2nd Graded)

Green (1st Graded)

Blue (2nd Graded)

Controls for Border Segment and City−Year FE

1990

2000

2010

Green (1st Graded)

Controls for Border Segment and City−Year FE

Number of White Residents

White Residents
4000
5000
6000

0

3000

Black Residents
500
1000
1500

7000

Number of Black Residents

2000

1980
Year

1940

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

1940

1970

Year
Blue (2nd Graded)

1980

1990

2000

Year
Green (1st Graded)

Blue (2nd Graded)

Controls for Border Segment and City−Year FE

Controls for Border Segment and City−Year FE

148

Green (1st Graded)

2010

Figure A.3.5: Red (Grade D) vs. Blue (Grade B) Border Tracts
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2010

neighborhoods between 1940 and 1970. During this time period, HOLC redlining had no
differential impact on neighborhood’s share of black or white residents, or the number of
black residents. In other words, tracts on the red-yellow boundary remained about as
racially segregated between 1940 and 1970. Redlining does, however, seem to have a differential effect on the number of white residents, as the implementation of the HOLC policy
is associated with almost 1,100 fewer white people (about 22 percent of the mean of white
residents per tract) residing in credit-restricted areas in 1970 compared to 1940. There is no
effect on the shares due to the overall population decline in these areas (see Table 5 column
2 or the top-right of Figure 7), which column 4 confirms is wholly driven by the exodus of
white residents in border areas.
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Table A.3.14: Effect of Redlining on Neighborhood Racial Composition: 1940-1970

Post40 X Redlined
Post-1940
Redlined
Observations
R2
Sample
Mean

(1)
Pct. Black

(2)
Black Pop

(3)
Pct.White

(4)
White Pop

-0.008
(0.016)
0.205∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.036∗∗∗
(0.011)

-180.006
(179.373)
586.720∗∗∗
(48.920)
326.953∗∗∗
(71.950)

0.006
(0.016)
-0.209∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.017∗
(0.009)

-1093.845∗∗
(412.367)
-484.801∗∗∗
(112.464)
-21.734
(287.750)

4108
0.373
Border Only
.19

4110
0.229
Border Only
1088.7

4108
0.474
Border Only
.8

4110
0.129
Border Only
5078.41

Standard errors in parentheses
All specifications include controls, border segment FE, city-by-year FE and cluster SEs at city level
∗

p < .10,

∗∗

p < .05,

∗∗∗

p < .01

Figure A.3.6 tracks the effects of HOLC redlining and its repeal (in 1977, marked by the
vertical red line) on border neighborhood racial composition from 1940 through 2010. The
panels on the left side are difference-in-differences predicted estimates for tracts bordering
the Red-Yellow boundary line, while the graphs on the right include all tracts within a
half-mile radius of the border. Both sets of estimates control for tract level observables in
1940, border segment fixed effects, and city-by-year interacted fixed effects (as is standard
in the preferred specification throughout this paper).2
The figures in the first row show results for the number of black residents. Both left and
right panels tell a similar story: between 1940 and 1970, the black population increased at
a similar rate in both red and yellow graded neighborhoods close to the HOLC boundary.
Importantly, there were always more black residents in the redlined areas than the control
neighborhoods. After redlining was made formally illegal in the mid-1970s, the number of
black families living in redlined areas dropped precipitously, from about 1,100 in redlined
border tracts in 1970 to about 700 in those same areas in 1980. The number of black
residents equalized on either side of the boundary, as the black and red-dotted lines in the
top left figure are nearly identical from 1980 through 2010. When redlining became illegal,
2

For tracts within a half-mile radius but not on the boundary line itself, I identify the closest border line
segment and use that in the fixed effect.
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perhaps black families living in credit-restricted areas for the first time were able to secure
housing in higher quality urban and/or suburban areas without being discriminated against.
It does not appear that black families simply moved across the red-yellow boundary after
1977.
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!
Figure A.3.6: Effect of Redlining and Repeal on Racial Composition, 1940-2010
Red-Yellow Border Tracts (L) vs Tracts Within 0.5 Miles of Red-Yellow Border (R)
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The panels in the second row show that the number of white residents in redlined areas declined in each decade from 1940 through 2010. This trend is consistent with the
white flight of families living in crowded, urban, mixed-race neighborhoods moving to more
sparsely populated neighborhoods in the post-War period. The white population in boundary yellow-graded areas fell between 1940 and 1970; but over the same period, the white
population living in yellow-graded areas within 0.5 miles of the boundary actually increased
(bottom right figure). This suggests that white migration out of redlined areas may have
been more gradual: first from border neighborhoods to tracts not adjacent to the boundary
and then to suburban areas after 1970. Notice the white population in yellow-graded areas
within a half mile of the red-yellow boundary does not actually begin to decline until after
mortgage lending discrimination becomes illegal in 1977.
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A.4. New Wharton Index: Appendix Tables
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Table A.4.1: What Does it Mean to Be Lightly, Moderately, or Highly Regulated?
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Table A.4.2: WRLURI2006 Results, Major Metropolitan Areas

Note: Reprint of Table 11 from Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008).

156

Table A.4.3: Weighting Analysis – Survey Response Summary Statistics
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